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The Synthesis Report (SYR) distils and integrates the findings of the 
three Working Group contributions to the Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the 
most comprehensive assessment of climate change undertaken thus 
far by the IPCC: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis; Cli-
mate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability; and Clima-
te Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. The SYR also incorpo-
rates the findings of two special reports on Renewable Energy Sources 
and Climate Change Mitigation (2011) and on Managing the Risks of 
Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation 
(2011). 
The SYR confirms that human influence on the climate system is clear 
and growing, with impacts observed across all continents and oceans. 
Many of the observed changes since the 1950s are unprecedented over 
decades to millennia. The IPCC is now 95 percent certain that humans 
are the main cause of current global warming. In addition, the SYR finds 
that the more human activities disrupt the climate, the greater the risks 
of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems, 
and long-lasting changes in all components of the climate system. The 
SYR highlights that we have the means to limit climate change and 
its risks, with many solutions that allow for continued economic and 
human development. However, stabilizing temperature increase to 
below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels will require an urgent and 
fundamental departure from business as usual. Moreover, the longer we 
wait to take action, the more it will cost and the greater the technologi-
cal, economic, social and institutional challenges we will face.
These and the other findings of the SYR have undoubtedly and consi-
derably enhanced our understanding of some of the most critical issues 
in relation to climate change: the role of greenhouse gas emissions; the 
severity of potential risks and impacts, especially for the least develo-
ped countries and vulnerable communities, given their limited ability 
to cope; and the options available to us and their underlying require-
ments to ensure that the effects of climate change remain manageable. 
As such, the SYR calls for the urgent attention of both policymakers 
and citizens of the world to tackle this challenge.
The timing of the SYR, which was released on 2nd November 2014 in 
Copenhagen, was crucial. Policymakers met in December 2014 in Lima 
at the 20th Conference of Parties under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to prepare the groundwork 
for the 21st Session in 2015 in Paris, when they have been tasked with 
concluding a new agreement to deal with climate change. It is our 
hope that the scientific findings of the SYR will be the basis of their 
motivation to find the way to a global agreement which can keep cli-
mate change to a manageable level, as the SYR gives us the knowledge 
to make informed choices, and enhances our vital understanding of the 
rationale for action – and the serious implications of inaction. Ignoran-
ce can no longer be an excuse for tergiversation. 
As an intergovernmental body jointly established in 1988 by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme (UNEP), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has provided policymakers with the most authoritative 
and objective scientific and technical assessments in this field. Begin-
ning in 1990, this series of IPCC Assessment Reports, Special Reports, 
Technical Papers, Methodology Reports and other products have 
become standard works of reference.
The SYR was made possible thanks to the voluntary work, dedication 
and commitment of thousands of experts and scientists from around 
the globe, representing a range of views and disciplines. We would 
like to express our deep gratitude to all the members of the Core Wri-
ting Team of the SYR, members of the Extended Writing Team, and the 
Review Editors, all of whom enthusiastically took on the huge chal-
lenge of producing an outstanding SYR on top of the other tasks they 
had already committed to during the AR5 cycle. We would also like 
to thank the staff of the Technical Support Unit of the SYR and the 
IPCC Secretariat for their dedication in organizing the production of 
this IPCC report. 
We also wish to acknowledge and thank the governments of the IPCC 
member countries for their support of scientists in developing this 
report, and for their contributions to the IPCC Trust Fund to provide 
the essentials for participation of experts from developing countries 
and countries with economies in transition. We would like to express 
our appreciation to the government of Wallonia (Belgium) for hosting 
the Scoping Meeting of the SYR, to the governments of Norway, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Malaysia for hosting drafting Sessions of 
the SYR, and to the government of Denmark for hosting the Fortieth 
Session of the IPCC where the SYR was approved. The generous financi-
al support from the governments of Norway and the Netherlands, from 
the Korea Energy Economics Institute, and the in-kind support by the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and The Energy and 
Resources Institute, New Delhi (India), enabled the smooth operation of 
the Technical Support Unit of the SYR. This is gratefully acknowledged.
We would particularly like to express our thanks to Dr Rajendra K. 
Pachauri, Chairman of the IPCC, for his leadership and constant gui-











The Synthesis Report (SYR), constituting the final product of the Fifth 
Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), is published under the title Climate Change 2014. This 
report distils, synthesizes and integrates the key findings of the three 
Working Group contributions – The Physical Science Basis, Impacts, 
Adaptation, and Vulnerability and Mitigation of Climate Change – to 
the AR5 in a concise document for the benefit of decision makers in 
the government, the private sector as well as the public at large. The 
SYR also draws on the findings of the two Special Reports brought out 
in 2011 dealing with Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change 
Mitigation, and Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation. The SYR, therefore, is a compre-
hensive up-to-date compilation of assessments dealing with climate 
change, based on the most recent scientific, technical and socio-eco-
nomic literature in the field.
Scope of the Report
This document is the result of coordinated and carefully connected 
cross working group efforts to ensure coherent and comprehensive in-
formation on various aspects related to climate change. This SYR inclu-
des a consistent evaluation and assessment of uncertainties and risks; 
integrated costing and economic analysis; regional aspects; changes, 
impacts and responses related to water and earth systems, the car-
bon cycle including ocean acidification, cryosphere and sea level rise; 
as well as treatment of mitigation and adaptation options within the 
framework of sustainable development. Through the entire length of 
the SYR, information is also provided relevant to Article 2, the ultima-
te objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).
Other aspects of climate change covered in this report include direct 
impacts of climate change on natural systems as well as both direct 
and indirect impacts on human systems, such as human health, food 
security and security of societal conditions. By embedding climate 
change risk and issues of adaptation and mitigation within the frame-
work of sustainable development, the SYR also highlights the fact that 
nearly all systems on this planet would be affected by the impacts 
of a changing climate, and that it is not possible to draw boundaries 
around climate change, its associated risks and impacts on the one 
hand and on the other, development which meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future gene-
rations to meet their own needs. The Report, therefore, also focuses 
on connections between these aspects and provides information on 
how climate change overlaps with and mainstreams into other deve-
lopmental issues.
Structure
The Report comprises a Summary for Policymakers (SPM) and a longer 
report from which the SPM is derived, as well as annexes. Even though 
the SPM follows a structure and sequence similar to that in the longer 
report, some specific issues covered under more than one topic of the 
longer report are summarized in one particular section of the SPM. 
Each paragraph of the SPM contains references to the respective text 
in the longer report. In turn, the latter contains extensive references to 
relevant chapters of the underlying Working Group Reports or the two 
Special Reports mentioned above. The SYR is essentially self-contained, 
and its SPM includes the most policy relevant material drawn from the 
longer report and the entire AR5.
All the three contributions to the AR5 including each Summary for 
Policymakers, each Technical Summary, frequently asked questions as 
well as the Synthesis Report in all official UN languages are availa-
ble online on the IPCC website and in electronic offline versions. In 
these electronic versions, references in the SYR to relevant parts of 
the underlying material are provided as hyperlinks, thereby enabling 
the reader to easily find further scientific, technical and socio-econo-
mic information. A user guide, glossary of terms used and listing of 
acronyms, authors, Review Editors and Expert Reviewers are provided 
in the annexes to this report.
To facilitate access to the findings of the SYR for a wide readership 
and to enhance their usability for stakeholders, each section of the 
SPM carries highlighted headline statements. Taken together, these 21 
headline statements provide an overarching summary in simple and 
completely non-technical language for easy assimilation by readers 
from different walks of life. These headline statements have been craf-
ted by the authors of the Report, and approved by the member gover-
nments of the IPCC.
The longer report is structured around four topic headings as manda-
ted by the Panel:
Observed changes and their causes (Topic 1) integrates new informati-
on from the three Working Groups on observed changes in the climate 
system, including changes in the atmosphere, oceans, cryosphere and 
sea level; recent and past drivers and human influences affecting emis-
sion drivers; observed impacts, including changes in extreme weather 
and climate events; and attribution of climate changes and impacts. 
Future climate changes, risks and impacts (Topic 2) presents informa- 
tion about future climate change, risks and impacts. It integrates infor-
mation about key drivers of future climate, the relationship between 
cumulative emissions and temperature change, and projected changes 
in the climate system in the 21st century and beyond. It assesses future 
risks and impacts caused by a changing climate and the interaction of 
climate-related and other hazards. It provides information about long-
term changes including sea-level rise and ocean acidification, and the 
risk of irreversible and abrupt changes. 
Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Deve-
lopment (Topic 3) addresses future pathways for adaptation and mi-
tigation as complementary strategies for reducing and managing the 
risks of climate change and assesses their interaction with sustainable 







on-making and differences in risks of climate change, adaptation and 
mitigation in terms of timescale, magnitude and persistence. It ana-
lyses the characteristics of adaptation and mitigation pathways, and 
associated challenges, limits and benefits, including for different levels 
of future warming.
Adaptation and Mitigation (Topic 4) brings together information from 
Working Groups II and III on specific adaptation and mitigation opti-
ons, including environmentally sound technologies and infrastructure, 
sustainable livelihoods, behaviour and lifestyle choices. It describes 
common enabling factors and constraints, and policy approaches, fi-
nance and technology on which effective response measures depend. 
It shows opportunities for integrated responses and links adaptation 
and mitigation with other societal objectives.
Process
The SYR of the AR5 of the IPCC has been prepared in accordance with 
the procedures of the IPCC to ensure adequate effort and rigor being 
achieved in the process. For the AR5 the preparation of the SYR was 
taken in hand a year earlier than was the case with the Fourth As-
sessment Report (AR4) – while the Working Group Reports were still 
being completed – with a view to enhancing integration and ensuring 
adequate synthesis. A scoping meeting specifically for proposing the 
detailed outline of the AR5 Synthesis Report was held in Liège, Bel-
gium in August, 2010, and the outline produced in that meeting was 
approved by the Panel in October, 2010 in Busan, Republic of Korea. 
In accordance with IPCC procedures, the IPCC Chair in consultation 
with the Co-Chairs of the Working Groups nominated authors for the 
Core Writing Team (CWT) of the SYR and a total of 45 CWT members 
and 9 Review Editors were selected and accepted by the IPCC Bureau 
in March, 2012. In addition, 14 Extended Writing Team (EWT) authors 
were selected by the CWT with the approval of the Chair of the IPCC, 
and this latter group contributed substantially to the material and the 
text provided in this report. During evolution of the contents of the SYR 
the IPCC Bureau was approached and it approved the inclusion of 6 
additional CWT members and an additional Review Editor. This further 
enhanced and deepened the expertise required for the preparation of 
the Report. The final draft report which has undergone a combined 
review by experts and governments was submitted to the 40th Session 
of the IPCC, held from 27 October to 1 November 2014 in Copenha-
gen, Denmark, where governments approved the SPM line by line and 
adopted the longer report section by section. 
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Stephen H. Schneider 
(11 February 1945 – 19 July 2010)
The Synthesis Report of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is dedicated to 
the memory of Stephen H. Schneider, one of the foremost climate scientists of our time.
Steve Schneider, born in New York, trained as a plasma physicist, embraced scholarship in the field of climate science almost 40 
years ago and continued his relentless efforts creating new knowledge in the field and informing policymakers and the public at 
large on the growing problem of climate change and solutions for dealing with it. At all times Steve Schneider remained intrepid 
and forthright in expressing his views. His convictions were driven by the strength of his outstanding scientific expertise. He was 
highly respected as Founding Editor of the interdisciplinary journal Climatic Change and authored hundreds of books and papers, 
many of which were co-authored with scientists from diverse disciplines. His association with the IPCC began with the First 
Assessment Report which was published in 1990, and which played a major role in the scientific foundation of the UN Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change. Subsequently, he was Lead Author, Coordinating Lead Author and Expert Reviewer for 
various Assessment Reports and a member of the Core Writing Team for the Synthesis Report of the Fourth Assessment Report. 
His life and accomplishments have inspired and motivated members of the Core Writing Team of this Report. Steve Schneider’s 
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This Synthesis Report is based on the reports of the three Working Groups of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), including relevant Special Reports. It provides an integrated view of climate change as the final part of the IPCC’s 
Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).
This summary follows the structure of the longer report which addresses the following topics: Observed changes and their 
causes; Future climate change, risks and impacts; Future pathways for adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development; 
Adaptation and mitigation.
In the Synthesis Report, the certainty in key assessment findings is communicated as in the Working Group Reports and 
Special Reports. It is based on the author teams’ evaluations of underlying scientific understanding and is expressed as a 
qualitative level of confidence (from very low to very high) and, when possible, probabilistically with a quantified likelihood 
(from exceptionally unlikely to virtually certain)1. Where appropriate, findings are also formulated as statements of fact with-
out using uncertainty qualifiers.
This report includes information relevant to Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC).
SPM 1.  Observed Changes and their Causes
Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of green-
house gases are the highest in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts 
on human and natural systems. {1}
SPM 1.1  Observed changes in the climate system
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the observed 
changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmosphere and ocean have 
warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen. {1.1}
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850. The 
period from 1983 to 2012 was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years in the Northern Hemisphere, where 
such assessment is possible (medium confidence). The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature data 
as calculated by a linear trend show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 to 1.06] °C 2 over the period 1880 to 2012, when multiple 
independently produced datasets exist (Figure SPM.1a). {1.1.1, Figure 1.1}
In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, the globally averaged surface temperature exhibits substantial decadal and 
interannual variability (Figure SPM.1a). Due to this natural variability, trends based on short records are very sensitive to the 
beginning and end dates and do not in general reflect long-term climate trends. As one example, the rate of warming over 
  
1 Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an 
assignment of confidence. The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium or high. A level of 
confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. The follow-
ing terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, 
likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely 
likely 95–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, more unlikely than likely 0–<50%, extremely unlikely 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. 
Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely. See for more details: Mastrandrea, M.D., C.B. Field, T.F. Stocker, O. Edenhofer, K.L. Ebi, D.J. Frame, 
H. Held, E. Kriegler, K.J. Mach, P.R. Matschoss, G.-K. Plattner, G.W. Yohe and F.W. Zwiers, 2010: Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assess-
ment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Geneva, Switzerland, 4 pp.
2 Ranges in square brackets or following ‘±’ are expected to have a 90% likelihood of including the value that is being estimated, unless otherwise 
stated.
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Globally averaged greenhouse gas concentrations
Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions
Quantitative information of CH4 and N2O emission time series from 1850 to 1970 is limited 
Figure SPM.1 |  The complex relationship between the observations (panels a, b, c, yellow background) and the emissions (panel d, 
light blue background) is addressed in Section 1.2 and Topic 1. Observations and other indicators of a changing global climate system. Observa-
tions: (a) Annually and globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005. 
Colours indicate different data sets. (b) Annually and globally averaged sea level change relative to the average over the period 1986 to 2005 in the 
longest-running dataset. Colours indicate different data sets. All datasets are aligned to have the same value in 1993, the first year of satellite altimetry 
data (red). Where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured shading. (c) Atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide 
(CO2, green), methane (CH4, orange) and nitrous oxide (N2O, red) determined from ice core data (dots) and from direct atmospheric measurements (lines). 
Indicators: (d) Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions from forestry and other land use as well as from burning of fossil fuel, cement production and flaring. 
Cumulative emissions of CO2 from these sources and their uncertainties are shown as bars and whiskers, respectively, on the right hand side. The global 
effects of the accumulation of CH4 and N2O emissions are shown in panel c. Greenhouse gas emission data from 1970 to 2010 are shown in Figure SPM.2. 




the past 15 years (1998–2012; 0.05 [–0.05 to 0.15] °C per decade), which begins with a strong El Niño, is smaller than the 
rate calculated since 1951 (1951–2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] °C per decade). {1.1.1, Box 1.1}
Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy 
accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (high confidence), with only about 1% stored in the atmosphere. On a global scale, 
the ocean warming is largest near the surface, and the upper 75 m warmed by 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade over the 
period 1971 to 2010. It is virtually certain that the upper ocean (0−700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it likely warmed 
between the 1870s and 1971. {1.1.2, Figure 1.2}
Averaged over the mid-latitude land areas of the Northern Hemisphere, precipitation has increased since 1901 (medium 
confidence before and high confidence after 1951). For other latitudes, area-averaged long-term positive or negative trends 
have low confidence. Observations of changes in ocean surface salinity also provide indirect evidence for changes in the 
global water cycle over the ocean (medium confidence). It is very likely that regions of high salinity, where evaporation dom-
inates, have become more saline, while regions of low salinity, where precipitation dominates, have become fresher since 
the 1950s. {1.1.1, 1.1.2}
Since the beginning of the industrial era, oceanic uptake of CO2 has resulted in acidification of the ocean; the pH of ocean 
surface water has decreased by 0.1 (high confidence), corresponding to a 26% increase in acidity, measured as hydrogen ion 
concentration. {1.1.2}
Over the period 1992 to 2011, the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass (high confidence), likely at a 
larger rate over 2002 to 2011. Glaciers have continued to shrink almost worldwide (high confidence). Northern Hemisphere 
spring snow cover has continued to decrease in extent (high confidence). There is high confidence that permafrost tempera-
tures have increased in most regions since the early 1980s in response to increased surface temperature and changing snow 
cover. {1.1.3}
The annual mean Arctic sea-ice extent decreased over the period 1979 to 2012, with a rate that was very likely in the range 
3.5 to 4.1% per decade. Arctic sea-ice extent has decreased in every season and in every successive decade since 1979, with 
the most rapid decrease in decadal mean extent in summer (high confidence). It is very likely that the annual mean Antarctic 
sea-ice extent increased in the range of 1.2 to 1.8% per decade between 1979 and 2012. However, there is high confidence 
that there are strong regional differences in Antarctica, with extent increasing in some regions and decreasing in others. 
{1.1.3, Figure 1.1}
Over the period 1901 to 2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 [0.17 to 0.21] m (Figure SPM.1b). The rate of sea level rise 
since the mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the previous two millennia (high confidence). {1.1.4, 
Figure 1.1}
SPM 1.2  Causes of climate change
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since the pre-industrial era have driven large increases in the atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) (Figure SPM.1c). Between 1750 and 2011, 
cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions to the atmosphere were 2040 ± 310 GtCO2. About 40% of these emissions have 
remained in the atmosphere (880 ± 35 GtCO2); the rest was removed from the atmosphere and stored on land (in plants and 
soils) and in the ocean. The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the emitted anthropogenic CO2, causing ocean acidification. 
About half of the anthropogenic CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in the last 40 years (high confidence) 
(Figure SPM.1d). {1.2.1, 1.2.2}
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have increased since the pre-industrial era, driven 
largely by economic and population growth, and are now higher than ever. This has led to atmo-
spheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in 
at least the last 800,000 years. Their effects, together with those of other anthropogenic driv-
ers, have been detected throughout the climate system and are extremely likely to have been 
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. {1.2, 1.3.1}
 Summary for Policymakers
5
SPM
Total anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases between 
2000 and 2010, despite a growing number of climate change mitigation policies. Anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2010 have 
reached 49 ± 4.5 GtCO2-eq/yr 3. Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes contributed about 78% 
of the total GHG emissions increase from 1970 to 2010, with a similar percentage contribution for the increase during the 
period 2000 to 2010 (high confidence) (Figure SPM.2). Globally, economic and population growth continued to be the most 
important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth between 
2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic growth has 
risen sharply. Increased use of coal has reversed the long-standing trend of gradual decarbonization (i.e., reducing the carbon 
intensity of energy) of the world’s energy supply (high confidence). {1.2.2}
The evidence for human influence on the climate system has grown since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4). It is 
extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was 
caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together. The best estimate 
of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period (Figure SPM.3). Anthro-
pogenic forcings have likely made a substantial contribution to surface temperature increases since the mid-20th century 
over every continental region except Antarctica4. Anthropogenic influences have likely affected the global water cycle since 
1960 and contributed to the retreat of glaciers since the 1960s and to the increased surface melting of the Greenland ice 
sheet since 1993. Anthropogenic influences have very likely contributed to Arctic sea-ice loss since 1979 and have very likely 
made a substantial contribution to increases in global upper ocean heat content (0–700 m) and to global mean sea level rise 
observed since the 1970s. {1.3, Figure 1.10}
3 Greenhouse gas emissions are quantified as CO2-equivalent (GtCO2-eq) emissions using weightings based on the 100-year Global Warming Potentials, 
using IPCC Second Assessment Report values unless otherwise stated. {Box 3.2}
4 For Antarctica, large observational uncertainties result in low confidence that anthropogenic forcings have contributed to the observed warming aver-
aged over available stations.
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Figure SPM.2 |  Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 
to 2010 by gases: CO2 from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide 
(N2O); fluorinated gases covered under the Kyoto Protocol (F-gases). Right hand side shows 2010 emissions, using alternatively CO2-equivalent emission 
weightings based on IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) and AR5 values. Unless otherwise stated, CO2-equivalent emissions in this report include the 
basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F-gases) calculated based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) values from the SAR (see Glos-
sary). Using the most recent GWP100 values from the AR5 (right-hand bars) would result in higher total annual GHG emissions (52 GtCO2-eq/yr) from an 




SPM 1.3  Impacts of climate change
In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on natural and human systems on 
all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespec-
tive of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human systems to changing climate. 
{1.3.2}
Evidence of observed climate change impacts is strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems. In many regions, 
changing precipitation or melting snow and ice are altering hydrological systems, affecting water resources in terms of 
quantity and quality (medium confidence). Many terrestrial, freshwater and marine species have shifted their geographic 
ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, abundances and species interactions in response to ongoing climate change 
(high confidence). Some impacts on human systems have also been attributed to climate change, with a major or minor 
contribution of climate change distinguishable from other influences (Figure SPM.4). Assessment of many studies covering 
a wide range of regions and crops shows that negative impacts of climate change on crop yields have been more common 
than positive impacts (high confidence). Some impacts of ocean acidification on marine organisms have been attributed to 





Contributions to observed surface temperature change over the period 1951–2010
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Figure SPM.3 |  Assessed likely ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming trends over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed greenhouse 
gases, other anthropogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of land use change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural 
forcings and natural internal climate variability (which is the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously within the climate system even in the 
absence of forcings). The observed surface temperature change is shown in black, with the 5 to 95% uncertainty range due to observational uncertainty. 
The attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution of an 
individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the combined anthropogenic forcings can be estimated with less uncertainty 
than the contributions from greenhouse gases and from other anthropogenic forcings separately. This is because these two contributions partially compen-
sate, resulting in a combined signal that is better constrained by observations. {Figure 1.9}
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SPM 1.4  Extreme events
Changes in many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 1950. 
Some of these changes have been linked to human influences, including a decrease in cold tem-
perature extremes, an increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in extreme high sea 
levels and an increase in the number of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions. {1.4}
It is very likely that the number of cold days and nights has decreased and the number of warm days and nights has increased 
on the global scale. It is likely that the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia. It is 
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POLAR REGIONS (Arctic and Antarctic)
Figure SPM.4 |  Based on the available scientific literature since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), there are substantially more impacts in recent 
decades now attributed to climate change. Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of climate change. Absence from the map of addi-
tional impacts attributed to climate change does not imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed impacts reflect a 
growing knowledge base, but publications are still limited for many regions, systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies. Symbols indicate 
categories of attributed impacts, the relative contribution of climate change (major or minor) to the observed impact and confidence in attribution. Each 
symbol refers to one or more entries in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related regional-scale impacts. Numbers in ovals indicate regional totals of climate 
change publications from 2001 to 2010, based on the Scopus bibliographic database for publications in English with individual countries mentioned in title, 
abstract or key words (as of July 2011). These numbers provide an overall measure of the available scientific literature on climate change across regions; 
they do not indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts in each region. Studies for polar regions and small islands 
are grouped with neighbouring continental regions. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific evidence criteria 
defined in WGII Chapter 18. Publications considered in the attribution analyses come from a broader range of literature assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII 




very likely that human influence has contributed to the observed global scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily 
temperature extremes since the mid-20th century. It is likely that human influence has more than doubled the probability of 
occurrence of heat waves in some locations. There is medium confidence that the observed warming has increased heat-re-
lated human mortality and decreased cold-related human mortality in some regions. {1.4}
There are likely more land regions where the number of heavy precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased. 
Recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation and discharge in some catchments implies greater risks of 
flooding at regional scale (medium confidence). It is likely that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced in storm 
surges) have increased since 1970, being mainly a result of rising mean sea level. {1.4}
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires, reveal significant 
vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many human systems to current climate variability (very high confi-
dence). {1.4}
SPM 2.  Future Climate Changes, Risks and Impacts
Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting chang-
es in all components of the climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive 
and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limiting climate change would require 
substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with adap-
tation, can limit climate change risks. {2}
SPM 2.1  Key drivers of future climate
Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean surface warming by the late 
21st century and beyond. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary over a wide range, 
depending on both socio-economic development and climate policy. {2.1}
Anthropogenic GHG emissions are mainly driven by population size, economic activity, lifestyle, energy use, land use patterns, 
technology and climate policy. The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), which are used for making projections 
based on these factors, describe four different 21st century pathways of GHG emissions and atmospheric concentrations, 
air pollutant emissions and land use. The RCPs include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two intermediate scenarios 
(RCP4.5 and RCP6.0) and one scenario with very high GHG emissions (RCP8.5). Scenarios without additional efforts to 
constrain emissions (’baseline scenarios’) lead to pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (Figure SPM.5a). RCP2.6 is 
representative of a scenario that aims to keep global warming likely below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. The RCPs 
are consistent with the wide range of scenarios in the literature as assessed by WGIII5. {2.1, Box 2.2, 4.3}
Multiple lines of evidence indicate a strong, consistent, almost linear relationship between cumulative CO2 emissions and 
projected global temperature change to the year 2100 in both the RCPs and the wider set of mitigation scenarios analysed 
in WGIII (Figure SPM.5b). Any given level of warming is associated with a range of cumulative CO2 emissions6, and therefore, 
e.g., higher emissions in earlier decades imply lower emissions later. {2.2.5, Table 2.2}
5 Roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios are categorized by CO2-equivalent concentration (CO2-eq) by 2100. The CO2-eq includes 
the forcing due to all GHGs (including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone), aerosols and albedo change.
6 Quantification of this range of CO2 emissions requires taking into account non-CO2 drivers.
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Figure SPM.5 |  (a) Emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) alone in the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (lines) and the associated scenario 
categories used in WGIII (coloured areas show 5 to 95% range). The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios published 
in the scientific literature and are defined on the basis of CO2-eq concentration levels (in ppm) in 2100. The time series of other greenhouse gas emissions 
are shown in Box 2.2, Figure 1. (b) Global mean surface temperature increase at the time global CO2 emissions reach a given net cumulative total, plotted 
as a function of that total, from various lines of evidence. Coloured plume shows the spread of past and future projections from a hierarchy of climate-
carbon cycle models driven by historical emissions and the four RCPs over all times out to 2100, and fades with the decreasing number of available models. 
Ellipses show total anthropogenic warming in 2100 versus cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 to 2100 from a simple climate model (median climate 
response) under the scenario categories used in WGIII. The width of the ellipses in terms of temperature is caused by the impact of different scenarios for 
non-CO2 climate drivers. The filled black ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 2000–2009 with associated 




Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming to less than 2°C relative to the period 1861–1880 with 
a probability of >66%7 would require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to remain below 
about 2900 GtCO2 (with a range of 2550 to 3150 GtCO2 depending on non-CO2 drivers). About 1900 GtCO28 had already been 
emitted by 2011. For additional context see Table 2.2. {2.2.5}
SPM 2.2 Projected changes in the climate system
Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st century under all assessed emission 
scenarios. It is very likely that heat waves will occur more often and last longer, and that 
extreme precipitation events will become more intense and frequent in many regions. The 
ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and global mean sea level to rise. {2.2}
The projected changes in Section SPM 2.2 are for 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005, unless otherwise indicated.
Future climate will depend on committed warming caused by past anthropogenic emissions, as well as future anthropogenic 
emissions and natural climate variability. The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 
1986–2005 is similar for the four RCPs and will likely be in the range 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence). This assumes that 
there will be no major volcanic eruptions or changes in some natural sources (e.g., CH4 and N2O), or unexpected changes in 
total solar irradiance. By mid-21st century, the magnitude of the projected climate change is substantially affected by the 
choice of emissions scenario. {2.2.1, Table 2.1}
Relative to 1850–1900, global surface temperature change for the end of the 21st century (2081–2100) is projected to likely 
exceed 1.5°C for RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence). Warming is likely to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 
(high confidence), more likely than not to exceed 2°C for RCP4.5 (medium confidence), but unlikely to exceed 2°C for RCP2.6 
(medium confidence). {2.2.1}
The increase of global mean surface temperature by the end of the 21st century (2081–2100) relative to 1986–2005 is likely 
to be 0.3°C to 1.7°C under RCP2.6, 1.1°C to 2.6°C under RCP4.5, 1.4°C to 3.1°C under RCP6.0 and 2.6°C to 4.8°C under 
RCP8.59. The Arctic region will continue to warm more rapidly than the global mean (Figure SPM.6a, Figure SPM.7a). {2.2.1, 
Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, Table 2.1}
It is virtually certain that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily 
and seasonal timescales, as global mean surface temperature increases. It is very likely that heat waves will occur with a 
higher frequency and longer duration. Occasional cold winter extremes will continue to occur. {2.2.1}
7 Corresponding figures for limiting warming to 2°C with a probability of >50% and >33% are 3000 GtCO2 (range of 2900 to 3200 GtCO2) and 3300 
GtCO2 (range of 2950 to 3800 GtCO2) respectively. Higher or lower temperature limits would imply larger or lower cumulative emissions respectively.
8 This corresponds to about two thirds of the 2900 GtCO2 that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >66%; to about 63% of the 
total amount of 3000 GtCO2 that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >50%; and to about 58% of the total amount of 3300 
GtCO2 that would limit warming to less than 2°C with a probability of >33%.
9 The period 1986–2005 is approximately 0.61 [0.55 to 0.67] °C warmer than 1850–1900. {2.2.1}
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Figure SPM.6 |  Global average surface temperature change (a) and global mean sea level rise10 (b) from 2006 to 2100 as determined by multi-model 
simulations. All changes are relative to 1986–2005. Time series of projections and a measure of uncertainty (shading) are shown for scenarios RCP2.6 
(blue) and RCP8.5 (red). The mean and associated uncertainties averaged over 2081–2100 are given for all RCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars at the 
right hand side of each panel. The number of Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) models used to calculate the multi-model mean is 
indicated. {2.2, Figure 2.1}
Changes in precipitation will not be uniform. The high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific are likely to experience an increase 
in annual mean precipitation under the RCP8.5 scenario. In many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions, mean precipi-
tation will likely decrease, while in many mid-latitude wet regions, mean precipitation will likely increase under the RCP8.5 
scenario (Figure SPM.7b). Extreme precipitation events over most of the mid-latitude land masses and over wet tropical 
regions will very likely become more intense and more frequent. {2.2.2, Figure 2.2}
The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century, with the strongest warming projected for the surface in 
tropical and Northern Hemisphere subtropical regions (Figure SPM.7a). {2.2.3, Figure 2.2}
10 Based on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic 
ice sheet, if initiated, could cause global mean sea level to rise substantially above the likely range during the 21st century. There is medium confidence 
that this additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a meter of sea level rise during the 21st century.
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Earth System Models project a global increase in ocean acidification for all RCP scenarios by the end of the 21st century, with 
a slow recovery after mid-century under RCP2.6. The decrease in surface ocean pH is in the range of 0.06 to 0.07 (15 to 17% 
increase in acidity) for RCP2.6, 0.14 to 0.15 (38 to 41%) for RCP4.5, 0.20 to 0.21 (58 to 62%) for RCP6.0 and 0.30 to 0.32 
(100 to 109%) for RCP8.5. {2.2.4, Figure 2.1}
Year-round reductions in Arctic sea ice are projected for all RCP scenarios. A nearly ice-free11 Arctic Ocean in the summer sea-
ice minimum in September before mid-century is likely for RCP8.512 (medium confidence). {2.2.3, Figure 2.1}
It is virtually certain that near-surface permafrost extent at high northern latitudes will be reduced as global mean surface 
temperature increases, with the area of permafrost near the surface (upper 3.5 m) projected to decrease by 37% (RCP2.6) to 
81% (RCP8.5) for the multi-model average (medium confidence). {2.2.3}
The global glacier volume, excluding glaciers on the periphery of Antarctica (and excluding the Greenland and Antarctic ice 
sheets), is projected to decrease by 15 to 55% for RCP2.6 and by 35 to 85% for RCP8.5 (medium confidence). {2.2.3}
11 When sea-ice extent is less than one million km2 for at least five consecutive years.
12 Based on an assessment of the subset of models that most closely reproduce the climatological mean state and 1979–2012 trend of the Arctic sea-ice 
extent.
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Figure SPM.7 |  Change in average surface temperature (a) and change in average precipitation (b) based on multi-model mean projections for 
2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005 under the RCP2.6 (left) and RCP8.5 (right) scenarios. The number of models used to calculate the multi-model mean 
is indicated in the upper right corner of each panel. Stippling (i.e., dots) shows regions where the projected change is large compared to natural internal 
variability and where at least 90% of models agree on the sign of change. Hatching (i.e., diagonal lines) shows regions where the projected change is less 
than one standard deviation of the natural internal variability. {2.2, Figure 2.2}
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There has been significant improvement in understanding and projection of sea level change since the AR4. Global mean sea 
level rise will continue during the 21st century, very likely at a faster rate than observed from 1971 to 2010. For the period 
2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005, the rise will likely be in the ranges of 0.26 to 0.55 m for RCP2.6, and of 0.45 to 0.82 m 
for RCP8.5 (medium confidence)10 (Figure SPM.6b). Sea level rise will not be uniform across regions. By the end of the 21st 
century, it is very likely that sea level will rise in more than about 95% of the ocean area. About 70% of the coastlines world-
wide are projected to experience a sea level change within ±20% of the global mean. {2.2.3}
SPM 2.3  Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate
Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human sys-
tems. Risks are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and 
communities in countries at all levels of development. {2.3}
Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and 
trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and 
magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the risk 
of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual 
regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting 
the rate and magnitude of climate change, including ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to 
trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with 
rising temperature (medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, 
including low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4}
A large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century, espe-
cially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally shift their 
geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; 
most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above 
in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the observation that natural global 
climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and species 
extinctions during the past millions of years. Marine organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and 
magnitudes of ocean acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes 
(medium confidence). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at 
risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). 
{2.3, 2.4, Figure 2.5}
Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the mid-21st 
century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversity reduction in sensitive regions will challenge 
the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize 
in tropical and temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local 
temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium 
confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food 
demand, would pose large risks to food security globally (high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable 
surface water and groundwater resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying 
competition for water among sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2}
13 Projected warming averaged over land is larger than global average warming for all RCP scenarios for the period 2081–2100 relative to 1986–2005. 
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Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already 
exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many 
regions and especially in developing countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high 
confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high temperature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is 
expected to compromise common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2}
In urban areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks 
from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scar-
city, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure 
and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2}
Climate change poses risks for food production
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Figure SPM.9 |  (a) Projected global redistribution of maximum catch potential of ~1000 exploited marine fish and invertebrate species. Projections 
compare the 10-year averages 2001–2010 and 2051–2060 using ocean conditions based on a single climate model under a moderate to high warming 
scenario, without analysis of potential impacts of overfishing or ocean acidification. (b) Summary of projected changes in crop yields (mostly wheat, maize, 
rice and soy), due to climate change over the 21st century. Data for each timeframe sum to 100%, indicating the percentage of projections showing yield 
increases versus decreases. The figure includes projections (based on 1090 data points) for different emission scenarios, for tropical and temperate regions 




Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and 
agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). 
{2.3.2}
Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic 
impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are 
projected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction more difficult, further erode food security and prolong 
existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confi-
dence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for understanding the risks of 
climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2}
Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack 
the resources for planned migration experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing coun-
tries with low income. Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers 
of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2}
SPM 2.4  Climate change beyond 2100, irreversibility and abrupt changes
Many aspects of climate change and associated impacts will continue for centuries, even if 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. The risks of abrupt or irreversible 
changes increase as the magnitude of the warming increases. {2.4}
Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios except RCP2.6. Surface temperatures will remain approximately 
constant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete cessation of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions. A large frac-
tion of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions is irreversible on a multi-century to millennial timescale, 
except in the case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sustained period. {2.4, Figure 2.8}
Stabilization of global average surface temperature does not imply stabilization for all aspects of the climate system. Shifting 
biomes, soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures and associated sea level rise all have their own intrinsic long timescales 
which will result in changes lasting hundreds to thousands of years after global surface temperature is stabilized. {2.1, 2.4}
There is high confidence that ocean acidification will increase for centuries if CO2 emissions continue, and will strongly affect 
marine ecosystems. {2.4}
It is virtually certain that global mean sea level rise will continue for many centuries beyond 2100, with the amount of rise 
dependent on future emissions. The threshold for the loss of the Greenland ice sheet over a millennium or more, and an asso-
ciated sea level rise of up to 7 m, is greater than about 1°C (low confidence) but less than about 4°C (medium confidence) 
of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt and irreversible ice loss from the Antarctic ice sheet is 
possible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make a quantitative assessment. {2.4}
Magnitudes and rates of climate change associated with medium- to high-emission scenarios pose an increased risk of 
abrupt and irreversible regional-scale change in the composition, structure and function of marine, terrestrial and freshwater 
ecosystems, including wetlands (medium confidence). A reduction in permafrost extent is virtually certain with continued rise 
in global temperatures. {2.4} 
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SPM 3.  Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development
Adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks 
of climate change. Substantial emissions reductions over the next few decades can reduce cli-
mate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase prospects for effective adaptation, reduce 
the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer term and contribute to climate-resilient 
pathways for sustainable development. {3.2, 3.3, 3.4}
SPM 3.1  Foundations of decision-making about climate change
Effective decision-making to limit climate change and its effects can be informed by a wide 
range of analytical approaches for evaluating expected risks and benefits, recognizing the 
importance of governance, ethical dimensions, equity, value judgments, economic assess-
ments and diverse perceptions and responses to risk and uncertainty. {3.1}
Sustainable development and equity provide a basis for assessing climate policies. Limiting the effects of climate change is 
necessary to achieve sustainable development and equity, including poverty eradication. Countries’ past and future contri-
butions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and countries also face varying challenges and circum-
stances and have different capacities to address mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation and adaptation raise issues of equity, 
justice and fairness. Many of those most vulnerable to climate change have contributed and contribute little to GHG emis-
sions. Delaying mitigation shifts burdens from the present to the future, and insufficient adaptation responses to emerging 
impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development. Comprehensive strategies in response to climate change 
that are consistent with sustainable development take into account the co-benefits, adverse side effects and risks that may 
arise from both adaptation and mitigation options. {3.1, 3.5, Box 3.4}
The design of climate policy is influenced by how individuals and organizations perceive risks and uncertainties and take 
them into account. Methods of valuation from economic, social and ethical analysis are available to assist decision-making. 
These methods can take account of a wide range of possible impacts, including low-probability outcomes with large conse-
quences. But they cannot identify a single best balance between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate impacts. {3.1}
Climate change has the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, because most GHGs accumulate 
over time and mix globally, and emissions by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. 
Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independently. Cooperative respons-
es, including international cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other cli-
mate change issues. The effectiveness of adaptation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, including 
international cooperation. The evidence suggests that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. 
{3.1}
SPM 3.2  Climate change risks reduced by mitigation and adaptation
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, 
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, wide-
spread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). Mitigation involves some level 
of co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side effects, but these risks do not involve the 
same possibility of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change, 
increasing the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts. {3.2, 3.4}
Mitigation and adaptation are complementary approaches for reducing risks of climate change impacts over different time-




impacts in the latter decades of the 21st century and beyond. Benefits from adaptation can already be realized in addressing 
current risks, and can be realized in the future for addressing emerging risks. {3.2, 4.5}
Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) aggregate climate change risks and illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation 
limits for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions. The five RFCs are associated with: (1) Unique and 
threatened systems, (2) Extreme weather events, (3) Distribution of impacts, (4) Global aggregate impacts, and (5) Large-
scale singular events. In this report, the RFCs provide information relevant to Article 2 of UNFCCC. {Box 2.4}
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 
21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence) 
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Figure SPM.10 |  The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and changes in 
annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050. Limiting risks across Reasons For Concern (a) would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO2 (b) 
which would constrain annual GHG emissions over the next few decades (c). Panel a reproduces the five Reasons For Concern {Box 2.4}. Panel b links 
temperature changes to cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) from 1870. They are based on Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) 
simulations (pink plume) and on a simple climate model (median climate response in 2100), for the baselines and five mitigation scenario categories (six 
ellipses). Details are provided in Figure SPM.5. Panel c shows the relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) of the scenario catego-
ries and their associated change in annual GHG emissions by 2050, expressed in percentage change (in percent GtCO2-eq per year) relative to 2010. The 
ellipses correspond to the same scenario categories as in Panel b, and are built with a similar method (see details in Figure SPM.5). {Figure 3.1}
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>1000 ppm CO2-eq), warming is more likely than not to exceed 4°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100 (Table SPM.1). The 
risks associated with temperatures at or above 4°C include substantial species extinction, global and regional food insecurity, 
consequential constraints on common human activities and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high confidence). 
Some risks of climate change, such as risks to unique and threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, 
are moderate to high at temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. {2.3, Figure 2.5, 3.2, 3.4, Box 2.4, Table SPM.1}
Substantial cuts in GHG emissions over the next few decades can substantially reduce risks of climate change by limiting 
warming in the second half of the 21st century and beyond. Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean 
surface warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Limiting risks across RFCs would imply a limit for cumulative emissions 
of CO2. Such a limit would require that global net emissions of CO2 eventually decrease to zero and would constrain annual 
emissions over the next few decades (Figure SPM.10) (high confidence). But some risks from climate damages are unavoid-
able, even with mitigation and adaptation. {2.2.5, 3.2, 3.4}
Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and risks, but these risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, wide-
spread and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change. Inertia in the economic and climate system and the possibility 
of irreversible impacts from climate change increase the benefits from near-term mitigation efforts (high confidence). Delays 
in additional mitigation or constraints on technological options increase the longer-term mitigation costs to hold climate 
change risks at a given level (Table SPM.2). {3.2, 3.4}
SPM 3.3  Characteristics of adaptation pathways
Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change impacts, but there are limits to its effec-
tiveness, especially with greater magnitudes and rates of climate change. Taking a longer-
term perspective, in the context of sustainable development, increases the likelihood that 
more immediate adaptation actions will also enhance future options and preparedness. {3.3}
Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of populations, the security of assets and the maintenance of ecosystem goods, 
functions and services now and in the future. Adaptation is place- and context-specific (high confidence). A first step towards 
adaptation to future climate change is reducing vulnerability and exposure to present climate variability (high confidence). 
Integration of adaptation into planning, including policy design, and decision-making can promote synergies with develop-
ment and disaster risk reduction. Building adaptive capacity is crucial for effective selection and implementation of adapta-
tion options (robust evidence, high agreement). {3.3}
Adaptation planning and implementation can be enhanced through complementary actions across levels, from individuals to 
governments (high confidence). National governments can coordinate adaptation efforts of local and sub-national govern-
ments, for example by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic diversification and by providing information, 
policy and legal frameworks and financial support (robust evidence, high agreement). Local government and the private 
sector are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adaptation of commu-
nities, households and civil society and in managing risk information and financing (medium evidence, high agreement). {3.3}
Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of governance are contingent on societal values, objectives and risk 
perceptions (high confidence). Recognition of diverse interests, circumstances, social-cultural contexts and expectations can 
benefit decision-making processes. Indigenous, local and traditional knowledge systems and practices, including indigenous 
peoples’ holistic view of community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to climate change, but these have 
not been used consistently in existing adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge with existing practices increas-
es the effectiveness of adaptation. {3.3}
Constraints can interact to impede adaptation planning and implementation (high confidence). Common constraints on 
implementation arise from the following: limited financial and human resources; limited integration or coordination of gov-
ernance; uncertainties about projected impacts; different perceptions of risks; competing values; absence of key adapta-
tion leaders and advocates; and limited tools to monitor adaptation effectiveness. Another constraint includes insufficient 




Greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (high confidence). 
Limits to adaptation emerge from the interaction among climate change and biophysical and/or socio-economic constraints. 
Further, poor planning or implementation, overemphasizing short-term outcomes or failing to sufficiently anticipate conse-
quences can result in maladaptation, increasing the vulnerability or exposure of the target group in the future or the vulner-
ability of other people, places or sectors (medium evidence, high agreement). Underestimating the complexity of adaptation 
as a social process can create unrealistic expectations about achieving intended adaptation outcomes. {3.3}
Significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs exist between mitigation and adaptation and among different adaptation 
responses; interactions occur both within and across regions (very high confidence). Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt 
to climate change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, particularly at the intersections among water, energy, 
land use and biodiversity, but tools to understand and manage these interactions remain limited. Examples of actions with 
co-benefits include (i) improved energy efficiency and cleaner energy sources, leading to reduced emissions of health-dam-
aging, climate-altering air pollutants; (ii) reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas through greening cities and 
recycling water; (iii) sustainable agriculture and forestry; and (iv) protection of ecosystems for carbon storage and other 
ecosystem services. {3.3}
Transformations in economic, social, technological and political decisions and actions can enhance adaptation and promote 
sustainable development (high confidence). At the national level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects 
a country’s own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable development in accordance with its national circumstances 
and priorities. Restricting adaptation responses to incremental changes to existing systems and structures, without consider-
ing transformational change, may increase costs and losses and miss opportunities. Planning and implementation of trans-
formational adaptation could reflect strengthened, altered or aligned paradigms and may place new and increased demands 
on governance structures to reconcile different goals and visions for the future and to address possible equity and ethical 
implications. Adaptation pathways are enhanced by iterative learning, deliberative processes and innovation. {3.3}
SPM 3.4  Characteristics of mitigation pathways
There are multiple mitigation pathways that are likely to limit warming to below 2°C relative 
to pre-industrial levels. These pathways would require substantial emissions reductions over 
the next few decades and near zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived greenhouse gases 
by the end of the century. Implementing such reductions poses substantial technological, eco-
nomic, social and institutional challenges, which increase with delays in additional mitigation 
and if key technologies are not available. Limiting warming to lower or higher levels involves 
similar challenges but on different timescales. {3.4}
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond those in place today, global emissions growth is expected to 
persist, driven by growth in global population and economic activities. Global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 
in baseline scenarios—those without additional mitigation—range from 3.7°C to 4.8°C above the average for 1850–1900 
for a median climate response. They range from 2.5°C to 7.8°C when including climate uncertainty (5th to 95th percentile 
range) (high confidence). {3.4}14
Emissions scenarios leading to CO2-equivalent concentrations in 2100 of about 450 ppm or lower are likely to maintain 
warming below 2°C over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels15. These scenarios are characterized by 40 to 70% 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions reductions by 2050 compared to 201016, and emissions levels near zero or below in 
2100. Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit 
temperature change to less than 2°C, unless they temporarily overshoot concentration levels of roughly 530 ppm CO2-eq 
 
 
15 For comparison, the CO2-eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 to 520 ppm)
16 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in the AR4 (50 to 85% lower than 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for this 
difference include that this report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in the AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large 
proportion of the new scenarios include Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies (see below). Other factors include the use of 2100 concentration 
levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010.
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before 2100, in which case they are about as likely as not to achieve that goal. In these 500 ppm CO2-eq scenarios, global 2050 
emissions levels are 25 to 55% lower than in 2010. Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are characterized by a greater 
reliance on Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies beyond mid-century (and vice versa). Trajectories that are likely to 
limit warming to 3°C relative to pre-industrial levels reduce emissions less rapidly than those limiting warming to 2°C. A lim-
ited number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit warming to 1.5°C by 2100; these scenarios are 
characterized by concentrations below 430 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 and 2050 emission reduction between 70% and 95% below 
2010. For a comprehensive overview of the characteristics of emissions scenarios, their CO2-equivalent concentrations and 
their likelihood to keep warming to below a range of temperature levels, see Figure SPM.11 and Table SPM.1. {3.4}



















































































































580–720 ppm CO2-eq 530–580 ppm CO2-eq 480–530 ppm CO2-eq 430–480 ppm CO2-eq
(a)
(b)
Figure SPM.11 |  Global greenhouse gas emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different 
long-term concentration levels (a) and associated upscaling requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100 compared 




Table SPM.1 |  Key characteristics of the scenarios collected and assessed for WGIII AR5. For all parameters the 10th to 90th percentile of the scenarios 
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a The ‘total range’ for the 430 to 480 ppm CO2-eq concentrations scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th to 90th percentile of the subcategory of 
these scenarios shown in Table 6.3 of the Working Group III Report.
b Baseline scenarios fall into the >1000 and 720 to 1000 ppm CO2-eq categories. The latter category also includes mitigation scenarios. The baseline sce-
narios in the latter category reach a temperature change of 2.5°C to 5.8°C above the average for 1850–1900 in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios 
in the >1000 ppm CO2-eq category, this leads to an overall 2100 temperature range of 2.5°C to 7.8°C (range based on median climate response: 3.7°C 
to 4.8°C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.
c The global 2010 emissions are 31% above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic greenhouse gas emission estimates presented in this report). 
CO2-eq emissions include the basket of Kyoto gases (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) as well as fluorinated gases).
d The assessment here involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCPs). To evaluate the CO2-eq concentration and climate implications of these scenarios, the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas 
Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) was used in a probabilistic mode. For a comparison between MAGICC model results and the outcomes of the models 
used in WGI, see WGI 12.4.1.2, 12.4.8 and WGIII 6.3.2.6.
e The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII AR5 using MAGICC and the assessment in 
WGI of the uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI, 
which are based on the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood 
statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was also applied for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where 
no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only {WGIII 6.3} and follow broadly the terms used by the WGI SPM for temperature 
projections: likely 66–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, and unlikely 0–33%. In addition the term more unlikely 
than likely 0–<50% is used. 
f The CO2-equivalent concentration (see Glossary) is calculated on the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle/climate model, MAGICC. The CO2-
equivalent concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 to 520 ppm). This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic 
radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in WGI, i.e., 2.3 W/m2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W/m2. 
g The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO2-eq concentration.
h For scenarios in this category, no CMIP5 run or MAGICC realization stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an unlikely assignment is given to 
reflect uncertainties that may not be reflected by the current climate models.
i Scenarios in the 580 to 650 ppm CO2-eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high 
end of the category (e.g., RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2°C 
temperature level, while the former are mostly assessed to have an unlikely probability of staying below this level.
j In these scenarios, global CO2-eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 to 95% below 2010 emissions, and they are between 110 to 120% below 2010 
emissions in 2100.
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Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 (consistent with a likely chance to keep warming below 2°C 
relative to pre-industrial levels) typically involve temporary overshoot17 of atmospheric concentrations, as do many scenarios 
reaching about 500 ppm CO2-eq to about 550 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 (Table SPM.1). Depending on the level of overshoot, 
overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and widespread deployment of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture 
and storage (BECCS) and afforestation in the second half of the century. The availability and scale of these and other CDR 
technologies and methods are uncertain and CDR technologies are, to varying degrees, associated with challenges and 
risks18. CDR is also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual emissions from sectors where 
mitigation is more expensive (high confidence). {3.4, Box 3.3}
Reducing emissions of non-CO2 agents can be an important element of mitigation strategies. All current GHG emissions 
and other forcing agents affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over the next few decades, although long-term 
warming is mainly driven by CO2 emissions. Emissions of non-CO2 forcers are often expressed as ‘CO2-equivalent emissions’, 
but the choice of metric to calculate these emissions, and the implications for the emphasis and timing of abatement of the 
various climate forcers, depends on application and policy context and contains value judgments. {3.4, Box 3.2}
17 In concentration ‘overshoot’ scenarios, concentrations peak during the century and then decline.
18 CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on the global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how 
much CO2 emissions could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. CDR methods may carry side effects and long-term consequences on a 
global scale.
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Figure SPM.12 |  The implications of different 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels for the rate of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reductions 
and low-carbon energy upscaling in mitigation scenarios that are at least about as likely as not to keep warming throughout the 21st century below 2°C 
relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 CO2-equivalent concentrations of 430 to 530 ppm). The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels 
by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/
yr) leading to these 2030 levels. The black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure 
SPM.2. The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average 
annual CO2 emissions reduction rates for the period 2030–2050. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent inter-model 
comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals to the range of scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emissions change 
(sustained over a period of 20 years) and the average annual CO2 emission change between 2000 and 2010 are shown as well. The arrows in the right 
panel show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply upscaling from 2030 to 2050 subject to different 2030 GHG emissions levels. Zero- and 
low-carbon energy supply includes renewables, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) or bioenergy with CCS 
(BECCS). [Note: Only scenarios that apply the full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) 
are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (>20 GtCO2-eq/yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions and scenarios with 




Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over the 
21st century to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. It will require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions 
from 2030 to 2050; a much more rapid scale-up of low-carbon energy over this period; a larger reliance on CDR in the long 
term; and higher transitional and long-term economic impacts. Estimated global emissions levels in 2020 based on the 
Cancún Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective mitigation trajectories that are at least about as likely as not to limit 
warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels, but they do not preclude the option to meet this goal (high confidence) 
(Figure SPM.12, Table SPM.2). {3.4}
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary widely depending on methodologies and assumptions, but 
increase with the stringency of mitigation. Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immediately, in 
which there is a single global carbon price, and in which all key technologies are available have been used as a cost-effective 
benchmark for estimating macro-economic mitigation costs (Figure SPM.13). Under these assumptions mitigation scenarios 
that are likely to limit warming to below 2°C through the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels entail losses in global 
consumption—not including benefits of reduced climate change as well as co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitiga-
tion—of 1 to 4% (median: 1.7%) in 2030, 2 to 6% (median: 3.4%) in 2050 and 3 to 11% (median: 4.8%) in 2100 relative to 
consumption in baseline scenarios that grows anywhere from 300% to more than 900% over the century (Figure SPM.13). 
These numbers correspond to an annualized reduction of consumption growth by 0.04 to 0.14 (median: 0.06) percentage 
points over the century relative to annualized consumption growth in the baseline that is between 1.6 and 3% per year (high 
confidence). {3.4}
In the absence or under limited availability of mitigation technologies (such as bioenergy, CCS and their combination BECCS, 
nuclear, wind/solar), mitigation costs can increase substantially depending on the technology considered. Delaying additional 
mitigation increases mitigation costs in the medium to long term. Many models could not limit likely warming to below 2°C 
over the 21st century relative to pre-industrial levels if additional mitigation is considerably delayed. Many models could 















































































































Figure SPM.13 |  Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios at different atmospheric concentrations levels in 2100. Cost-effective scenarios 
assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models’ 
default technology assumptions. Consumption losses are shown relative to a baseline development without climate policy (left panel). The table at the top 
shows percentage points of annualized consumption growth reductions relative to consumption growth in the baseline of 1.6 to 3% per year (e.g., if the 
reduction is 0.06 percentage points per year due to mitigation, and baseline growth is 2.0% per year, then the growth rate with mitigation would be 1.94% 
per year). Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change or co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation. 
Estimates at the high end of these cost ranges are from models that are relatively inflexible to achieve the deep emissions reductions required in the long 
run to meet these goals and/or include assumptions about market imperfections that would raise costs. {Figure 3.4}
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Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 or 500 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving air quality and energy 
security objectives, with significant co-benefits for human health, ecosystem impacts and sufficiency of resources and resilience 
of the energy system. {4.4.2.2}
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce revenues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between regions 
and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios are associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for 
major exporters (high confidence). The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effects of mitigation on the value of fossil 
fuel assets (medium confidence). {4.4.2.2}
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) involves large-scale methods that seek to reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy 
in the climate system. SRM is untested and is not included in any of the mitigation scenarios. If it were deployed, SRM would 
Table SPM.2 |  Increase in global mitigation costs due to either limited availability of specific technologies or delays in additional mitigation a relative to 
cost-effective scenarios b. The increase in costs is given for the median estimate and the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenarios (in parentheses) c. In 
addition, the sample size of each scenario set is provided in the coloured symbols. The colours of the symbols indicate the fraction of models from systematic 
model comparison exercises that could successfully reach the targeted concentration level. {Table 3.2}
Mitigation cost increases in scenarios with  
limited availability of technologies d
[% increase in total discounted e mitigation costs  
(2015–2100) relative to default technology assumptions]
Mitigation cost increases 
due to delayed additional 
mitigation until 2030
[% increase in mitigation costs 




no CCS nuclear phase out limited solar/wind limited bioenergy






























(2 to 23%) 
8% 
(5 to 15%) 
18% 
(4 to 66%) 
}
15%  
(3 to 32%) 
16%  
(5 to 24%) 
580 to 650 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Symbol legend—fraction of models successful in producing scenarios (numbers indicate the number of successful models) 
: all models successful 
 
: between 80 and 100% of models successful
: between 50 and 80% of models successful 
 
: less than 50% of models successful
Notes:
a Delayed mitigation scenarios are associated with greenhouse gas emission of more than 55 GtCO2-eq in 2030, and the increase in mitigation costs is mea-
sured relative to cost-effective mitigation scenarios for the same long-term concentration level.
b Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology 
relative to the models’ default technology assumptions.
c The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon 
until 2100 are included. Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 could not produce associ-
ated scenarios for concentration levels below 530 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies and/or delayed additional 
mitigation.
d No CCS: carbon dioxide capture and storage is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: no addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under 
construction, and operation of existing plants until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar/Wind: a maximum of 20% global electricity generation from solar 
and wind power in any year of these scenarios. Limited Bioenergy: a maximum of 100 EJ/yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for 
heat, power, combinations and industry was around 18 EJ/yr in 2008). EJ = Exajoule =  1018 Joule.
e Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and 
abatement costs in percent of baseline gross domestic product (GDP, for scenarios from partial equilibrium models) for the period 2015–2100, discounted 




entail numerous uncertainties, side effects, risks and shortcomings and has particular governance and ethical implications. 
SRM would not reduce ocean acidification. If it were terminated, there is high confidence that surface temperatures would 
rise very rapidly impacting ecosystems susceptible to rapid rates of change. {Box 3.3}
SPM 4.  Adaptation and Mitigation
Many adaptation and mitigation options can help address climate change, but no single 
option is sufficient by itself. Effective implementation depends on policies and cooperation at 
all scales and can be enhanced through integrated responses that link adaptation and mitiga-
tion with other societal objectives. {4}
SPM 4.1  Common enabling factors and constraints for adaptation and mitigation responses
Adaptation and mitigation responses are underpinned by common enabling factors. These 
include effective institutions and governance, innovation and investments in environmentally 
sound technologies and infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods and behavioural and lifestyle 
choices. {4.1}
Inertia in many aspects of the socio-economic system constrains adaptation and mitigation options (medium evidence, high 
agreement). Innovation and investments in environmentally sound infrastructure and technologies can reduce GHG emis-
sions and enhance resilience to climate change (very high confidence). {4.1}
Vulnerability to climate change, GHG emissions and the capacity for adaptation and mitigation are strongly influenced by 
livelihoods, lifestyles, behaviour and culture (medium evidence, medium agreement). Also, the social acceptability and/or 
effectiveness of climate policies are influenced by the extent to which they incentivize or depend on regionally appropriate 
changes in lifestyles or behaviours. {4.1}
For many regions and sectors, enhanced capacities to mitigate and adapt are part of the foundation essential for managing 
climate change risks (high confidence). Improving institutions as well as coordination and cooperation in governance can help 
overcome regional constraints associated with mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk reduction (very high confidence). {4.1}
SPM 4.2  Response options for adaptation
Adaptation options exist in all sectors, but their context for implementation and potential 
to reduce climate-related risks differs across sectors and regions. Some adaptation respons-
es involve significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs. Increasing climate change will 
increase challenges for many adaptation options. {4.2}
Adaptation experience is accumulating across regions in the public and private sectors and within communities. There is 
increasing recognition of the value of social (including local and indigenous), institutional, and ecosystem-based measures 
and of the extent of constraints to adaptation. Adaptation is becoming embedded in some planning processes, with more 
limited implementation of responses (high confidence). {1.6, 4.2, 4.4.2.1}
The need for adaptation along with associated challenges is expected to increase with climate change (very high confidence). 
Adaptation options exist in all sectors and regions, with diverse potential and approaches depending on their context in 
vulnerability reduction, disaster risk management or proactive adaptation planning (Table SPM.3). Effective strategies and 
actions consider the potential for co-benefits and opportunities within wider strategic goals and development plans. {4.2}
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Table SPM.3 |  Approaches for managing the risks of climate change through adaptation. These approaches should be considered overlapping rather than 




































































































Improved access to education, nutrition, health facilities, energy, safe housing & settlement structures, 
& social support structures; Reduced gender inequality & marginalization in other forms.
Poverty alleviation Improved access to & control of local resources; Land tenure; Disaster risk reduction; Social safety nets & social protection; Insurance schemes.
Livelihood security
Income, asset & livelihood diversification; Improved infrastructure; Access to technology & decision-
making fora; Increased decision-making power; Changed cropping, livestock & aquaculture practices; 
Reliance on social networks.
Disaster risk 
management
Early warning systems; Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Diversifying water resources; Improved 
drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & wastewater management; 
Transport & road infrastructure improvements.
Ecosystem 
management
Maintaining wetlands & urban green spaces; Coastal afforestation; Watershed & reservoir 
management; Reduction of other stressors on ecosystems & of habitat fragmentation; Maintenance 
of genetic diversity; Manipulation of disturbance regimes; Community-based natural resource 
management.
Spatial or land-use 
planning
Provisioning of adequate housing, infrastructure & services; Managing development in flood prone & 
other high risk areas; Urban planning & upgrading programs; Land zoning laws; Easements; Protected 
areas.
Structural/physical
Engineered & built-environment options: Sea walls & coastal protection structures; Flood levees;  
Water storage; Improved drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & 
wastewater management; Transport & road infrastructure improvements; Floating houses; Power plant 
& electricity grid adjustments.
Technological options: New crop & animal varieties; Indigenous, traditional & local knowledge, 
technologies & methods; Efficient irrigation; Water-saving technologies; Desalinisation; Conservation 
agriculture; Food storage & preservation facilities; Hazard & vulnerability mapping & monitoring; Early 
warning systems; Building insulation; Mechanical & passive cooling; Technology development, transfer 
& diffusion.
Ecosystem-based options: Ecological restoration; Soil conservation; Afforestation & reforestation; 
Mangrove conservation & replanting; Green infrastructure (e.g., shade trees, green roofs); Controlling 
overfishing; Fisheries co-management; Assisted species migration & dispersal; Ecological corridors; 
Seed banks, gene banks & other ex situ conservation; Community-based natural resource management.
Services: Social safety nets & social protection; Food banks & distribution of food surplus; Municipal 
services including water & sanitation; Vaccination programs; Essential public health services; Enhanced 
emergency medical services.
Institutional
Economic options: Financial incentives; Insurance; Catastrophe bonds; Payments for ecosystem 
services; Pricing water to encourage universal provision and careful use; Microfinance; Disaster 
contingency funds; Cash transfers; Public-private partnerships.
Laws & regulations: Land zoning laws; Building standards & practices; Easements; Water regulations 
& agreements; Laws to support disaster risk reduction; Laws to encourage insurance purchasing; 
Defined property rights & land tenure security; Protected areas; Fishing quotas; Patent pools & 
technology transfer.
National & government policies & programs: National & regional adaptation plans including 
mainstreaming; Sub-national & local adaptation plans; Economic diversification; Urban upgrading 
programs; Municipal water management programs; Disaster planning & preparedness; Integrated 
water resource management; Integrated coastal zone management; Ecosystem-based management; 
Community-based adaptation.
Social
Educational options: Awareness raising & integrating into education; Gender equity in education; 
Extension services; Sharing indigenous, traditional & local knowledge; Participatory action research & 
social learning; Knowledge-sharing & learning platforms.
Informational options: Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Early warning & response systems; 
Systematic monitoring & remote sensing; Climate services; Use of indigenous climate observations; 
Participatory scenario development; Integrated assessments.
Behavioural options: Household preparation & evacuation planning; Migration; Soil & water 
conservation; Storm drain clearance; Livelihood diversification; Changed cropping, livestock & 
aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.
Spheres of change
Practical: Social & technical innovations, behavioural shifts, or institutional & managerial changes that 
produce substantial shifts in outcomes.
Political: Political, social, cultural & ecological decisions & actions consistent with reducing 
vulnerability & risk & supporting adaptation, mitigation & sustainable development.





SPM 4.3  Response options for mitigation
Mitigation options are available in every major sector. Mitigation can be more cost-effective 
if using an integrated approach that combines measures to reduce energy use and the green-
house gas intensity of end-use sectors, decarbonize energy supply, reduce net emissions and 
enhance carbon sinks in land-based sectors. {4.3}
Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strategies are more cost-effective in cutting emissions than a focus 
on individual technologies and sectors, with efforts in one sector affecting the need for mitigation in others (medium confi-
dence). Mitigation measures intersect with other societal goals, creating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side effects. 
These intersections, if well-managed, can strengthen the basis for undertaking climate action. {4.3}
Emissions ranges for baseline scenarios and mitigation scenarios that limit CO2-equivalent concentrations to low levels 
(about 450 ppm CO2-eq, likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) are shown for different sectors and gases 
in Figure SPM.14. Key measures to achieve such mitigation goals include decarbonizing (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of) 
electricity generation (medium evidence, high agreement) as well as efficiency enhancements and behavioural changes, in 
order to reduce energy demand compared to baseline scenarios without compromising development (robust evidence, high 
agreement). In scenarios reaching 450 ppm CO2-eq concentrations by 2100, global CO2 emissions from the energy supply 
sector are projected to decline over the next decade and are characterized by reductions of 90% or more below 2010 levels 
between 2040 and 2070. In the majority of low-concentration stabilization scenarios (about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2-eq, 
at least about as likely as not to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels), the share of low-carbon electricity supply 
(comprising renewable energy (RE), nuclear and carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)  including bioenergy with carbon 
dioxide capture and storage (BECCS)) increases from the current share of approximately 30% to more than 80% by 2050, 



































Direct CO2 emissions by major sectors, and non-CO2 emissions, for baseline and mitigation scenarios













































Figure SPM.14 |  Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by sector and total non-CO2 greenhouse gases (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (faded bars) and 
mitigation scenarios (solid colour bars) that reach about 450 (430 to 480) ppm CO2-eq concentrations in 2100 (likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-
industrial levels). Mitigation in the end-use sectors leads also to indirect emissions reductions in the upstream energy supply sector. Direct emissions of the 
end-use sectors thus do not include the emission reduction potential at the supply-side due to, for example, reduced electricity demand. The numbers at the 
bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range (upper row: baseline scenarios; lower row: mitigation scenarios), which differs 
across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Emissions ranges for mitigation scenarios include the full portfolio 
of mitigation options; many models cannot reach 450 ppm CO2-eq concentration by 2100 in the absence of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS). 
Negative emissions in the electricity sector are due to the application of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS). ‘Net’ agriculture, 
forestry and other land use (AFOLU) emissions consider afforestation, reforestation as well as deforestation activities. {4.3, Figure 4.1}
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Near-term reductions in energy demand are an important element of cost-effective mitigation strategies, provide more 
flexibility for reducing carbon intensity in the energy supply sector, hedge against related supply-side risks, avoid lock-in to 
carbon-intensive infrastructures, and are associated with important co-benefits. The most cost-effective mitigation options in 
forestry are afforestation, sustainable forest management and reducing deforestation, with large differences in their relative 
importance across regions; and in agriculture, cropland management, grazing land management and restoration of organic 
soils (medium evidence, high agreement). {4.3, Figures 4.1, 4.2, Table 4.3}
Behaviour, lifestyle and culture have a considerable influence on energy use and associated emissions, with high mitigation 
potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing technological and structural change (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in consumption patterns, adoption of energy savings 
measures, dietary change and reduction in food wastes. {4.1, 4.3}
SPM 4.4  Policy approaches for adaptation and mitigation, technology and finance
Effective adaptation and mitigation responses will depend on policies and measures across 
multiple scales: international, regional, national and sub-national. Policies across all scales 
supporting technology development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance for responses 
to climate change, can complement and enhance the effectiveness of policies that directly 
promote adaptation and mitigation. {4.4}
International cooperation is critical for effective mitigation, even though mitigation can also have local co-benefits. Adapta-
tion focuses primarily on local to national scale outcomes, but its effectiveness can be enhanced through coordination across 
governance scales, including international cooperation: {3.1, 4.4.1}
• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is the main multilateral forum focused on 
addressing climate change, with nearly universal participation. Other institutions organized at different levels of gover-
nance have resulted in diversifying international climate change cooperation. {4.4.1}
• The Kyoto Protocol offers lessons towards achieving the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with respect to 
participation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms and environmental effectiveness (medium evidence, low agree-
ment). {4.4.1}
• Policy linkages among regional, national and sub-national climate policies offer potential climate change mitigation ben-
efits (medium evidence, medium agreement). Potential advantages include lower mitigation costs, decreased emission 
leakage and increased market liquidity. {4.4.1}
• International cooperation for supporting adaptation planning and implementation has received less attention histori-
cally than mitigation but is increasing and has assisted in the creation of adaptation strategies, plans and actions at the 
national, sub-national and local level (high confidence). {4.4.1}
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-national plans and strategies on both adaptation and mitigation 
since the AR4, with an increased focus on policies designed to integrate multiple objectives, increase co-benefits and reduce 
adverse side effects (high confidence): {4.4.2.1, 4.4.2.2}
• National governments play key roles in adaptation planning and implementation (robust evidence, high agreement) 
through coordinating actions and providing frameworks and support. While local government and the private sector 
have different functions, which vary regionally, they are increasingly recognized as critical to progress in adaptation, 
given their roles in scaling up adaptation of communities, households and civil society and in managing risk information 
and financing (medium evidence, high agreement). {4.4.2.1}
• Institutional dimensions of adaptation governance, including the integration of adaptation into planning and decision-




high agreement). Examples of institutional approaches to adaptation involving multiple actors include economic options 
(e.g., insurance, public-private partnerships), laws and regulations (e.g., land-zoning laws) and national and government 
policies and programmes (e.g., economic diversification). {4.2, 4.4.2.1, Table SPM.3}
• In principle, mechanisms that set a carbon price, including cap and trade systems and carbon taxes, can achieve mitiga-
tion in a cost-effective way but have been implemented with diverse effects due in part to national circumstances as 
well as policy design. The short-run effects of cap and trade systems have been limited as a result of loose caps or caps 
that have not proved to be constraining (limited evidence, medium agreement). In some countries, tax-based policies 
specifically aimed at reducing GHG emissions—alongside technology and other policies—have helped to weaken the 
link between GHG emissions and GDP (high confidence). In addition, in a large group of countries, fuel taxes (although 
not necessarily designed for the purpose of mitigation) have had effects that are akin to sectoral carbon taxes. {4.4.2.2}
• Regulatory approaches and information measures are widely used and are often environmentally effective (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). Examples of regulatory approaches include energy efficiency standards; examples of infor-
mation programmes include labelling programmes that can help consumers make better-informed decisions. {4.4.2.2}
• Sector-specific mitigation policies have been more widely used than economy-wide policies (medium evidence, high 
agreement). Sector-specific policies may be better suited to address sector-specific barriers or market failures and may be 
bundled in packages of complementary policies. Although theoretically more cost-effective, administrative and political 
barriers may make economy-wide policies harder to implement. Interactions between or among mitigation policies may 
be synergistic or may have no additive effect on reducing emissions. {4.4.2.2}
• Economic instruments in the form of subsidies may be applied across sectors, and include a variety of policy designs, such 
as tax rebates or exemptions, grants, loans and credit lines. An increasing number and variety of renewable energy (RE) 
policies including subsidies—motivated by many factors—have driven escalated growth of RE technologies in recent 
years. At the same time, reducing subsidies for GHG-related activities in various sectors can achieve emission reductions, 
depending on the social and economic context (high confidence). {4.4.2.2}
Co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation could affect achievement of other objectives such as those related to 
human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods and equitable sustainable 
development. The potential for co-benefits for energy end-use measures outweighs the potential for adverse side effects 
whereas the evidence suggests this may not be the case for all energy supply and agriculture, forestry and other land use 
(AFOLU) measures. Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy services and could hamper the ability of socie-
ties to expand access to modern energy services to underserved populations (low confidence). These potential adverse side 
effects on energy access can be avoided with the adoption of complementary policies such as income tax rebates or other 
benefit transfer mechanisms (medium confidence). Whether or not side effects materialize, and to what extent side effects 
materialize, will be case- and site-specific, and depend on local circumstances and the scale, scope and pace of implementa-
tion. Many co-benefits and adverse side effects have not been well-quantified. {4.3, 4.4.2.2, Box 3.4}
Technology policy (development, diffusion and transfer) complements other mitigation policies across all scales, from interna-
tional to sub-national; many adaptation efforts also critically rely on diffusion and transfer of technologies and management 
practices (high confidence). Policies exist to address market failures in R&D, but the effective use of technologies can also 
depend on capacities to adopt technologies appropriate to local circumstances. {4.4.3}
Substantial reductions in emissions would require large changes in investment patterns (high confidence). For mitigation 
scenarios that stabilize concentrations (without overshoot) in the range of 430 to 530 ppm CO2-eq by 210019, annual invest-
ments in low carbon electricity supply and energy efficiency in key sectors (transport, industry and buildings) are projected 
in the scenarios to rise by several hundred billion dollars per year before 2030. Within appropriate enabling environments, 
the private sector, along with the public sector, can play important roles in financing mitigation and adaptation (medium 
evidence, high agreement). {4.4.4}
19 This range comprises scenarios that reach 430 to 480 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 (likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) and scenarios 
that reach 480 to 530 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 (without overshoot: more likely than not to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels).
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Financial resources for adaptation have become available more slowly than for mitigation in both developed and developing 
countries. Limited evidence indicates that there is a gap between global adaptation needs and the funds available for adapta-
tion (medium confidence). There is a need for better assessment of global adaptation costs, funding and investment. Potential 
synergies between international finance for disaster risk management and adaptation have not yet been fully realized (high 
confidence). {4.4.4}
SPM 4.5  Trade-offs, synergies and interactions with sustainable development
Climate change is a threat to sustainable development. Nonetheless, there are many opportu-
nities to link mitigation, adaptation and the pursuit of other societal objectives through inte-
grated responses (high confidence). Successful implementation relies on relevant tools, suit-
able governance structures and enhanced capacity to respond (medium confidence). {3.5, 4.5}
Climate change exacerbates other threats to social and natural systems, placing additional burdens particularly on the poor 
(high confidence). Aligning climate policy with sustainable development requires attention to both adaptation and mitigation 
(high confidence). Delaying global mitigation actions may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways and adaptation in 
the future. Opportunities to take advantage of positive synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, 
particularly if limits to adaptation are exceeded. Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change imply an increas-
ing complexity of interactions, encompassing connections among human health, water, energy, land use and biodiversity 
(medium evidence, high agreement). {3.1, 3.5, 4.5}
Strategies and actions can be pursued now which will move towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development, 
while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, social and economic well-being and effective environmental manage-
ment. In some cases, economic diversification can be an important element of such strategies. The effectiveness of integrated 
responses can be enhanced by relevant tools, suitable governance structures and adequate institutional and human capacity 
(medium confidence). Integrated responses are especially relevant to energy planning and implementation; interactions 
among water, food, energy and biological carbon sequestration; and urban planning, which provides substantial opportu-






















The Synthesis Report (SYR) of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 
provides an overview of the state of knowledge concerning the science 
of climate change, emphasizing new results since the publication of 
the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) in 2007. The SYR synthe-
sizes the main findings of the AR5 based on contributions from Work-
ing Group I (The Physical Science Basis), Working Group II (Impacts, 
Adaptation and Vulnerability) and Working Group III (Mitigation of 
Climate Change), plus two additional IPCC reports (Special Report on 
Renewable Energy Sources and Climate Change Mitigation and Spe-
cial Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation).
The AR5 SYR longer report is divided into four topics. Topic 1 (Observed 
Changes and their Causes) focuses on observational evidence for a 
changing climate, the impacts caused by this change and the human 
contributions to it. Topic 2 (Future Climate Changes, Risks and Impacts) 
assesses projections of future climate change and the resultant pro-
jected impacts and risks. Topic 3 (Future Pathways for Adaptation, Miti-
gation and Sustainable Development) considers adaptation and miti-
gation as complementary strategies for reducing and managing the 
risks of climate change. Topic 4 (Adaptation and Mitigation) describes 
individual adaptation and mitigation options and policy approaches. It 
also addresses integrated responses that link mitigation and adapta-
tion with other societal objectives.
The challenges of understanding and managing risks and uncertainties 
are important themes in this report. See Box 1 (Risk and the Manage-
ment of an Uncertain Future) and Box 2 (Communicating the Degree 
of Certainty in Assessment Findings). 
This report includes information relevant to Article 2 of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Box Introduction.1 | Risk and the Management of an Uncertain Future
Climate change exposes people, societies, economic sectors and ecosystems to risk. Risk is the potential for consequences when some-
thing of value is at stake and the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. {WGII SPM Background Box SPM.2, WGIII 
2.1, SYR Glossary}
Risks from climate change impacts arise from the interaction between hazard (triggered by an event or trend related to climate 
change), vulnerability (susceptibility to harm) and exposure (people, assets or ecosystems at risk). Hazards include processes that range 
from brief events, such as severe storms, to slow trends, such as multi-decade droughts or multi-century sea level rise. Vulnerability 
and exposure are both sensitive to a wide range of social and economic processes, with possible increases or decreases depending 
on development pathways. Risks and co-benefits also arise from policies that aim to mitigate climate change or to adapt to it. (1.5)
Risk is often represented as the probability of occurrence of hazardous events or trends multiplied by the magnitude of the conse-
quences if these events occur. Therefore, high risk can result not only from high probability outcomes but also from low probability out-
comes with very severe consequences. This makes it important to assess the full range of possible outcomes, from low probability tail 
outcomes to very likely outcomes. For example, it is unlikely that global mean sea level will rise by more than one meter in this century, 
but the consequence of a greater rise could be so severe that this possibility becomes a significant part of risk assessment. Similarly, 
low confidence but high consequence outcomes are also policy relevant; for instance the possibility that the response of Amazon forest 
could substantially amplify climate change merits consideration despite our currently imperfect ability to project the outcome. (2.4, 
Table 2.3) {WGI Table 13.5, WGII SPM A-3, 4.4, Box 4-3, WGIII Box 3-9, SYR Glossary}
Risk can be understood either qualitatively or quantitatively. It can be reduced and managed using a wide range of formal or informal 
tools and approaches that are often iterative. Useful approaches for managing risk do not necessarily require that risk levels can be 
accurately quantified. Approaches recognizing diverse qualitative values, goals and priorities, based on ethical, psychological, cultural 









Box Introduction.2 | Communicating the Degree of Certainty in Assessment Findings
An integral feature of IPCC reports is the communication of the strength of and uncertainties in scientific understanding underlying 
assessment findings. Uncertainty can result from a wide range of sources. Uncertainties in the past and present are the result of limita-
tions of available measurements, especially for rare events, and the challenges of evaluating causation in complex or multi-component 
processes that can span physical, biological and human systems. For the future, climate change involves changing likelihoods of diverse 
outcomes. Many processes and mechanisms are well understood, but others are not. Complex interactions among multiple climatic and 
non-climatic influences changing over time lead to persistent uncertainties, which in turn lead to the possibility of surprises. Compared 
to past IPCC reports, the AR5 assesses a substantially larger knowledge base of scientific, technical and socio-economic literature. {WGI 
1.4, WGII SPM A-3, 1.1.2, WGIII 2.3}
The IPCC Guidance Note on Uncertainty a defines a common approach to evaluating and communicating the degree of certainty in 
findings of the assessment process. Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. In many cases, a 
synthesis of evidence and agreement supports an assignment of confidence, especially for findings with stronger agreement and mul-
tiple independent lines of evidence. The degree of certainty in each key finding of the assessment is based on the type, amount, quality 
and consistency of evidence (e.g., data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) and the degree of agreement. 
The summary terms for evidence are: limited, medium or robust. For agreement, they are low, medium or high. Levels of confidence 
include five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high and very high, and are typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. The likelihood, or 
probability, of some well-defined outcome having occurred or occurring in the future can be described quantitatively through the follo-
wing terms: virtually certain, 99–100% probability; extremely likely, 95–100%; very likely, 90–100%; likely, 66–100%; more likely than 
not, >50–100%; about as likely as not, 33–66%; unlikely, 0–33%; very unlikely, 0–10%; extremely unlikely, 0–5%; and exceptionally 
unlikely, 0–1%. Additional terms (extremely likely, 95–100%; more likely than not, >50–100%; more unlikely than likely, 0–<50%; 
and extremely unlikely, 0–5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely. Unless 
otherwise indicated, findings assigned a likelihood term are associated with high or very high confidence. Where appropriate, findings 
are also formulated as statements of fact without using uncertainty qualifiers. {WGI SPM B, WGII Background Box SPM.3, WGIII 2.1} 
 a  Mastrandrea, M.D., C.B. Field, T.F. Stocker, O. Edenhofer, K.L. Ebi, D.J. Frame, H. Held, E. Kriegler, K.J. Mach, P.R. Matschoss, G.-K. Plattner, G.W. Yohe and F.W. Zwiers,  
  2010: Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  
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Topic 1 Observed Changes and their Causes
1 Based on multiple independent analyses of measurements, it is virtu-
ally certain that globally the troposphere has warmed and the lower 
stratosphere has cooled since the mid-20th century. There is medium 
confidence in the rate of change and its vertical structure in the North-
ern Hemisphere extratropical troposphere. {WGI SPM B1, 2.4.4}
Confidence in precipitation change averaged over global land areas 
since 1901 is low prior to 1951 and medium afterwards. Averaged over 
the mid-latitude land areas of the Northern Hemisphere, precipitation 
has likely increased since 1901 (medium confidence before and high 
confidence after 1951). For other latitudes area-averaged long-term 
positive or negative trends have low confidence (Figure 1.1). {WGI SPM 
B1, Figure SPM.2, 2.5.1}
1.1.2 Ocean
Ocean warming dominates the increase in energy stored in the 
climate system, accounting for more than 90% of the energy 
accumulated between 1971 and 2010 (high confidence) with 
only about 1% stored in the atmosphere (Figure 1.2). On a 
global scale, the ocean warming is largest near the surface, and 
the upper 75 m warmed by 0.11 [0.09 to 0.13] °C per decade 
over the period 1971 to 2010. It is virtually certain that the 
upper ocean (0−700 m) warmed from 1971 to 2010, and it likely 
warmed between the 1870s and 1971. It is likely that the ocean 
warmed from 700 to 2000 m from 1957 to 2009 and from 3000 
m to the bottom for the period 1992 to 2005 (Figure 1.2). {WGI 
SPM B.2, 3.2, Box 3.1}
It is very likely that regions of high surface salinity, where evaporation 
dominates, have become more saline, while regions of low salinity, where 
precipitation dominates, have become fresher since the 1950s. These 
regional trends in ocean salinity provide indirect evidence for changes 
in evaporation and precipitation over the oceans and thus for changes 
in the global water cycle (medium confidence). There is no observational 
evidence of a long-term trend in the Atlantic Meridional Overturning 
Circulation (AMOC). {WGI SPM B.2, 2.5, 3.3, 3.4.3, 3.5, 3.6.3} 
1.1 Observed changes in the climate system
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and 
since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are 
unprecedented over decades to millennia. The atmo-
sphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow 
and ice have diminished, and sea level has risen.
1.1.1 Atmosphere
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at 
the Earth’s surface than any preceding decade since 1850. The 
period from 1983 to 2012 was very likely the warmest 30-year period 
of the last 800 years in the Northern Hemisphere, where such assess-
ment is possible (high confidence) and likely the warmest 30-year 
period of the last 1400 years (medium confidence). {WGI 2.4.3, 5.3.5}
The globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature 
data as calculated by a linear trend show a warming of 0.85 [0.65 
to 1.06] °C20 over the period 1880 to 2012, for which multiple inde-
pendently produced datasets exist. The total increase between the 
average of the 1850–1900 period and the 2003–2012 period is 0.78 
[0.72 to 0.85] °C, based on the single longest dataset available. For the 
longest period when calculation of regional trends is sufficiently com-
plete (1901 to 2012), almost the entire globe has experienced surface 
warming (Figure 1.1). {WGI SPM B.1, 2.4.3}
In addition to robust multi-decadal warming, the globally averaged 
surface temperature exhibits substantial decadal and interannual vari-
ability (Figure 1.1). Due to this natural variability, trends based on short 
records are very sensitive to the beginning and end dates and do not 
in general reflect long-term climate trends. As one example, the rate 
of warming over the past 15 years (1998–2012; 0.05 [–0.05 to 0.15] 
°C per decade), which begins with a strong El Niño, is smaller than 
the rate calculated since 1951 (1951–2012; 0.12 [0.08 to 0.14] °C per 
decade; see Box 1.1). {WGI SPM B.1, 2.4.3}
Topic 1: Observed Changes and their Causes
Human influence on the climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest 
in history. Recent climate changes have had widespread impacts on human and natural systems. 
Topic 1 focuses on observational evidence of a changing climate, the impacts caused by this change and the human contributions to it. It discuss-
es observed changes in climate (1.1) and external influences on climate (forcings), differentiating those forcings that are of anthropogenic origin, 
and their contributions by economic sectors and greenhouse gases (GHGs) (1.2). Section 1.3 attributes observed climate change to its causes 
and attributes impacts on human and natural systems to climate change, determining the degree to which those impacts can be attributed to 
climate change. The changing probability of extreme events and their causes are discussed in Section 1.4, followed by an account of exposure 
and vulnerability within a risk context (1.5) and a section on adaptation and mitigation experience (1.6).
20 Ranges in square brackets indicate a 90% uncertainty interval unless otherwise stated. The 90% uncertainty interval is expected to have a 90% likelihood of covering the value 








Observed Changes and their Causes Topic 1
1
Since the beginning of the industrial era, oceanic uptake of CO2 has 
resulted in acidification of the ocean; the pH of ocean surface water 
has decreased by 0.1 (high confidence), corresponding to a 26% 
increase in acidity, measured as hydrogen ion concentration. There is 
medium confidence that, in parallel to warming, oxygen concentra-
tions have decreased in coastal waters and in the open ocean thermo-
cline in many ocean regions since the 1960s, with a likely expansion 
of tropical oxygen minimum zones in recent decades. {WGI SPM B.5, 
TS2.8.5, 3.8.1, 3.8.2, 3.8.3, 3.8.5, Figure 3.20}
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Figure 1.1 |  Multiple observed indicators of a changing global climate system. (a) Observed globally averaged combined land and ocean surface temperature anomalies (relative 
to the mean of 1986 to 2005 period, as annual and decadal averages) with an estimate of decadal mean uncertainty included for one data set (grey shading). {WGI Figure SPM.1, 
Figure 2.20; a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material WGI TS.SM.1.1} (b) Map of the observed surface 
temperature change, from 1901 to 2012, derived from temperature trends determined by linear regression from one data set (orange line in Panel a). Trends have been calculated 
where data availability permitted a robust estimate (i.e., only for grid boxes with greater than 70% complete records and more than 20% data availability in the first and last 10% 
of the time period), other areas are white. Grid boxes where the trend is significant, at the 10% level, are indicated by a + sign. {WGI Figure SPM.1, Figure 2.21, Figure TS.2; a list-
ing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material WGI TS.SM.1.2} (c) Arctic (July to September average) and Antarctic 
(February) sea ice extent. {WGI Figure SPM.3, Figure 4.3, Figure 4.SM.2; a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary 
Material WGI TS.SM.3.2}. (d) Global mean sea level relative to the 1986–2005 mean of the longest running data set, and with all data sets aligned to have the same value in 1993, 
the first year of satellite altimetry data. All time series (coloured lines indicating different data sets) show annual values, and where assessed, uncertainties are indicated by coloured 
shading. {WGI Figure SPM.3, Figure 3.13; a listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material WGI TS.SM.3.4}. (e) 
Map of observed precipitation change, from 1951 to 2010; trends in annual accumulation calculated using the same criteria as in Panel b. {WGI Figure SPM.2, TS TFE.1, Figure 2, 
Figure 2.29. A listing of data sets and further technical details are given in the WGI Technical Summary Supplementary Material WGI TS.SM.2.1}
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1.1.3 Cryosphere
Over the last two decades, the Greenland and Antarctic ice 
sheets have been losing mass (high confidence). Glaciers have 
continued to shrink almost worldwide (high confidence). North-
ern Hemisphere spring snow cover has continued to decrease 
in extent (high confidence). There is high confidence that there 
are strong regional differences in the trend in Antarctic sea ice 
extent, with a very likely increase in total extent. {WGI SPM B.3, 
4.2–4.7}
Glaciers have lost mass and contributed to sea level rise throughout 
the 20th century. The rate of ice mass loss from the Greenland ice sheet 
has very likely substantially increased over the period 1992 to 2011, 
resulting in a larger mass loss over 2002 to 2011 than over 1992 to 
2011. The rate of ice mass loss from the Antarctic ice sheet, mainly 
from the northern Antarctic Peninsula and the Amundsen Sea sector of 
West Antarctica, is also likely larger over 2002 to 2011. {WGI SPM B.3, 
SPM B.4, 4.3.3, 4.4.2, 4.4.3}
The annual mean Arctic sea ice extent decreased over the period 1979 
(when satellite observations commenced) to 2012. The rate of decrease 
was very likely in the range 3.5 to 4.1% per decade. Arctic sea ice extent 
has decreased in every season and in every successive decade since 
1979, with the most rapid decrease in decadal mean extent in summer 
(high confidence). For the summer sea ice minimum, the decrease was 
very likely in the range of 9.4 to 13.6% per decade (range of 0.73 to 
1.07 million km2 per decade) (see Figure 1.1). It is very likely that the 
annual mean Antarctic sea ice extent increased in the range of 1.2 
to 1.8% per decade (range of 0.13 to 0.20 million km2 per decade) 
between 1979 and 2012. However, there is high confidence that there 
are strong regional differences in Antarctica, with extent increasing in 
some regions and decreasing in others. {WGI SPM B.5, 4.2.2, 4.2.3}
There is very high confidence that the extent of Northern Hemisphere 
snow cover has decreased since the mid-20th century by 1.6 [0.8 to 
2.4] % per decade for March and April, and 11.7% per decade for June, 
over the 1967 to 2012 period. There is high confidence that permafrost 
temperatures have increased in most regions of the Northern Hemi-
sphere since the early 1980s, with reductions in thickness and areal 
extent in some regions. The increase in permafrost temperatures has 
occurred in response to increased surface temperature and changing 
snow cover. {WGI SPM B.3, 4.5, 4.7.2}
1.1.4 Sea level
Over the period 1901–2010, global mean sea level rose by 0.19 
[0.17 to 0.21] m (Figure 1.1). The rate of sea level rise since the 
mid-19th century has been larger than the mean rate during the 
previous two millennia (high confidence). {WGI SPM B.4, 3.7.2, 
5.6.3, 13.2}
It is very likely that the mean rate of global averaged sea level rise was 
1.7 [1.5 to 1.9] mm/yr between 1901 and 2010 and 3.2 [2.8 to 3.6] 
mm/yr between 1993 and 2010. Tide gauge and satellite altimeter data 
are consistent regarding the higher rate during the latter period. It is 
likely that similarly high rates occurred between 1920 and 1950. {WGI 
SPM B.4, 3.7, 13.2}
Since the early 1970s, glacier mass loss and ocean thermal expansion 
from warming together explain about 75% of the observed global 
mean sea level rise (high confidence). Over the period 1993–2010, 
global mean sea level rise is, with high confidence, consistent with 
the sum of the observed contributions from ocean thermal expansion, 
due to warming, from changes in glaciers, the Greenland ice sheet, 
the Antarctic ice sheet and land water storage. {WGI SPM B.4, 13.3.6}
Rates of sea level rise over broad regions can be several times larger 
or smaller than the global mean sea level rise for periods of sever-
al decades, due to fluctuations in ocean circulation. Since 1993, the 
regional rates for the Western Pacific are up to three times larger than 
the global mean, while those for much of the Eastern Pacific are near 
zero or negative. {WGI 3.7.3, FAQ 13.1}
There is very high confidence that maximum global mean sea level 
during the last interglacial period (129,000 to 116,000 years ago) was, 
for several thousand years, at least 5 m higher than present and 




















Energy accumulation within the Earth’s climate system
Figure 1.2 |  Energy accumulation within the Earth’s climate system. Estimates are in 
1021 J, and are given relative to 1971 and from 1971 to 2010, unless otherwise indi-
cated. Components included are upper ocean (above 700 m), deep ocean (below 700 
m; including below 2000 m estimates starting from 1992), ice melt (for glaciers and ice 
caps, Greenland and Antarctic ice sheet estimates starting from 1992, and Arctic sea ice 
estimate from 1979 to 2008), continental (land) warming, and atmospheric warming 
(estimate starting from 1979). Uncertainty is estimated as error from all five compo-
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Box 1.1 | Recent Temperature Trends and their Implications
The observed reduction in surface warming trend over the period 1998 to 2012 as compared to the period 1951 to 2012, 
is due in roughly equal measure to a reduced trend in radiative forcing and a cooling contribution from natural internal 
variability, which includes a possible redistribution of heat within the ocean (medium confidence). The rate of warming of the 
observed global mean surface temperature over the period from 1998 to 2012 is estimated to be around one-third to one-half of the trend 
over the period from 1951 to 2012 (Box 1.1, Figures 1a and 1c). Even with this reduction in surface warming trend, the climate system has 
very likely continued to accumulate heat since 1998 (Figure 1.2) and sea level has continued to rise (Figure 1.1). {WGI SPM D.1, Box 9.2}
The radiative forcing of the climate system has continued to increase during the 2000s, as has its largest contributor, the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2. However, the radiative forcing has been increasing at a lower rate over the period from 1998 to 2011, compared to 
1984 to 1998 or 1951 to 2011, due to cooling effects from volcanic eruptions and the cooling phase of the solar cycle over the period from 
2000 to 2009. There is, however, low confidence in quantifying the role of the forcing trend in causing the reduction in the rate of surface 
warming. {WGI 8.5.2, Box 9.2}
For the period from 1998 to 2012, 111 of the 114 available climate-model simulations show a surface warming trend larger than the 
observations (Box 1.1, Figure 1a). There is medium confidence that this difference between models and observations is to a substantial 
degree caused by natural internal climate variability, which sometimes enhances and sometimes counteracts the long-term externally 
forced warming trend (compare Box 1.1, Figures 1a and 1b; during the period from 1984 to 1998, most model simulations show a smaller 
warming trend than observed). Natural internal variability thus diminishes the relevance of short trends for long-term climate change. The 
difference between models and observations may also contain contributions from inadequacies in the solar, volcanic and aerosol forcings 
used by the models and, in some models, from an overestimate of the response to increasing greenhouse gas and other anthropogenic 
forcing (the latter dominated by the effects of aerosols). {WGI 2.4.3, Box 9.2, 9.4.1, 10.3.1.1}
For the longer period from 1951 to 2012, simulated surface warming trends are consistent with the observed trend (very high confidence) 
(Box 1.1, Figure 1c). Furthermore, the independent estimates of radiative forcing, of surface warming and of observed heat storage (the 
latter available since 1970) combine to give a heat budget for the Earth that is consistent with the assessed likely range of equilibrium 
climate sensitivity20 (1.5–4.5 ºC)21. The record of observed climate change has thus allowed characterization of the basic properties of the 
climate system that have implications for future warming, including the equilibrium climate sensitivity and the transient climate response 
(see Topic 2). {WGI Box 9.2, 10.8.1, 10.8.2, Box 12.2, Box 13.1}
Box 1.1, Figure 1 |  Trends in the global mean surface temperature over the periods from 1998 to 2012 (a), 1984 to 1998 (b), and 1951 to 2012 (c), from observations 
(red) and the 114 available simulations with current-generation climate models (grey bars). The height of each grey bar indicates how often a trend of a certain magnitude 
(in °C per decade) occurs among the 114 simulations. The width of the red-hatched area indicates the statistical uncertainty that arises from constructing a global average 
from individual station data. This observational uncertainty differs from the one quoted in the text of Section 1.1.1; there, an estimate of natural internal variability is also 
included. Here, by contrast, the magnitude of natural internal variability is characterised by the spread of the model ensemble. {based on WGI Box 9.2, Figure 1}
 
21 The connection between the heat budget and equilibrium climate sensitivity, which is the long-term surface warming under an assumed doubling of the atmospheric 
CO2 concentration, arises because a warmer surface causes enhanced radiation to space which counteracts the increase in the Earth’s heat content. How much the 
radiation to space increases for a given increase in surface temperature depends on the same feedback processes (e.g., cloud feedback, water vapour feedback) that 
determine equilibrium climate sensitivity. 
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high confidence that it did not exceed 10 m above present. During the 
last interglacial period, the Greenland ice sheet very likely contributed 
between 1.4 and 4.3 m to the higher global mean sea level, implying 
with medium confidence an additional contribution from the Antarctic 
ice sheet. This change in sea level occurred in the context of different 
orbital forcing and with high-latitude surface temperature, averaged 
over several thousand years, at least 2°C warmer than present (high 
confidence). {WGI SPM B.4, 5.3.4, 5.6.2, 13.2.1}
1.2 Past and recent drivers of climate change 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
increased since the pre-industrial era driven largely 
by economic and population growth. From 2000 to 
2010 emissions were the highest in history. Historical 
emissions have driven atmospheric concentrations of 
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide to levels 
that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 
years, leading to an uptake of energy by the climate 
system.
Natural and anthropogenic substances and processes that alter the 
Earth’s energy budget are physical drivers of climate change. Radiative 
forcing  quantifies the perturbation of energy into the Earth system 
caused by these drivers. Radiative forcings larger than zero lead to a 
near-surface warming, and radiative forcings smaller than zero lead to 
a cooling. Radiative forcing is estimated based on in-situ and remote 
observations, properties of GHGs and aerosols, and calculations using 
numerical models. The radiative forcing over the 1750–2011 period is 
shown in Figure 1.4 in major groupings. The ‘Other Anthropogenic’ 
group is principally comprised of cooling effects from aerosol changes, 
with smaller contributions from ozone changes, land use reflectance 
changes and other minor terms. {WGI SPM C, 8.1, 8.5.1}
1.2.1 Natural and anthropogenic radiative forcings
Atmospheric concentrations of GHGs are at levels that are 
unprecedented in at least 800,000 years. Concentrations of 
carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
have all shown large increases since 1750 (40%, 150% and 20%, 
respectively) (Figure 1.3). CO2 concentrations are increasing at the 
fastest observed decadal rate of change (2.0 ± 0.1 ppm/yr) for 2002–
2011. After almost one decade of stable CH4 concentrations since the 
late 1990s, atmospheric measurements have shown renewed increases 
since 2007. N2O concentrations have steadily increased at a rate of 
0.73 ± 0.03 ppb/yr over the last three decades. {WGI SPM B5, 2.2.1, 
6.1.2, 6.1.3, 6.3}
The total anthropogenic radiative forcing over 1750–2011 
is calculated to be a warming effect of 2.3 [1.1 to 3.3] W/m2 
(Figure 1.4), and it has increased more rapidly since 1970 than 
during prior decades. Carbon dioxide is the largest single con-
tributor to radiative forcing over 1750–2011 and its trend since 
1970. The total anthropogenic radiative forcing estimate for 2011 
is substantially higher (43%) than the estimate reported in the IPCC 
Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) for the year 2005. This is caused by 
a combination of continued growth in most GHG concentrations and 
an improved estimate of radiative forcing from aerosols. {WGI SPM C, 
8.5.1}
The radiative forcing from aerosols, which includes cloud 
adjustments, is better understood and indicates a weaker 
cooling effect than in AR4. The aerosol radiative forcing over 
1750–2011 is estimated as –0.9 [–1.9 to −0.1] W/m2 (medium 
confidence). Radiative forcing from aerosols has two competing 
components: a dominant cooling effect from most aerosols and 
their cloud adjustments and a partially offsetting warming con-
tribution from black carbon absorption of solar radiation. There 
is high confidence that the global mean total aerosol radiative forcing 
has counteracted a substantial portion of radiative forcing from well-
mixed GHGs. Aerosols continue to contribute the largest uncertainty to 
the total radiative forcing estimate. {WGI SPM C, 7.5, 8.3, 8.5.1}
Changes in solar irradiance and volcanic aerosols cause natu-
ral radiative forcing (Figure 1.4). The radiative forcing from strato-
spheric volcanic aerosols can have a large cooling effect on the climate 
system for some years after major volcanic eruptions. Changes in total 
solar irradiance are calculated to have contributed only around 2% of 






































Figure 1.3 | Observed changes in atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. 
Atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2, green), methane (CH4, orange), and 
nitrous oxide (N2O, red). Data from ice cores (symbols) and direct atmospheric measure-
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1.2.2 Human activities affecting emission drivers
About half of the cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
between 1750 and 2011 have occurred in the last 40 years 
(high confidence). Cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions of 
2040 ± 310 GtCO2 were added to the atmosphere between 1750 
and 2011. Since 1970, cumulative CO2 emissions from fossil fuel 
combustion, cement production and flaring have tripled, and cumula-
tive CO2 emissions from forestry and other land use21(FOLU)22 have 
increased by about 40% (Figure 1.5)23. In 2011, annual CO2 emis-
sions from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and flaring 
were 34.8 ± 2.9 GtCO2/yr. For 2002–2011, average annual emissions 
from FOLU were 3.3 ± 2.9 GtCO2/yr. {WGI 6.3.1, 6.3.2, WGIII SPM.3} 
About 40% of these anthropogenic CO2 emissions have 
remained in the atmosphere (880 ± 35 GtCO2) since 1750. The 
rest was removed from the atmosphere by sinks, and stored in 
natural carbon cycle reservoirs. Sinks from ocean uptake and vege-
tation with soils account, in roughly equal measures, for the remainder 
of the cumulative CO2 emissions. The ocean has absorbed about 30% 
of the emitted anthropogenic CO2, causing ocean acidification. {WGI 
3.8.1, 6.3.1} 
Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have continued 
to increase over 1970 to 2010 with larger absolute increases 
between 2000 and 2010 (high confidence). Despite a growing 
number of climate change mitigation policies, annual GHG emissions 
grew on average by 1.0 GtCO2-eq (2.2%) per year, from 2000 to 2010, 
compared to 0.4 GtCO2-eq (1.3%) per year, from 1970 to 2000 (Figure 
1.6)24. Total anthropogenic GHG emissions from 2000 to 2010 were 
the highest in human history and reached 49 (±4.5) GtCO2-eq/yr in 
2010. The global economic crisis of 2007/2008 reduced emissions only 
temporarily. {WGIII SPM.3, 1.3, 5.2, 13.3, 15.2.2, Box TS.5, Figure 15.1}
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Figure 1.4 | Radiative forcing of climate change during the industrial era 
(1750–2011). Bars show radiative forcing from well-mixed greenhouse gases 
(WMGHG), other anthropogenic forcings, total anthropogenic forcings and natural 
forcings. The error bars indicate the 5 to 95% uncertainty. Other anthropogenic forc-
ings include aerosol, land use surface reflectance and ozone changes. Natural forcings 
include solar and volcanic effects. The total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 
relative to 1750 is 2.3 W/m2 (uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W/m2). This corresponds to a 
CO2-equivalent concentration (see Glossary) of 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 to 520 
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Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions
Quantitative information of CH4 and N2O emission time series from 1850 to 1970 is limited 
Figure 1.5 |  Annual global anthropogenic carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2/yr) from fossil fuel combustion, cement production and 
flaring, and forestry and other land use (FOLU), 1750–2011. Cumulative emissions and their uncertainties are shown as bars and whiskers, respectively, on the right-hand side. The 
global effects of the accumulation of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions are shown in Figure 1.3. Greenhouse gas emission data from 1970 to 2010 are shown in 
Figure 1.6. {modified from WGI Figure TS.4 and WGIII Figure TS.2}
22 Forestry and other land use (FOLU)—also referred to as LULUCF (land use, land use change and forestry)—is the subset of agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) 
emissions and removals of GHGs related to direct human-induced LULUCF activities, excluding agricultural emissions and removals (see WGIII AR5 Glossary).
23 Numbers from WGI 6.3 converted into GtCO2 units. Small differences in cumulative emissions from Working Group III {WGIII SPM.3, TS.2.1} are due to different approaches to 
rounding, different end years and the use of different data sets for emissions from FOLU. Estimates remain extremely close, given their uncertainties.
24 CO2-equivalent emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs. Throughout the SYR, when historical emissions of GHGs are provided in GtCO2-eq, they 
are weighted by Global Warming Potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100), taken from the IPCC Second Assessment Report unless otherwise stated. A unit abbreviation 
of GtCO2-eq is used. {Box 3.2, Glossary}
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CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and industrial pro-
cesses contributed about 78% to the total GHG emission 
increase between 1970 and 2010, with a contribution of similar 
percentage over the 2000–2010 period (high confidence). Fos-
sil-fuel-related CO2 emissions reached 32 (±2.7) GtCO2/yr, in 2010, and 
grew further by about 3% between 2010 and 2011, and by about 1 to 
2% between 2011 and 2012. CO2 remains the major anthropogenic 
GHG, accounting for 76% of total anthropogenic GHG emissions in 
2010. Of the total, 16% comes from CH4, 6.2% from N2O, and 2.0% 
from fluorinated gases (F-gases) (Figure 1.6)25. Annually, since 1970, 
about 25% of anthropogenic GHG emissions have been in the form of 
non-CO2 gases26. {WGIII SPM.3, 1.2, 5.2}
Total annual anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased by 
about 10 GtCO2-eq between 2000 and 2010. This increase direct-
ly came from the energy (47%), industry (30%), transport (11%) 
and building (3%) sectors (medium confidence). Accounting for 
indirect emissions raises the contributions by the building and 
industry sectors (high confidence). Since 2000, GHG emissions have 
been growing in all sectors, except in agriculture, forestry and other 
land use (AFOLU)22. In 2010, 35% of GHG emissions were released by 
the energy sector, 24% (net emissions) from AFOLU, 21% by industry, 
14% by transport and 6.4% by the building sector. When emissions 
from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that 
use the final energy (i.e., indirect emissions), the shares of the industry 
and building sectors in global GHG emissions are increased to 31% 
and 19%, respectively (Figure 1.7). {WGIII SPM.3, 7.3, 8.1, 9.2, 10.3, 
11.2} See also Box 3.2 for contributions from various sectors, based on 
metrics other than 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100).
Globally, economic and population growth continue to be the 
most important drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuel combustion. The contribution of population growth 
between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly identical to that of 
the previous three decades, while the contribution of economic 
growth has risen sharply (high confidence). Between 2000 and 
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Figure 1.6 |  Total annual anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) for the period 1970 to 2010, by gases: CO2 from 
fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes; CO2 from Forestry and Other Land Use (FOLU); methane (CH4); nitrous oxide (N2O); fluorinated gases covered under the Kyoto 
Protocol (F-gases). Right hand side shows 2010 emissions, using alternatively CO2-equivalent emission weightings based on IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR) and AR5 values. 
Unless otherwise stated, CO2-equivalent emissions in this report include the basket of Kyoto gases (CO2, CH4, N2O as well as F-gases) calculated based on 100-year Global Warming 
Potential (GWP100) values from the SAR (see Glossary). Using the most recent GWP100 values from the AR5 (right-hand bars) would result in higher total annual GHG emissions (52 
GtCO2-eq/yr) from an increased contribution of methane, but does not change the long-term trend significantly. Other metric choices would change the contributions of different 
gases (see Box 3.2). The 2010 values are shown again broken down into their components with the associated uncertainties (90% confidence interval) indicated by the error bars. 
Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion are known with an 8% uncertainty margin (90% confidence interval). There are very large uncertainties (of the order of ±50%) 
attached to the CO2 emissions from FOLU. Uncertainty about the global emissions of CH4, N2O and the F-gases has been estimated at 20%, 60% and 20%, respectively. 2010 
was the most recent year for which emission statistics on all gases as well as assessments of uncertainties were essentially complete at the time of data cut off for this report. The 
uncertainty estimates only account for uncertainty in emissions, not in the GWPs (as given in WGI 8.7). {WGIII Figure SPM.1}
25 Using the most recent 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) values from the AR5 {WGI 8.7} instead of GWP100 values from the IPCC Second Assessment Report, 
global GHG emission totals would be slightly higher (52 GtCO2-eq/yr) and non-CO2 emission shares would be 20% for CH4, 5% for N2O and 2.2% for F-gases.
26 For this report, data on non-CO2 GHGs, including F-gases, were taken from the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database {WGIII Annex II.9}, 
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2010, both drivers outpaced emission reductions from improvements 
in energy intensity of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 1.8). 
Increased use of coal relative to other energy sources has reversed 
the long-standing trend in gradual decarbonization (i.e., reducing the 
carbon intensity of energy) of the world’s energy supply. {WGIII SPM.3, 
TS.2.2, 1.3, 5.3, 7.2, 7.3, 14.3}
1.3 Attribution of climate 
changes and impacts 
The evidence for human influence on the climate 
system has grown since AR4. Human influence has 
been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the 
ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reduc-
tions in snow and ice, and in global mean sea level 
rise; and it is extremely likely to have been the domi-
nant cause of the observed warming since the mid-
20th century. In recent decades, changes in climate 
have caused impacts on natural and human systems 
on all continents and across the oceans. Impacts are 
due to observed climate change, irrespective of its 
cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human 
systems to changing climate.
The causes of observed changes in the climate system, as well as in any 
natural or human system impacted by climate, are established follow-
ing a consistent set of methods. Detection addresses the question of 
whether climate or a natural or human system affected by climate has 
actually changed in a statistical sense, while attribution evaluates the 
relative contributions of multiple causal factors to an observed change 
Greenhouse gas emissions by economic sectors



























Figure 1.7 |  Total anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-
equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) from economic sectors in 2010. The circle shows the 
shares of direct GHG emissions (in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from five 
economic sectors in 2010. The pull-out shows how shares of indirect CO2 emissions 
(in % of total anthropogenic GHG emissions) from electricity and heat production are 
attributed to sectors of final energy use. ‘Other energy’ refers to all GHG emission 
sources in the energy sector as defined in WGIII Annex II, other than electricity and 
heat production {WGIII Annex II.9.1}. The emission data on agriculture, forestry and 
other land use (AFOLU) includes land-based CO2 emissions from forest fires, peat fires 
and peat decay that approximate to net CO2 flux from the sub-sectors of forestry and 
other land use (FOLU) as described in Chapter 11 of the WGIII report. Emissions are 
converted into CO2-equivalents based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100), 
taken from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Sector definitions are provided 
in WGIII Annex II.9. {WGIII Figure SPM.2}









































Decomposition of the change in total global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion by decade
Carbon intensity of energy
Energy intensity of GDP
GDP per capita
Total change
Figure 1.8 |  Decomposition of the change in total annual carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion by decade and four driving factors: population, income (gross 
domestic product, GDP) per capita, energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy. The bar segments show the changes associated with each individual factor, holding the 
respective other factors constant. Total emission changes are indicated by a triangle. The change in emissions over each decade is measured in gigatonnes of CO2 per year (GtCO2/yr); 
income is converted into common units, using purchasing power parities. {WGIII SPM.3}
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or event with an assignment of statistical confidence27. Attribution of 
climate change to causes quantifies the links between observed climate 
change and human activity, as well as other, natural, climate drivers. In 
contrast, attribution of observed impacts to climate change considers 
the links between observed changes in natural or human systems and 
observed climate change, regardless of its cause. Results from studies 
attributing climate change to causes provide estimates of the magni-
tude of warming in response to changes in radiative forcing and hence 
support projections of future climate change (Topic 2). Results from 
studies attributing impacts to climate change provide strong indica-
tions for the sensitivity of natural or human systems to future climate 
change. {WGI 10.8, WGII SPM A-1, WGI/II/III/SYR Glossaries}
1.3.1 Attribution of climate changes to human and 
natural influences on the climate system
It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed 
increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 
2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in GHG con-
centrations and other anthropogenic forcings together (Figure 
1.9). The best estimate of the human induced contribution to warming 
is similar to the observed warming over this period. GHGs contributed 
a global mean surface warming likely to be in the range of 0.5°C to 
1.3°C over the period 1951 to 2010, with further contributions from 
other anthropogenic forcings, including the cooling effect of aerosols, 
from natural forcings, and from natural internal variability (see Figure 
1.9). Together these assessed contributions are consistent with the 
observed warming of approximately 0.6°C to 0.7°C over this period. 
{WGI SPM D.3, 10.3.1}
It is very likely that anthropogenic influence, particularly GHGs and 
stratospheric ozone depletion, has led to a detectable observed pat-
tern of tropospheric warming and a corresponding cooling in the lower 
stratosphere since 1961. {WGI SPM D.3, 2.4.4, 9.4.1, 10.3.1}
Over every continental region except Antarctica, anthropogenic 
forcings have likely made a substantial contribution to surface 
temperature increases since the mid-20th century (Figure 1.10). 
For Antarctica, large observational uncertainties result in low confi-
dence that anthropogenic forcings have contributed to the observed 
warming averaged over available stations. In contrast, it is likely that 
there has been an anthropogenic contribution to the very substantial 
Arctic warming since the mid-20th century. Human influence has likely 
contributed to temperature increases in many sub-continental regions. 
{WGI SPM D.3, TS.4.8, 10.3.1} 
Anthropogenic influences have very likely contributed to Arctic 
sea ice loss since 1979 (Figure 1.10). There is low confidence in the 
scientific understanding of the small observed increase in Antarctic sea 
ice extent due to the incomplete and competing scientific explanations 
for the causes of change and low confidence in estimates of natural 
internal variability in that region. {WGI SPM D.3, 10.5.1, Figure 10.16} 
Anthropogenic influences likely contributed to the retreat of glaciers 
since the 1960s and to the increased surface melting of the Green-
land ice sheet since 1993. Due to a low level of scientific understand-
ing, however, there is low confidence in attributing the causes of the 
observed loss of mass from the Antarctic ice sheet over the past two 
decades. It is likely that there has been an anthropogenic contribu-
tion to observed reductions in Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover 
since 1970. {WGI 4.3.3, 10.5.2, 10.5.3}
It is likely that anthropogenic influences have affected the 
global water cycle since 1960. Anthropogenic influences have 
contributed to observed increases in atmospheric moisture content 
(medium confidence), to global-scale changes in precipitation patterns 
over land (medium confidence), to intensification of heavy precipita-
tion over land regions where data are sufficient (medium confidence)
(see 1.4) and to changes in surface and subsurface ocean salinity (very 
likely). {WGI SPM D.3, 2.5.1, 2.6.2, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 7.6.2, 10.3.2, 10.4.2, 
10.6}
It is very likely that anthropogenic forcings have made a sub-
stantial contribution to increases in global upper ocean heat 
content (0–700 m) observed since the 1970s (Figure 1.10). There 
is evidence for human influence in some individual ocean basins. It is 
very likely that there is a substantial anthropogenic contribution to the 
global mean sea level rise since the 1970s. This is based on the high 
confidence in an anthropogenic influence on the two largest contribu-
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Figure 1.9 |  Assessed likely ranges (whiskers) and their mid-points (bars) for warming 
trends over the 1951–2010 period from well-mixed greenhouse gases, other anthro-
pogenic forcings (including the cooling effect of aerosols and the effect of land use 
change), combined anthropogenic forcings, natural forcings, and natural internal cli-
mate variability (which is the element of climate variability that arises spontaneously 
within the climate system, even in the absence of forcings). The observed surface tem-
perature change is shown in black, with the 5 to 95% uncertainty range due to obser-
vational uncertainty. The attributed warming ranges (colours) are based on observations 
combined with climate model simulations, in order to estimate the contribution by an 
individual external forcing to the observed warming. The contribution from the com-
bined anthropogenic forcings can be estimated with less uncertainty than the separate 
contributions from greenhouse gases and other anthropogenic forcings separately. This 
is because these two contributions partially compensate, resulting in a signal that is 
better constrained by observations. {Based on Figure WGI TS.10}
27 Definitions were taken from the Good Practice Guidance Paper on Detection and Attribution, the agreed product of the IPCC Expert Meeting on Detection and Attribution 
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anic uptake of anthropogenic CO2 has resulted in gradual acidification 
of ocean surface waters (high confidence). {WGI SPM D.3, 3.2.3, 3.8.2, 
10.4.1, 10.4.3, 10.4.4, 10.5.2, 13.3, Box 3.2, TS.4.4, WGII 6.1.1.2, Box 
CC-OA}
1.3.2 Observed impacts attributed to climate change
In recent decades, changes in climate have caused impacts on 
natural and human systems on all continents and across the 
oceans. Impacts are due to observed climate change, irrespec-
tive of its cause, indicating the sensitivity of natural and human 
systems to changing climate. Evidence of observed climate change 
impacts is strongest and most comprehensive for natural systems. 
Some impacts on human systems have also been attributed to climate 
change, with a major or minor contribution of climate change distin-
guishable from other influences (Figure 1.11). Impacts on human sys-
tems are often geographically heterogeneous because they depend not 
only on changes in climate variables but also on social and economic 
factors. Hence, the changes are more easily observed at local levels, 
while attribution can remain difficult. {WGII SPM A-1, SPM A-3, 18.1, 
18.3–18.6}
Observations Models using only natural forcings
Models using both natural and anthropogenic forcings
Land surface
Global averages
Ocean heat contentLand and ocean surface
Arctic
1910         1960         2010
1910        1960        2010
1910              1960              20101910              1960              2010 1910              1960              2010
1910         1960         2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010
1910        1960        2010 1910        1960        2010



































































































































































Figure 1.10 |  Comparison of observed and simulated change in continental surface temperatures on land (yellow panels), Arctic and Antarctic September sea ice extent (white 
panels), and upper ocean heat content in the major ocean basins (blue panels). Global average changes are also given. Anomalies are given relative to 1880–1919 for surface 
temperatures, to 1960–1980 for ocean heat content, and to 1979–1999 for sea ice. All time series are decadal averages, plotted at the centre of the decade. For temperature panels, 
observations are dashed lines if the spatial coverage of areas being examined is below 50%. For ocean heat content and sea ice panels, the solid lines are where the coverage of 
data is good and higher in quality, and the dashed lines are where the data coverage is only adequate, and, thus, uncertainty is larger (note that different lines indicate different 
data sets; for details, see WGI Figure SPM.6). Model results shown are Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) multi-model ensemble ranges, with shaded bands 
indicating the 5 to 95% confidence intervals. {WGI Figure SPM 6; for detail, see WGI Figure TS.12}
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In many regions, changing precipitation or melting snow and 
ice are altering hydrological systems, affecting water resources 
in terms of quantity and quality (medium confidence). Glaciers 
continue to shrink almost worldwide due to climate change (high con-
fidence), affecting runoff and water resources downstream (medium 
confidence). Climate change is causing permafrost warming and thaw-
ing in high-latitude regions and in high-elevation regions (high confi-
dence). {WGII SPM A-1}
Many terrestrial, freshwater and marine species have shifted 
their geographic ranges, seasonal activities, migration patterns, 
abundances and species interactions in response to ongoing cli-
mate change (high confidence). While only a few recent species 
extinctions have been attributed as yet to climate change (high con-
fidence), natural global climate change at rates slower than current 
anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem shifts and 
species extinctions during the past millions of years (high confidence). 
Increased tree mortality, observed in many places worldwide, has been 
attributed to climate change in some regions. Increases in the fre-
quency or intensity of ecosystem disturbances such as droughts, wind-
storms, fires and pest outbreaks have been detected in many parts of 
the world and in some cases are attributed to climate change (medium 
confidence). Numerous observations over the last decades in all ocean 
basins show changes in abundance, distribution shifts poleward and/
or to deeper, cooler waters for marine fishes, invertebrates and phyto-
plankton (very high confidence), and altered ecosystem composition 
(high confidence), tracking climate trends. Some warm-water corals 
and their reefs have responded to warming with species replacement, 
bleaching, and decreased coral cover causing habitat loss (high confi-
dence). Some impacts of ocean acidification on marine organisms have 
been attributed to human influence, from the thinning of pteropod and 
foraminiferan shells (medium confidence) to the declining growth rates 
of corals (low confidence). Oxygen minimum zones are progressively 
expanding in the tropical Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans, due to 
reduced ventilation and O2 solubility in warmer, more stratified oceans, 
and are constraining fish habitat (medium confidence). {WGII SPM A-1, 
Table SPM.A1, TS A-1, 6.3.2.5, 6.3.3, 18.3–18.4, 30.5.1.1, Box CC-OA, 
Box CC-CR}
Assessment of many studies covering a wide range of regions 
and crops shows that negative impacts of climate change on 
crop yields have been more common than positive impacts (high 
confidence). The smaller number of studies showing positive impacts 
relate mainly to high-latitude regions, though it is not yet clear whether 
the balance of impacts has been negative or positive in these regions 
(high confidence). Climate change has negatively affected wheat and 
maize yields for many regions and in the global aggregate (medium 
confidence). Effects on rice and soybean yield have been smaller in 
major production regions and globally, with a median change of zero 
across all available data which are fewer for soy compared to the other 
crops (see Figure 1.11c). Observed impacts relate mainly to production 
aspects of food security rather than access or other components of 
food security. Since AR4, several periods of rapid food and cereal price 
increases following climate extremes in key producing regions indicate 
a sensitivity of current markets to climate extremes among other fac-
tors (medium confidence). {WGII SPM A-1}
At present the worldwide burden of human ill-health from cli-
mate change is relatively small compared with effects of other 
stressors and is not well quantified. However, there has been 
increased heat-related mortality and decreased cold-related mortality 
in some regions as a result of warming (medium confidence). Local 
changes in temperature and rainfall have altered the distribution of 
some water-borne illnesses and disease vectors (medium confidence). 
{WGII SPM A-1}
‘Cascading’ impacts of climate change can now be attributed 
along chains of evidence from physical climate through to inter-
mediate systems and then to people (Figure 1.12). The changes 
in climate feeding into the cascade, in some cases, are linked to human 
drivers (e.g., a decreasing amount of water in spring snowpack in west-
ern North America), while, in other cases, assessments of the causes of 
observed climate change leading into the cascade are not available. In 
all cases, confidence in detection and attribution to observed climate 
change decreases for effects further down each impact chain. {WGII 
18.6.3}
Figure 1.11 |  Widespread impacts in a changing world: (a) Based on the available scientific literature since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), there are substantially 
more impacts in recent decades now attributed to climate change. Attribution requires defined scientific evidence on the role of climate change. Absence from the map of additional 
impacts attributed to climate change does not imply that such impacts have not occurred. The publications supporting attributed impacts reflect a growing knowledge base, but 
publications are still limited for many regions, systems and processes, highlighting gaps in data and studies. Symbols indicate categories of attributed impacts, the relative contri-
bution of climate change (major or minor) to the observed impact and confidence in attribution. Each symbol refers to one or more entries in WGII Table SPM.A1, grouping related 
regional-scale impacts. Numbers in ovals indicate regional totals of climate change publications from 2001 to 2010, based on the Scopus bibliographic database for publications in 
English with individual countries mentioned in title, abstract or key words (as of July 2011). These numbers provide an overall measure of the available scientific literature on climate 
change across regions; they do not indicate the number of publications supporting attribution of climate change impacts in each region. Studies for polar regions and small islands 
are grouped with neighbouring continental regions. The inclusion of publications for assessment of attribution followed IPCC scientific evidence criteria defined in WGII Chapter 
18. Publications considered in the attribution analyses come from a broader range of literature assessed in the WGII AR5. See WGII Table SPM.A1 for descriptions of the attributed 
impacts. (b) Average rates of change in distribution (km per decade) for marine taxonomic groups based on observations over 1900–2010. Positive distribution changes are con-
sistent with warming (moving into previously cooler waters, generally poleward). The number of responses analysed is given for each category. (c) Summary of estimated impacts 
of observed climate changes on yields over 1960–2013 for four major crops in temperate and tropical regions, with the number of data points analysed given within parentheses 
for each category. {WGII Figure SPM.2, Box TS.1 Figure 1}
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Figure 1.12 |  Major systems where new evidence indicates interconnected, ‘cascading’ impacts from recent climate change through several natural and human subsystems. 
Bracketed text indicates confidence in the detection of a climate change effect and the attribution of observed impacts to climate change. The role of climate change can be major 
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1.4 Extreme events
Changes in many extreme weather and climate events 
have been observed since about 1950. Some of these 
changes have been linked to human influences, includ-
ing a decrease in cold temperature extremes, an 
increase in warm temperature extremes, an increase in 
extreme high sea levels and an increase in the number 
of heavy precipitation events in a number of regions. 
It is very likely that the number of cold days and nights has 
decreased and the number of warm days and nights has 
increased on the global scale. It is likely that the frequency of heat 
waves has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia. It is 
very likely that human influence has contributed to the observed global 
scale changes in the frequency and intensity of daily temperature 
extremes since the mid-20th century. It is likely that human influence 
has more than doubled the probability of occurrence of heat waves in 
some locations. {WGI SPM B.1, SPM D.3, Table SPM.1, FAQ 2.2, 2.6.1, 
10.6}
There is medium confidence that the observed warming has 
increased heat-related human mortality and decreased cold-re-
lated human mortality in some regions. Extreme heat events cur-
rently result in increases in mortality and morbidity in North America 
(very high confidence), and in Europe with impacts that vary according 
to people’s age, location and socio-economic factors (high confidence). 
{WGII SPM A-1, 11.4.1, Table 23-1, 26.6.1.2} 
There are likely more land regions where the number of heavy 
precipitation events has increased than where it has decreased. 
The frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation events has likely 
increased in North America and Europe. In other continents, confidence 
in trends is at most medium. It is very likely that global near-surface 
and tropospheric air specific humidity has increased since the 1970s. 
In land regions where observational coverage is sufficient for assess-
ment, there is medium confidence that anthropogenic forcing has con-
tributed to a global-scale intensification of heavy precipitation over 
the second half of the 20th century. {WGI SPM B-1, 2.5.1, 2.5.4–2.5.5, 
2.6.2, 10.6, Table SPM.1, FAQ 2.2, SREX Table 3-1, 3.2}
There is low confidence that anthropogenic climate change has 
affected the frequency and magnitude of fluvial floods on a 
global scale. The strength of the evidence is limited mainly by a lack of 
long-term records from unmanaged catchments. Moreover, floods are 
strongly influenced by many human activities impacting catchments, 
making the attribution of detected changes to climate change difficult. 
However, recent detection of increasing trends in extreme precipitation 
and discharges in some catchments implies greater risks of flooding on 
a regional scale (medium confidence). Costs related to flood damage, 
worldwide, have been increasing since the 1970s, although this is 
partly due to the increasing exposure of people and assets. {WGI 2.6.2, 
WGII 3.2.7, SREX SPM B}
There is low confidence in observed global-scale trends in 
droughts, due to lack of direct observations, dependencies of 
inferred trends on the choice of the definition for drought, and 
due to geographical inconsistencies in drought trends. There 
is also low confidence in the attribution of changes in drought over 
global land areas since the mid-20th century, due to the same observa-
tional uncertainties and difficulties in distinguishing decadal scale var-
iability in drought from long-term trends. {WGI Table SPM.1, 2.6.2.3, 
10.6, Figure 2.33, WGII 3.ES, 3.2.7}
There is low confidence that long-term changes in tropical 
cyclone activity are robust, and there is low confidence in the 
attribution of global changes to any particular cause. However, it 
is virtually certain that intense tropical cyclone activity has increased in 
the North Atlantic since 1970. {WGI Table SPM.1, 2.6.3, 10.6}
It is likely that extreme sea levels (for example, as experienced 
in storm surges) have increased since 1970, being mainly the 
result of mean sea level rise. Due to a shortage of studies and the 
difficulty of distinguishing any such impacts from other modifications 
to coastal systems, limited evidence is available on the impacts of sea 
level rise. {WGI 3.7.4–3.7.6, Figure 3.15, WGII 5.3.3.2, 18.3}
Impacts from recent climate-related extremes, such as heat 
waves, droughts, floods, cyclones and wildfires, reveal signifi-
cant vulnerability and exposure of some ecosystems and many 
human systems to current climate variability (very high confi-
dence). Impacts of such climate-related extremes include alteration of 
ecosystems, disruption of food production and water supply, damage 
to infrastructure and settlements, human morbidity and mortality and 
consequences for mental health and human well-being. For countries 
at all levels of development, these impacts are consistent with a sig-
nificant lack of preparedness for current climate variability in some 
sectors. {WGII SPM A-1, 3.2, 4.2-3, 8.1, 9.3, 10.7, 11.3, 11.7, 13.2, 14.1, 
18.6, 22.2.3, 22.3, 23.3.1.2, 24.4.1, 25.6-8, 26.6-7, 30.5,Table 18-3, 
Table 23-1, Figure 26-2, Box 4-3, Box 4-4, Box 25-5, Box 25-6, Box 
25-8, Box CC-CR}
Direct and insured losses from weather-related disasters have 
increased substantially in recent decades, both globally and 
regionally. Increasing exposure of people and economic assets has 
been the major cause of long-term increases in economic losses from 
weather- and climate-related disasters (high confidence). {WGII 10.7.3, 
SREX SPM B, 4.5.3.3}
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1.5 Exposure and vulnerability
The character and severity of impacts from climate 
change and extreme events emerge from risk that 
depends not only on climate-related hazards but also 
on exposure (people and assets at risk) and vulner-
ability (susceptibility to harm) of human and natural 
systems.
Exposure and vulnerability are influenced by a wide range of 
social, economic and cultural factors and processes that have 
been incompletely considered to date and that make quanti-
tative assessments of their future trends difficult (high confi-
dence). These factors include wealth and its distribution across soci-
ety, demographics, migration, access to technology and information, 
employment patterns, the quality of adaptive responses, societal 
values, governance structures and institutions to resolve conflict. {WGII 
SPM A-3, SREX SPM B}
Differences in vulnerability and exposure arise from non-cli-
matic factors and from multidimensional inequalities often 
produced by uneven development processes (very high confi-
dence). These differences shape differential risks from climate 
change. People who are socially, economically, culturally, politically, 
institutionally or otherwise marginalized are especially vulnerable to 
climate change and also to some adaptation and mitigation responses 
(medium evidence, high agreement). This heightened vulnerability is 
rarely due to a single cause. Rather, it is the product of intersecting 
social processes that result in inequalities in socio-economic status 
and income, as well as in exposure. Such social processes include, for 
example, discrimination on the basis of gender, class, ethnicity, age and 
(dis)ability. {WGII SPM A-1, Figure SPM.1, 8.1–8.2, 9.3–9.4, 10.9, 11.1, 
11.3–11.5, 12.2–12.5, 13.1–13.3, 14.1–14.3, 18.4, 19.6, 23.5, 25.8, 
26.6, 26.8, 28.4, Box CC-GC}
Climate-related hazards exacerbate other stressors, often with 
negative outcomes for livelihoods, especially for people living 
in poverty (high confidence). Climate-related hazards affect poor 
people’s lives directly through impacts on livelihoods, reductions in 
crop yields or the destruction of homes, and indirectly through, for 
example, increased food prices and food insecurity. Observed positive 
effects for poor and marginalized people, which are limited and often 
indirect, include examples such as diversification of social networks 
and of agricultural practices. {WGII SPM A-1, 8.2–8.3, 9.3, 11.3, 13.1–
13.3, 22.3, 24.4, 26.8}
Violent conflict increases vulnerability to climate change 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Large-scale violent conflict 
harms assets that facilitate adaptation, including infrastructure, insti-
tutions, natural resources, social capital and livelihood opportunities. 
{WGII SPM A-1, 12.5, 19.2, 19.6}
1.6 Human responses to climate change: 
adaptation and mitigation
Adaptation and mitigation experience is accumulating 
across regions and scales, even while global 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have 
continued to increase.  
 
Throughout history, people and societies have adjusted to and coped 
with climate, climate variability and extremes, with varying degrees 
of success. In today’s changing climate, accumulating experience with 
adaptation and mitigation efforts can provide opportunities for learn-
ing and refinement (3, 4). {WGII SPM A-2}
Adaptation is becoming embedded in some planning pro-
cesses, with more limited implementation of responses (high 
confidence). Engineered and technological options are commonly 
implemented adaptive responses, often integrated within existing pro-
grammes, such as disaster risk management and water management. 
There is increasing recognition of the value of social, institutional and 
ecosystem-based measures and of the extent of constraints to adap-
tation. {WGII SPM A-2, 4.4, 5.5, 6.4, 8.3, 9.4, 11.7, 14.1, 14.3–14.4, 
15.2–15.5, 17.2–17.3, 21.3, 21.5, 22.4, 23.7, 25.4, 26.8–26.9, 30.6, 
Box 25-1, Box 25-2, Box 25-9, Box CC-EA}
Governments at various levels have begun to develop adapta-
tion plans and policies and integrate climate change consider-
ations into broader development plans. Examples of adaptation 
are now available from all regions of the world (see Topic 4 for details 
on adaptation options and policies to support their implementation). 
{WGII SPM A-2, 22.4, 23.7, 24.4–24.6, 24.9, 25.4, 25.10, 26.7–26.9, 
27.3, 28.2, 28.4, 29.3, 29.6, 30.6, Table 25-2, Table 29-3, Figure 29-1, 
Box 5-1, Box 23-3, Box 25-1, Box 25-2, Box 25-9, Box CC-TC}
Global increases in anthropogenic emissions and climate 
impacts have occurred, even while mitigation activities have 
taken place in many parts of the world. Though various mitiga-
tion initiatives between the sub-national and global scales have been 
developed or implemented, a full assessment of their impact may be 
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2.1 Key drivers of future climate and the 
basis on which projections are made
Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global 
mean surface warming by the late 21st century and 
beyond. Projections of greenhouse gas emissions vary 
over a wide range, depending on both socio-economic 
development and climate policy.
Climate models are mathematical representations of processes impor-
tant in the Earth’s climate system. Results from a hierarchy of climate 
models are considered in this report; ranging from simple idealized 
models, to models of intermediate complexity, to comprehensive Gen-
eral Circulation Models (GCMs), including Earth System Models (ESMs) 
that also simulate the carbon cycle. The GCMs simulate many climate 
aspects, including the temperature of the atmosphere and the oceans, 
precipitation, winds, clouds, ocean currents and sea-ice extent. The 
models are extensively tested against historical observations (Box 2.1). 
{WGI 1.5.2, 9.1.2, 9.2, 9.8.1}
In order to obtain climate change projections, the climate models use 
information described in scenarios of GHG and air pollutant emis-
sions and land use patterns. Scenarios are generated by a range of 
approaches, from simple idealised experiments to Integrated Assess-
ment Models (IAMs, see Glossary). Key factors driving changes in 
anthropogenic GHG emissions are economic and population growth, 
lifestyle and behavioural changes, associated changes in energy use 
and land use, technology and climate policy, which are fundamentally 
uncertain. {WGI 11.3, 12.4, WGIII 5, 6, 6.1}
The standard set of scenarios used in the AR5 is called Representative 
Concentration Pathways (RCPs, Box 2.2). {WGI Box SPM.1}
 
Box 2.1 | Advances, Confidence and Uncertainty in Modelling the Earth’s Climate System
Improvements in climate models since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) are evident in simulations of continental-
scale surface temperature, large-scale precipitation, the monsoon, Arctic sea ice, ocean heat content, some extreme 
events, the carbon cycle, atmospheric chemistry and aerosols, the effects of stratospheric ozone and the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation. Climate models reproduce the observed continental-scale surface temperature patterns and multi-decadal trends, includ-
ing the more rapid warming since the mid-20th century and the cooling immediately following large volcanic eruptions (very high 
confidence). The simulation of large-scale patterns of precipitation has improved somewhat since the AR4, although models continue 
to perform less well for precipitation than for surface temperature. Confidence in the representation of processes involving clouds and 
aerosols remains low. {WGI SPM D.1, 7.2.3, 7.3.3, 7.6.2, 9.4, 9.5, 9.8, 10.3.1}
The ability to simulate ocean thermal expansion, glaciers and ice sheets, and thus sea level, has improved since the AR4, but significant 
challenges remain in representing the dynamics of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. This, together with advances in scientific 
understanding and capability, has resulted in improved sea level projections in this report, compared with the AR4. {WGI SPM E.6, 
9.1.3, 9.2, 9.4.2, 9.6, 9.8, 13.1, 13.4, 13.5}
There is overall consistency between the projections from climate models in AR4 and AR5 for large-scale patterns of change and the 
magnitude of the uncertainty has not changed significantly, but new experiments and studies have led to a more complete and rigorous 
characterization of the uncertainty in long-term projections. {WGI 12.4}
Topic 2: Future Climate Changes, Risk and Impacts
Continued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes in all components of the 
climate system, increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems. Limit-
ing climate change would require substantial and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions which, together with 
adaptation, can limit climate change risks.
Topic 2 assesses projections of future climate change and the resulting risks and impacts. Factors that determine future climate change, including 
scenarios for future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, are outlined in Section 2.1. Descriptions of the methods and tools used to make projections 
of climate, impacts and risks, and their development since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), are provided in Boxes 2.1 to 2.3. Details of 
projected changes in the climate system, including the associated uncertainty and the degree of expert confidence in the projections are provided 
in Section 2.2. The future impacts of climate change on natural and human systems and associated risks are assessed in Section 2.3. Topic 2 
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Box 2.2 | The Representative Concentration Pathways 
The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) describe four different 21st century pathways of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions and atmospheric concentrations, air pollutant emissions and land use. The RCPs have been developed using 
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) as input to a wide range of climate model simulations to project their consequences for the cli-
mate system. These climate projections, in turn, are used for impacts and adaptation assessment. The RCPs are consistent with the wide 
range of scenarios in the mitigation literature assessed by WGIII2820. The scenarios are used to assess the costs associated with emission 
reductions consistent with particular concentration pathways. The RCPs represent the range of GHG emissions in the wider literature 
well (Box 2.2, Figure 1); they include a stringent mitigation scenario (RCP2.6), two intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 and RCP6.0), and 
one scenario with very high GHG emissions (RCP8.5). Scenarios without additional efforts to constrain emissions (‘baseline scenarios’) 
lead to pathways ranging between RCP6.0 and RCP8.5. RCP2.6 is representative of a scenario that aims to keep global warming likely 
below 2°C above pre-industrial temperatures. The majority of models indicate that scenarios meeting forcing levels similar to RCP2.6 
are characterized by substantial net negative emissions2921 by 2100, on average around 2 GtCO2/yr. The land use scenarios of RCPs, 
together, show a wide range of possible futures, ranging from a net reforestation to further deforestation, consistent with projections in 
the full scenario literature. For air pollutants such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), the RCP scenarios assume a consistent decrease in emissions 
as a consequence of assumed air pollution control and GHG mitigation policy (Box 2.2, Figure 1). Importantly, these future scenarios 
do not account for possible changes in natural forcings (e.g., volcanic eruptions) (see Box 1.1). {WGI Box SPM 1, 6.4, 8.5.3, 12.3, Annex 
II, WGII 19, 21, WGIII 6.3.2, 6.3.6}
The RCPs cover a wider range than the scenarios from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) used in previous 
assessments, as they also represent scenarios with climate policy. In terms of overall forcing, RCP8.5 is broadly comparable to 
the SRES A2/A1FI scenario, RCP6.0 to B2 and RCP4.5 to B1. For RCP2.6, there is no equivalent scenario in SRES. As a result, the differ-
ences in the magnitude of AR4 and AR5 climate projections are largely due to the inclusion of the wider range of emissions assessed. 
{WGI TS Box TS.6, 12.4.9}
Box 2.2, Figure 1 | Emission scenarios and the resulting radiative forcing levels for the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs, lines) and the associated 
scenarios categories used in WGIII (coloured areas, see Table 3.1). Panels a to d show the emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and 
sulfur dioxide (SO2). Panel e shows future radiative forcing levels for the RCPs calculated using the simple carbon cycle climate model, Model for the Assessment of 
Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC), for the RCPs (per forcing agent) and for the WGIII scenario categories (total) {WGI 8.2.2, 8.5.3, Figure 8.2, Annex 
II, WGIII Table SPM.1, Table 6.3}. The WGIII scenario categories summarize the wide range of emission scenarios published in the scientific literature and are defined 
based on total CO2-equivalent concentrations (in ppm) in 2100 (Table 3.1). The vertical lines to the right of the panels (panel a–d) indicate the full range of the WGIII 
AR5 scenario database.
 28 Roughly 300 baseline scenarios and 900 mitigation scenarios are categorized by CO2-equivalent concentration (CO2-eq) by 2100. The CO2-eq includes the forcing 
due to all GHGs (including halogenated gases and tropospheric ozone), aerosols and albedo change (see Glossary).
 29 Net negative emissions can be achieved when more GHGs are sequestered than are released into the atmosphere (e.g., by using bio-energy in combination with 
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The methods used to estimate future impacts and risks resulting from 
climate change are described in Box 2.3. Modelled future impacts 
assessed in this report are generally based on climate-model projec-
tions using the RCPs, and in some cases, the older Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES). {WGI Box SPM.1, WGII 1.1, 1.3, 2.2–2.3, 
19.6, 20.2, 21.3, 21.5, 26.2, Box CC-RC}
Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction 
between climate-related hazards (including hazardous events 
and trends) and the vulnerability and exposure of human and 
natural systems. Alternative development paths influence risk by 
changing the likelihood of climatic events and trends, through their 
effects on GHGs, pollutants and land use, and by altering vulnerability 
and exposure. {WGII SPM, 19.2.4, Figure 19-1, Box 19-2} 
Experiments, observations and models used to estimate future 
impacts and risks have improved since the AR4, with increas-
ing understanding across sectors and regions. For example, an 
improved knowledge base has enabled expanded assessment of 
risks for human security and livelihoods and for the oceans. For some 
aspects of climate change and climate change impacts, uncertainty 
about future outcomes has narrowed. For others, uncertainty will per-
sist. Some of the persistent uncertainties are grounded in the mecha-
nisms that control the magnitude and pace of climate change. Others 
emerge from potentially complex interactions between the changing 
climate and the underlying vulnerability and exposure of people, soci-
eties and ecosystems. The combination of persistent uncertainty in 
key mechanisms plus the prospect of complex interactions motivates 
a focus on risk in this report. Because risk involves both probability 
and consequence, it is important to consider the full range of possible 
outcomes, including low-probability, high-consequence impacts that 
are difficult to simulate. {WGII 2.1–2.4, 3.6, 4.3, 11.3, 12.6, 19.2, 19.6, 
21.3–21.5, 22.4, 25.3–25.4, 25.11, 26.2}
2.2 Projected changes in the climate system
Surface temperature is projected to rise over the 21st 
century under all assessed emission scenarios. It is 
very likely that heat waves will occur more often and 
last longer, and that extreme precipitation events will 
become more intense and frequent in many regions. 
The ocean will continue to warm and acidify, and 
global mean sea level to rise.
The projected changes in Section 2.2 are for 2081–2100 relative to 
1986–2005, unless otherwise indicated.
2.2.1 Air temperature2021
The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–
2035 relative to 1986–2005 is similar for the four RCPs, and will 
likely be in the range 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence)302. This 
range assumes no major volcanic eruptions or changes in some natu-
ral sources (e.g., methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O)), or unexpected 
changes in total solar irradiance. Future climate will depend on commit-
 
Box 2.3 | Models and Methods for Estimating Climate Change Risks, Vulnerability and Impacts
Future climate-related risks, vulnerabilities and impacts are estimated in the AR5 through experiments, analogies and 
models, as in previous assessments. ‘Experiments’ involve deliberately changing one or more climate-system factors affecting a 
subject of interest to reflect anticipated future conditions, while holding the other factors affecting the subject constant. ‘Analogies’ 
make use of existing variations and are used when controlled experiments are impractical due to ethical constraints, the large area or 
long time required or high system complexity. Two types of analogies are used in projections of climate and impacts. Spatial analo-
gies identify another part of the world currently experiencing similar conditions to those anticipated to be experienced in the future. 
Temporal analogies use changes in the past, sometimes inferred from paleo-ecological data, to make inferences about changes in the 
future. ‘Models’ are typically numerical simulations of real-world systems, calibrated and validated using observations from experi-
ments or analogies, and then run using input data representing future climate. Models can also include largely descriptive narratives 
of possible futures, such as those used in scenario construction. Quantitative and descriptive models are often used together. Impacts 
are modelled, among other things, for water resources, biodiversity and ecosystem services on land, inland waters, the oceans and ice 
bodies, as well as for urban infrastructure, agricultural productivity, health, economic growth and poverty. {WGII 2.2.1, 2.4.2, 3.4.1, 
4.2.2, 5.4.1, 6.5, 7.3.1, 11.3.6, 13.2.2}
Risks are evaluated based on the interaction of projected changes in the Earth system with the many dimensions of vul-
nerability in societies and ecosystems. The data are seldom sufficient to allow direct estimation of probabilities of a given outcome; 
therefore, expert judgment using specific criteria (large magnitude, high probability or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; 
persistent vulnerability or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation) is used 
to integrate the diverse information sources relating to the severity of consequences and the likelihood of occurrence into a risk evalu-
ation, considering exposure and vulnerability in the context of specific hazards. {WGII 11.3, 19.2, 21.1, 21.3–21.5, 25.3–25.4, 25.11, 
26.2}
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ted warming caused by past anthropogenic emissions, as well as future 
anthropogenic emissions and natural climate variability. By the mid-21st 
century, the magnitude of the projected climate change is substantially 
affected by the choice of emissions scenarios. Climate change contin-
ues to diverge among the scenarios through to 2100 and beyond (Table 
2.1, Figure 2.1). The ranges provided for particular RCPs (Table 2.1), and 
those given below in Section 2.2, primarily arise from differences in the 
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Figure 2.1 |  (a) Time series of global annual change in mean surface temperature for the 1900–2300 period (relative to 1986–2005) from Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
Phase 5 (CMIP5) concentration-driven experiments. Projections are shown for the multi-model mean (solid lines) and the 5 to 95% range across the distribution of individual models 
(shading). Grey lines and shading represent the CMIP5 historical simulations. Discontinuities at 2100 are due to different numbers of models performing the extension runs beyond 
the 21st century and have no physical meaning. (b) Same as (a) but for the 2006–2100 period (relative to 1986–2005). (c) Change in Northern Hemisphere September sea-ice 
extent (5 year running mean). The dashed line represents nearly ice-free conditions (i.e., when September sea-ice extent is less than 106 km2 for at least five consecutive years). (d) 
Change in global mean sea level. (e) Change in ocean surface pH. For all panels, time series of projections and a measure of uncertainty (shading) are shown for scenarios RCP2.6 
(blue) and RCP8.5 (red). The number of CMIP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated. The mean and associated uncertainties averaged over the 2081–2100 
period are given for all RCP scenarios as coloured vertical bars on the right hand side of panels (b) to (e). For sea-ice extent (c), the projected mean and uncertainty (minimum–max-
imum range) is only given for the subset of models that most closely reproduce the climatological mean state and the 1979–2012 trend in the Arctic sea ice. For sea level (d), based 
on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause 
global mean sea level to rise substantially above the likely range during the 21st century. However, there is medium confidence that this additional contribution would not exceed 
several tenths of a meter of sea level rise during the 21st century. {WGI Figure SPM.7, Figure SPM.9, Figure 12.5, 6.4.4, 12.4.1, 13.4.4, 13.5.1}
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Relative to 1850–1900, global surface temperature change for 
the end of the 21st century (2081–2100) is projected to likely 
exceed 1.5°C for RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high confidence). 
Warming is likely to exceed 2°C for RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high 
confidence), more likely than not to exceed 2°C for RCP4.5 
(medium confidence), but unlikely to exceed 2°C for RCP2.6 
(medium confidence). {WGI SPM E.1, 12.4.1, Table 12.3}
The Arctic region will continue to warm more rapidly than the global 
mean (Figure 2.2) (very high confidence). The mean warming over 
land will be larger than over the ocean (very high confidence) and 
larger than global average warming (Figure 2.2). {WGI SPM E.1, 11.3.2, 
12.4.3, 14.8.2}
It is virtually certain that there will be more frequent hot and 
fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily 
and seasonal timescales, as global mean surface temperature 
increases. It is very likely that heat waves will occur with a higher 
frequency and longer duration. Occasional cold winter extremes will 
continue to occur. {WGI SPM E.1, 12.4.3}
2.2.2 Water cycle
Changes in precipitation in a warming world will not be uniform. 
The high latitudes and the equatorial Pacific are likely to experience an 
increase in annual mean precipitation by the end of this century under 
the RCP8.5 scenario. In many mid-latitude and subtropical dry regions, 
mean precipitation will likely decrease, while in many mid-latitude wet 
regions, mean precipitation will likely increase under the RCP8.5 sce-
nario (Figure 2.2). {WGI SPM E.2, 7.6.2, 12.4.5, 14.3.1, 14.3.5}
Extreme precipitation events over most mid-latitude land masses and 
over wet tropical regions will very likely become more intense and 
more frequent as global mean surface temperature increases. {WGI 
SPM E.2, 7.6.2, 12.4.5}
Globally, in all RCPs, it is likely that the area encompassed by monsoon 
systems will increase and monsoon precipitation is likely to intensify 
and El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) related precipitation varia-
bility on regional scales will likely intensify. {WGI SPM E.2, 14.2, 14.4}
2.2.3 Ocean, cryosphere and sea level
The global ocean will continue to warm during the 21st century. 
The strongest ocean warming is projected for the surface in tropical 
and Northern Hemisphere subtropical regions. At greater depth the 
warming will be most pronounced in the Southern Ocean (high confi-
dence). {WGI SPM E.4, 6.4.5, 12.4.7}
It is very likely that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Cir-
culation (AMOC) will weaken over the 21st century, with best 
estimates and model ranges for the reduction of 11% (1 to 24%) for 
Table 2.1 |  Projected change in global mean surface temperature and global mean sea level rise for the mid- and late 21st century, relative to the 1986–2005 period. {WGI Table 
SPM.2, 12.4.1 13.5.1, Table 12.2, Table 13.5}
2046–2065 2081–2100
Scenario Mean Likely range c Mean Likely range c
Global Mean Surface  
Temperature Change (°C) a
RCP2.6 1.0 0.4 to 1.6 1.0 0.3 to 1.7
RCP4.5 1.4 0.9 to 2.0 1.8 1.1 to 2.6
RCP6.0 1.3 0.8 to 1.8 2.2 1.4 to 3.1
RCP8.5 2.0 1.4 to 2.6 3.7 2.6 to 4.8
Scenario Mean Likely range d Mean Likely range d
Global Mean Sea Level Rise (m) b
RCP2.6 0.24 0.17 to 0.32 0.40 0.26 to 0.55
RCP4.5 0.26 0.19 to 0.33 0.47 0.32 to 0.63
RCP6.0 0.25 0.18 to 0.32 0.48 0.33 to 0.63
RCP8.5 0.30 0.22 to 0.38 0.63 0.45 to 0.82
Notes:
a Based on the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) ensemble; changes calculated with respect to the 1986–2005 period. Using Hadley Centre Climatic 
Research Unit Gridded Surface Temperature Data Set 4 (HadCRUT4) and its uncertainty estimate (5 to 95% confidence interval), the observed warming from 1850–1900 to 
the reference period 1986–2005 is 0.61 [0.55 to 0.67] °C. Likely ranges have not been assessed here with respect to earlier reference periods because methods are not gen-
erally available in the literature for combining the uncertainties in models and observations. Adding projected and observed changes does not account for potential effects 
of model biases compared to observations, and for natural internal variability during the observational reference period. {WGI 2.4.3, 11.2.2, 12.4.1, Table 12.2, Table 12.3}
b Based on 21 CMIP5 models; changes calculated with respect to the 1986–2005 period. Based on current understanding (from observations, physical understanding and 
modelling), only the collapse of marine-based sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet, if initiated, could cause global mean sea level to rise substantially above the likely range 
during the 21st century. There is medium confidence that this additional contribution would not exceed several tenths of a meter of sea level rise during the 21st century. 
c Calculated from projections as 5 to 95% model ranges. These ranges are then assessed to be likely ranges after accounting for additional uncertainties or different levels of 
confidence in models. For projections of global mean surface temperature change in 2046–2065, confidence is medium, because the relative importance of natural internal 
variability, and uncertainty in non-greenhouse gas forcing and response, are larger than for the 2081–2100 period. The likely ranges for 2046–2065 do not take into account 
the possible influence of factors that lead to the assessed range for near term (2016–2035) change in global mean surface temperature that is lower than the 5 to 95% 
model range, because the influence of these factors on longer term projections has not been quantified due to insufficient scientific understanding. {WGI 11.3.1} 
d Calculated from projections as 5 to 95% model ranges. These ranges are then assessed to be likely ranges after accounting for additional uncertainties or different levels 
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Figure 2.2 |  Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) multi-model mean projections (i.e., the average of the model projections available) for the 2081–2100 
period under the RCP2.6 (left) and RCP8.5 (right) scenarios for (a) change in annual mean surface temperature and (b) change in annual mean precipitation, in percentages, and 
(c) change in average sea level. Changes are shown relative to the 1986–2005 period. The number of CMIP5 models used to calculate the multi-model mean is indicated in the 
upper right corner of each panel. Stippling (dots) on (a) and (b) indicates regions where the projected change is large compared to natural internal variability (i.e., greater than two 
standard deviations of internal variability in 20-year means) and where 90% of the models agree on the sign of change. Hatching (diagonal lines) on (a) and (b) shows regions 
where the projected change is less than one standard deviation of natural internal variability in 20-year means. {WGI Figure SPM.8, Figure 13.20, Box 12.1}
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the RCP2.6 scenario, 34% (12 to 54%) for the RCP8.5. Nevertheless, 
it is very unlikely that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or 
collapse in the 21st century. {WGI SPM E.4, 12.4.7.2}
Year-round reductions in Arctic sea ice are projected for all RCP 
scenarios. The subset of models that most closely reproduce the obser-
vations3123 project that a nearly ice-free Arctic Ocean3224 in September is 
likely for RCP8.5 before mid-century (medium confidence) (Figure 2.1). 
In the Antarctic, a decrease in sea ice extent and volume is projected 
with low confidence. {WGI SPM E.5, 12.4.6.1}
The area of Northern Hemisphere spring snow cover is likely to 
decrease by 7% for RCP2.6 and by 25% in RCP8.5 by the end of the 
21st century for the multi-model average (medium confidence). {WGI 
SPM E.5, 12.4.6}
It is virtually certain that near-surface permafrost extent at high 
northern latitudes will be reduced as global mean surface tem-
perature increases. The area of permafrost near the surface (upper 
3.5 m) is likely to decrease by 37% (RCP2.6) to 81% (RCP8.5) for the 
multi-model average (medium confidence). {WGI SPM E.5, 12.4.6}
The global glacier volume, excluding glaciers on the periphery of Ant-
arctica (and excluding the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets), is pro-
jected to decrease by 15 to 55% for RCP2.6 and by 35 to 85% for 
RCP8.5 (medium confidence). {WGI SPM E.5, 13.4.2, 13.5.1}
Global mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st cen-
tury (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1). There has been significant improvement 
in understanding and projection of sea level change since the AR4. 
Under all RCP scenarios, the rate of sea level rise will very likely exceed 
the observed rate of 2.0 [1.7–2.3] mm/yr during 1971–2010, with the 
rate of rise for RCP8.5 during 2081–2100 of 8 to 16 mm/yr (medium 
confidence). {WGI SPM B4, SPM E.6, 13.5.1}
Sea level rise will not be uniform across regions. By the end of 
the 21st century, it is very likely that sea level will rise in more than 
about 95% of the ocean area. Sea level rise depends on the pathway 
of CO2 emissions, not only on the cumulative total; reducing emissions 
earlier rather than later, for the same cumulative total, leads to a larger 
mitigation of sea level rise. About 70% of the coastlines worldwide 
are projected to experience sea level change within ±20% of the 
global mean (Figure 2.2). It is very likely that there will be a significant 
increase in the occurrence of future sea level extremes in some regions 
by 2100. {WGI SPM E.6, TS 5.7.1, 12.4.1, 13.4.1, 13.5.1, 13.6.5, 13.7.2, 
Table 13.5}
2.2.4 Carbon cycle and biogeochemistry
Ocean uptake of anthropogenic CO2 will continue under all four 
RCPs through to 2100, with higher uptake for higher concentra-
tion pathways (very high confidence). The future evolution of the 
land carbon uptake is less certain. A majority of models projects a con- 
tinued land carbon uptake under all RCPs, but some models simulate 
a land carbon loss due to the combined effect of climate change and 
land use change. {WGI SPM E.7, 6.4.2, 6.4.3}
Based on Earth System Models, there is high confidence that 
the feedback between climate change and the carbon cycle will 
amplify global warming. Climate change will partially offset increas-
es in land and ocean carbon sinks caused by rising atmospheric CO2. 
As a result more of the emitted anthropogenic CO2 will remain in the 
atmosphere, reinforcing the warming. {WGI SPM E.7, 6.4.2, 6.4.3}
Earth System Models project a global increase in ocean acidifi-
cation for all RCP scenarios by the end of the 21st century, with 
a slow recovery after mid-century under RCP2.6. The decrease in 
surface ocean pH is in the range of 0.06 to 0.07 (15 to 17% increase in 
acidity) for RCP2.6, 0.14 to 0.15 (38 to 41%) for RCP4.5, 0.20 to 0.21 
(58 to 62%) for RCP6.0, and 0.30 to 0.32 (100 to 109%) for RCP8.5 
(Figure 2.1). {WGI SPM E.7, 6.4.4}
It is very likely that the dissolved oxygen content of the ocean 
will decrease by a few percent during the 21st century in 
response to surface warming, predominantly in the subsurface 
mid-latitude oceans. There is no consensus on the future volume of 
low oxygen waters in the open ocean because of large uncertainties in 
potential biogeochemical effects and in the evolution of tropical ocean 
dynamics. {WGI TS 5.6, 6.4.5, WGII TS B-2, 6.1}
2.2.5 Climate system responses
Climate system properties that determine the response to external 
forcing have been estimated both from climate models and from anal-
ysis of past and recent climate change. The equilibrium climate sensi-
tivity (ECS)3325 is likely in the range 1.5°C to 4.5°C, extremely unlikely 
less than 1°C, and very unlikely greater than 6°C. {WGI SPM D.2, TS 
TFE.6, 10.8.1, 10.8.2, 12.5.4, Box 12.2} 
Cumulative emissions of CO2 largely determine global mean sur-
face warming by the late 21st century and beyond. Multiple lines of 
evidence indicate a strong and consistent near-linear relationship across 
all scenarios considered between net cumulative CO2 emissions (includ-
ing the impact of CO2 removal) and projected global temperature change 
to the year 2100 (Figure 2.3). Past emissions and observed warming sup-
port this relationship within uncertainties. Any given level of warming 
is associated with a range of cumulative CO2 emissions (depending on 
non-CO2 drivers), and therefore, for example, higher emissions in earlier 
decades imply lower emissions later. {WGI SPM E.8, TS TFE.8, 12.5.4} 
The global mean peak surface temperature change per trillion 
tonnes of carbon (1000 GtC) emitted as CO2 is likely in the range 
of 0.8°C to 2.5°C. This quantity, called the transient climate response 
to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), is supported by both modelling 
and observational evidence and applies to cumulative emissions up to 
about 2000 GtC. {WGI SPM D.2, TS TFE.6, 12.5.4, Box 12.2}
31 Climatological mean state and the 1979–2012 trend in Arctic sea-ice extent.
32 When sea-ice extent is less than one million km2 for at least five consecutive years.
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Warming caused by CO2 emissions is effectively irreversible 
over multi-century timescales unless measures are taken to 
remove CO2 from the atmosphere. Ensuring CO2-induced warming 
remains likely less than 2°C requires cumulative CO2 emissions from 
all anthropogenic sources to remain below about 3650 GtCO2 (1000 
GtC), over half of which were already emitted by 2011. {WGI SPM E.8, 
TS TFE.8, 12.5.2, 12.5.3, 12.5.4}
Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming 
(accounting for both CO2 and other human influences on climate) to 
less than 2°C relative to the period 1861–1880 with a probability of 
>66% would require total CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sourc-
es since 1870 to be limited to about 2900 GtCO2 when accounting for 
non-CO2 forcing as in the RCP2.6 scenario, with a range of 2550 to 
3150 GtCO2 arising from variations in non-CO2 climate drivers across 
the scenarios considered by WGIII (Table 2.2). About 1900 [1650 to 
2150] GtCO2 were emitted by 2011, leaving about 1000 GtCO2 to be 
consistent with this temperature goal. Estimated total fossil carbon 
reserves exceed this remaining amount by a factor of 4 to 7, with 
resources much larger still. {WGI SPM E.8, TS TFE.8, Figure 1, TS.SM.10, 
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Figure 2.3 |  Global mean surface temperature increase as a function of cumulative total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from various lines of evidence. Multi-model results 
from a hierarchy of climate carbon-cycle models for each Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) until 2100 are shown (coloured lines). Model results over the historical period 
(1860 to 2010) are indicated in black. The coloured plume illustrates the multi-model spread over the four RCP scenarios and fades with the decreasing number of available models 
in RCP8.5. Dots indicate decadal averages, with selected decades labelled. Ellipses show total anthropogenic warming in 2100 versus cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 to 2100 
from a simple climate model (median climate response) under the scenario categories used in WGIII. Temperature values are always given relative to the 1861–1880 period, and 
emissions are cumulative since 1870. Black filled ellipse shows observed emissions to 2005 and observed temperatures in the decade 2000–2009 with associated uncertainties. 
{WGI SPM E.8, TS TFE.8, Figure 1, TS.SM.10, 12.5.4, Figure 12.45, WGIII Table SPM.1, Table 6.3}
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2.3 Future risks and impacts caused 
by a changing climate 
Climate change will amplify existing risks and create 
new risks for natural and human systems. Risks are 
unevenly distributed and are generally greater for 
disadvantaged people and communities in countries 
at all levels of development. Increasing magnitudes of 
warming increase the likelihood of severe, pervasive 
and irreversible impacts for people, species and 
ecosystems. Continued high emissions would lead to 
mostly negative impacts for biodiversity, ecosystem 
services and economic development and amplify risks 
for livelihoods and for food and human security. 
Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of cli-
mate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the 
vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, including 
their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and 
other changes in the climate system, accompanied by ocean acidifica-
tion, increase the risk of severe, pervasive, and in some cases, irrevers-
ible detrimental impacts. Future climate change will amplify existing 
climate-related risks and create new risks. {WGII SPM B, Figure SPM.1}
Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to understanding dan-
gerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Risks are 
considered key due to high hazard or high vulnerability of societies and 
systems exposed, or both. Their identification is based on large magni-
tude or high probability of impacts; irreversibility or timing of impacts; 
persistent vulnerability or exposure; or limited potential to reduce risks. 
Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure 2.4), 
while others are global (Table 2.3). For risk assessment it is important 
to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts, including low-prob-
ability outcomes with large consequences. Risk levels often increase 
with temperature (Box 2.4) and are sometimes more directly linked to 
other dimensions of climate change, such as the rate of warming, as 
well as the magnitudes and rates of ocean acidification and sea level 
rise (Figure 2.5). {WGII SPM A-3, SPM B-1}
Table 2.2 | Cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emission consistent with limiting warming to less than stated temperature limits at different levels of probability, based on different 
lines of evidence. {WGI 12.5.4, WGIII 6}
Cumulative CO2 emissions from 1870 in GtCO2 
Net anthropogenic warming a <1.5°C <2°C <3°C
Fraction of simulations  
meeting goal b
66% 50% 33% 66% 50% 33% 66% 50% 33%
Complex models, RCP 
scenarios only c
2250 2250 2550 2900 3000 3300 4200 4500 4850
Simple model, WGIII 
scenarios d








n.a. e 4150 to 
5750
5250 to 6000
Cumulative CO2 emissions from 2011 in GtCO2 
Complex models, RCP 
scenarios only c
400 550 850 1000 1300 1500 2400 2800 3250
Simple model, WGIII 
scenarios d




n.a. e 2350 to 
4000
3500 to 4250
Total fossil carbon available in 2011 f : 3670 to 7100 GtCO2 (reserves) and 31300 to 50050 GtCO2 (resources)
Notes:
a Warming due to CO2 and non-CO2 drivers. Temperature values are given relative to the 1861–1880 base period. 
b Note that the 66% range in this table should not be equated to the likelihood statements in Table SPM.1 and Table 3.1 and WGIII Table SPM.1. The assessment in these 
latter tables is not only based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII using a single climate model, but also the assessment in WGI of the 
uncertainty of the temperature projections not covered by climate models. 
c Cumulative CO2 emissions at the time the temperature threshold is exceeded that are required for 66%, 50% or 33% of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
(CMIP5) complex models Earth System Model (ESM) and Earth System Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMIC) simulations, assuming non-CO2 forcing follows the RCP8.5 
scenario. Similar cumulative emissions are implied by other RCP scenarios. For most scenario–threshold combinations, emissions and warming continue after the threshold 
is exceeded. Nevertheless, because of the cumulative nature of CO2 emissions, these figures provide an indication of the cumulative CO2 emissions implied by the CMIP5 
model simulations under RCP-like scenarios. Values are rounded to the nearest 50.
d Cumulative CO2 emissions at the time of peak warming from WGIII scenarios for which a fraction of greater than 66% (66 to 100%), greater than 50% (50 to 66%) or 
greater than 33% (33 to 50%) of climate simulations keep global mean temperature increase to below the stated threshold. Ranges indicate the variation in cumulative 
CO2 emissions arising from differences in non-CO2 drivers across the WGIII scenarios. The fraction of climate simulations for each scenario is derived from a 600-member 
parameter ensemble of a simple carbon-cycle climate model, Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC), in a probabilistic mode. 
Parameter and scenario uncertainty are explored in this ensemble. Structural uncertainties cannot be explored with a single model set-up. Ranges show the impact of scenar-
io uncertainty, with 80% of scenarios giving cumulative CO2 emissions within the stated range for the given fraction of simulations. Simple model estimates are constrained 
by observed changes over the past century, do not account for uncertainty in model structure and may omit some feedback processes: they are hence slightly higher than 
the CMIP5 complex models estimates. Values are rounded to the nearest 50.
e The numerical results for the cumulative CO2 emissions for staying below 3°C with greater than 66% (66 to 100%) is greatly influenced by a large number of scenarios that 
would also meet the 2°C objective and therefore not comparable with numbers provided for the other temperature threshold.
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Key risks that span sectors and regions include the following 
(high confidence) {WGII SPM B-1}:
1. Risk of severe ill-health and disrupted livelihoods resulting from 
storm surges, sea level rise and coastal flooding; inland flooding in 
some urban regions; and periods of extreme heat.
2. Systemic risks due to extreme weather events leading to break-
down of infrastructure networks and critical services.
3. Risk of food and water insecurity and loss of rural livelihoods and 
income, particularly for poorer populations.
4. Risk of loss of ecosystems, biodiversity and ecosystem goods, func-
tions and services. 
The overall risks of future climate change impacts can be 
reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change, 
including ocean acidification. Some risks are considerable even at 
1°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels. 
Many global risks are high to very high for global temperature increas-
es of 4°C or more (see Box 2.4). These risks include severe and wide-
spread impacts on unique and threatened systems, the extinction of 
many species, large risks to food security and compromised normal 
human activities, including growing food or working outdoors in some 
areas for parts of the year, due to the combination of high temperature 
and humidity (high confidence). The precise levels of climate change 
sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain uncertain, 
but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds in the earth 
system or in interlinked human and natural systems increases with 
rising temperature (medium confidence). {WGII SPM B-1}
Regional key risks and 
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bleaching and mortality
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related water and 
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Increased water restrictions
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Spread of vector-borne diseases 
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fisheries catch 
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Representative key risks for each region for 
Figure 2.4 |  Representative key risks for each region, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Identification of 
key risks was based on expert judgment using the following specific criteria: large magnitude, high probability or irreversibility of impacts; timing of impacts; persistent vulnerability 
or exposure contributing to risks; or limited potential to reduce risks through adaptation or mitigation. Risk levels are assessed as very low, low, medium, high or very high for three 
timeframes: the present, near term (here, for 2030–2040) and long term (here, for 2080–2100). In the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not 
diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels are presented for two possible futures (2°C and 4°C global mean temperature increase above 
pre-industrial levels). For each time frame, risk levels are indicated for a continuation of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are 
not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. {WGII SPM Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1}
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Future Climate Changes, Risk and Impacts Topic 2
Adaptation can substantially reduce the risks of climate change 
impacts, but greater rates and magnitude of climate change 
increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (high 
confidence). The potential for adaptation, as well as constraints and 
limits to adaptation, varies among sectors, regions, communities and 
ecosystems. The scope for adaptation changes over time and is closely 
linked to socio-economic development pathways and circumstances. 
See Figure 2.4 and Table 2.3, along with Topics 3 and 4. {WGII SPM B, 
SPM C, TS B, TS C}
2.3.1 Ecosystems and their services in the oceans, 
along coasts, on land and in freshwater 
Risks of harmful impacts on ecosystems and human systems 
increase with the rates and magnitudes of warming, ocean 
acidification, sea level rise and other dimensions of climate 
change (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by the 
observation that natural global climate change at rates lower than 
current anthropogenic climate change caused significant ecosystem 
shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years on land 
and in the oceans (high confidence). Many plant and animal species 
will be unable to adapt locally or move fast enough during the 21st 
century to track suitable climates under mid- and high range rates of 
climate change (RCP4.5, RCP6.0 and RCP8.5) (medium confidence) 
(Figure 2.5a). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable. 
{WGII SPM A-1, SPM B-2, 4.3–4, 5.4, 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 25.6, 26.4, 29.4, Box 
CC-CR, Box CC-MB, Box CC-RF}
A large fraction of terrestrial, freshwater and marine species 
faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during 
and beyond the 21st century, especially as climate change 
interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Extinction risk is 
increased relative to pre-industrial and present periods, under all RCP 
scenarios, as a result of both the magnitude and rate of climate change 
(high confidence). Extinctions will be driven by several climate-associ-
ated drivers (warming, sea-ice loss, variations in precipitation, reduced 
river flows, ocean acidification and lowered ocean oxygen levels) and 
the interactions among these drivers and their interaction with simul-
taneous habitat modification, over-exploitation of stocks, pollution, 
eutrophication and invasive species (high confidence). {WGII SPM B-2, 
4.3–4.4, 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 25.6, 26.4, Box CC-RF, Box CC-MB}
Global marine species redistribution and marine biodiversi-
ty reduction in sensitive regions, under climate change, will 
challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and 
other ecosystem services, especially at low latitudes (high con-
fidence). By the mid-21st century, under 2°C global warming rela-
tive to pre-industrial temperatures, shifts in the geographical range of 
marine species will cause species richness and fisheries catch potential 
to increase, on average, at mid and high latitudes (high confidence) 
and to decrease at tropical latitudes and in semi-enclosed seas (Figure 
2.6a) (medium confidence). The progressive expansion of Oxygen Min-
imum Zones and anoxic ‘dead zones’ in the oceans will further con-
strain fish habitats (medium confidence). Open-ocean net primary pro-
duction is projected to redistribute and to decrease globally, by 2100, 
under all RCP scenarios (medium confidence). Climate change adds 
to the threats of over-fishing and other non-climatic stressors (high 
confidence). {WGII SPM B-2, 6.3–6.5, 7.4, 25.6, 28.3, 29.3, 30.6–30.7, 
Box CC-MB, Box CC-PP}
Marine ecosystems, especially coral reefs and polar ecosystems, 
are at risk from ocean acidification (medium to high confidence). 
Ocean acidification has impacts on the physiology, behaviour and pop-
ulation dynamics of organisms. The impacts on individual species and 
the number of species affected in species groups increase from RCP4.5 
to RCP8.5. Highly calcified molluscs, echinoderms and reef-building 
corals are more sensitive than crustaceans (high confidence) and 
fishes (low confidence) (Figure 2.6b). Ocean acidification acts together 
with other global changes (e.g., warming, progressively lower oxygen 
levels) and with local changes (e.g., pollution, eutrophication) (high 
confidence), leading to interactive, complex and amplified impacts for 
species and ecosystems (Figure 2.5b). {WGII SPM B-2, Figure SPM.6B, 
5.4, 6.3.2, 6.3.5, 22.3, 25.6, 28.3, 30.5, Figure 6-10, Box CC-CR, Box 
CC-OA, Box TS.7}
Carbon stored in the terrestrial biosphere is susceptible to loss 
to the atmosphere as a result of climate change, deforestation 
and ecosystem degradation (high confidence). The aspects of cli-
mate change with direct effects on stored terrestrial carbon include 
high temperatures, drought and windstorms; indirect effects include 
increased risk of fires, pest and disease outbreaks. Increased tree 
mortality and associated forest dieback is projected to occur in many 
regions over the 21st century (medium confidence), posing risks for 
carbon storage, biodiversity, wood production, water quality, amen-
ity and economic activity. There is a high risk of substantial carbon 
and methane emissions as a result of permafrost thawing. {WGII SPM, 
4.2–4.3, Figure 4-8, Box 4-2, Box 4-3, Box 4-4}
Coastal systems and low-lying areas will increasingly experience 
submergence, flooding and erosion throughout the 21st century 
and beyond, due to sea level rise (very high confidence). The 
population and assets projected to be exposed to coastal risks as well 
as human pressures on coastal ecosystems will increase significantly in 
the coming decades due to population growth, economic development 
and urbanization (high confidence). Climatic and non-climatic drivers 
affecting coral reefs will erode habitats, increase coastline exposure 
to waves and storms and degrade environmental features important 
to fisheries and tourism (high confidence). Some low-lying develop-
ing countries and small island states are expected to face very high 
impacts that could have associated damage and adaptation costs of 
several percentage points of gross domestic product (GDP) (Figure 
2.5c). {WGII 5.3–5.5, 22.3, 24.4, 25.6, 26.3, 26.8, 29.4, Table 26-1, Box 
25-1, Box CC-CR}
2.3.2 Water, food and urban systems, human 
health, security and livelihoods
The fractions of the global population that will experience 
water scarcity and be affected by major river floods are pro-
jected to increase with the level of warming in the 21st century 
(robust evidence, high agreement). {WGII 3.4–3.5, 26.3, 29.4, Table 
3-2, Box 25-8}
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Change in maximum catch potential (2051–2060 compared to 2001–2010, SRES A1B)
>100%< –50% –21 to –50% –6 to –20% –1 to –5% 20 to 49% 50 to 100%5 to 19%0 to 4%no data
Mollusc and crustacean fisheries 

































































































































































Figure 2.6 |  Climate change risks for fisheries. (a) Projected global redistribution of maximum catch potential of ~1000 species of exploited fishes and invertebrates, comparing the 
10-year averages over 2001–2010 and 2051–2060, using ocean conditions based on a single climate model under a moderate to high warming scenario (2°C warming relative to 
pre-industrial temperatures), without analysis of potential impacts of overfishing or ocean acidification. (b) Marine mollusc and crustacean fisheries (present-day estimated annual 
catch rates ≥0.005 tonnes/km2) and known locations of cold- and warm-water corals, depicted on a global map showing the projected distribution of surface ocean acidification 
by 2100 under RCP8.5. The bottom panel compares the percentage of species sensitive to ocean acidification for corals, molluscs and crustaceans, vulnerable animal phyla with 
socio-economic relevance (e.g., for coastal protection and fisheries). The number of species analysed across studies is given on top of the bars for each category of elevated CO2. 
For 2100, RCP scenarios falling within each pCO2 category are as follows: RCP4.5 for 500 to 650 μatm, RCP6.0 for 651 to 850 μatm and RCP8.5 for 851 to 1370 μatm. By 2150, 
RCP8.5 falls within the 1371 to 2900 μatm category. The control category corresponds to 380 μatm (The unit μatm is approximately equivalent to ppm in the atmosphere). {WGI 
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Climate change over the 21st century is projected to reduce 
renewable surface water and groundwater resources in most 
dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), 
intensifying competition for water among sectors (limited evi-
dence, medium agreement). In presently dry regions, the frequency 
of droughts will likely increase by the end of the 21st century under 
RCP8.5 (medium confidence). In contrast, water resources are pro-
jected to increase at high latitudes (robust evidence, high agreement). 
The interaction of increased temperature; increased sediment, nutrient 
and pollutant loadings from heavy rainfall; increased concentrations 
of pollutants during droughts; and disruption of treatment facilities 
during floods will reduce raw water quality and pose risks to drinking 
water quality (medium evidence, high agreement). {WGI 12.4, WGII 
3.2, 3.4–3.6, 22.3, 23.9, 25.5, 26.3, Table 3-2, Table 23-3, Box 25-2, 
Box CC-RF, Box CC-WE}
All aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate 
change, including food production, access, use and price sta-
bility (high confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and 
temperate regions, climate change without adaptation is projected to 
negatively impact production at local temperature increases of 2°C or 
more above late 20th century levels, although individual locations may 
benefit (medium confidence). Projected impacts vary across crops and 
regions and adaptation scenarios, with about 10% of projections for 
the 2030–2049 period showing yield gains of more than 10%, and 
about 10% of projections showing yield losses of more than 25%, 
compared with the late 20th century. Global temperature increases of 
~4°C or more above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing 
food demand, would pose large risks to food security, both global-
ly and regionally (high confidence) (Figure 2.4, 2.7). The relationship 
between global and regional warming is explained in 2.2.1. {WGII 
6.3–6.5, 7.4–7.5, 9.3, 22.3, 24.4, 25.7, 26.5, Table 7-2, Table 7-3, Figure 
7-1, Figure 7-4, Figure 7-5, Figure 7-6, Figure 7-7, Figure 7-8, Box 7-1}
Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human 
health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already 
exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century, cli-
mate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in 
many regions and especially in developing countries with low 
income, as compared to a baseline without climate change 
(high confidence). Health impacts include greater likelihood of injury 
and death due to more intense heat waves and fires, increased risks 
from foodborne and waterborne diseases and loss of work capacity 
and reduced labour productivity in vulnerable populations (high confi-
dence). Risks of undernutrition in poor regions will increase (high con-
fidence). Risks from vector-borne diseases are projected to generally 
increase with warming, due to the extension of the infection area and 
season, despite reductions in some areas that become too hot for dis-
ease vectors (medium confidence). Globally, the magnitude and sever-
ity of negative impacts will increasingly outweigh positive impacts 
(high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the combination of high tem-
perature and humidity in some areas for parts of the year is expected 
to compromise common human activities, including growing food and 
working outdoors (high confidence). {WGII SPM B-2, 8.2, 11.3–11.8, 
19.3, 22.3, 25.8, 26.6, Figure 25-5, Box CC-HS}
In urban areas, climate change is projected to increase risks for 
people, assets, economies and ecosystems, including risks from 
heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coast-
al flooding, landslides, air pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea 
level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks will 
be amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or 
living in exposed areas. {WGII 3.5, 8.2–8.4, 22.3, 24.4–24.5, 26.8, Table 
8-2, Box 25-9, Box CC-HS}
Rural areas are expected to experience major impacts on water 
availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and agri-
cultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of 
food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). 
These impacts will disproportionately affect the welfare of the poor in 
rural areas, such as female-headed households and those with limited 
access to land, modern agricultural inputs, infrastructure and educa-
tion. {WGII 5.4, 9.3, 25.9, 26.8, 28.2, 28.4, Box 25-5}
Figure 2.7 |  Summary of projected changes in crop yields (mostly wheat, maize, rice and soy) due to climate change over the 21st century. The figure combines 1090 data points 
from crop model projections, covering different emission scenarios, tropical and temperate regions and adaptation and no-adaptation cases. The projections are sorted into the 
20-year periods (horizontal axis) during which their midpoint occurs. Changes in crop yields are relative to late 20th century levels and data for each time period sum to 100%. 












































































































Key risk Adaptation issues & prospects  Climaticdrivers


















Level of risk & potential for adaptation
Potential for additional adaptation 
to reduce risk
Risk level with 
current adaptation








Reduction in terrestrial carbon sink: Carbon stored in terrestrial 
ecosystems is vulnerable to loss back into the atmosphere, resulting from 
increased fire frequency due to climate change and the sensitivity of 
ecosystem respiration to rising temperatures (medium confidence)
{WGII 4.2, 4.3}
• Adaptation options include managing land use 
(including deforestation), fire and other disturbances, 
and non-climatic stressors. 
Boreal tipping point: Arctic ecosystems are vulnerable to abrupt 
change related to the thawing of permafrost, spread of shrubs in 
tundra and increase in pests and fires in boreal forests 
(medium confidence)
{WGII 4.3, Box 4-4}
• There are few adaptation options in the Arctic.
Amazon tipping point: Moist Amazon forests could change abruptly 
to less-carbon-dense, drought- and fire-adapted ecosystems 
(low confidence)
{WGII 4.3, Box 4-3}
• Policy and market measures can reduce deforestation 
and fire.
Increased risk of species extinction: A large fraction of the species 
assessed is vulnerable to extinction due to climate change, often in 
interaction with other threats. Species with an intrinsically low 
dispersal rate, especially when occupying flat landscapes where the 
projected climate velocity is high, and species in isolated habitats such 
as mountaintops, islands or small protected areas are especially at risk. 
Cascading effects through organism interactions, especially those 
vulnerable to phenological changes, amplify risk (high confidence) 
{WGII 4.3, 4.4}
• Adaptation options include reduction of habitat 
modification and fragmentation, pollution, 
over-exploitation and invasive species; protected area 
expansion; assisted dispersal; and ex situ conservation.
Marine biodiversity loss with high rate of climate change  
(medium confidence) 
{WGII 6.3, 6.4, Table 30-4, Box CC-MB}
• Adaptation options are limited to reducing other stresses, 
mainly pollution, and limiting pressures from coastal human 
activities such as tourism and fishing.
Reduced growth and survival of commercially valuable shellfish and 
other calcifiers (e.g., reef building corals, calcareous red algae) due to 
ocean acidification (high confidence)
{WGII 5.3, 6.1, 6.3, 6.4, 30.3, Box CC-OA}
• Evidence for differential resistance and evolutionary 
adaptation of some species exists, but they are likely to be 
limited at higher CO2 concentrations and temperatures.
• Adaptation options include exploiting more resilient 
species or protecting habitats with low natural CO2 levels, 
as well as reducing other stresses, mainly pollution, and 











high Medium Global redistribution and decrease of low-latitude fisheries yields, paralleled by a global trend to catches having smaller fishes 
(medium confidence)
{WGII 6.3 to 6.5, 30.5, 30.6}
• Increasing coastal poverty at low latitudes as fisheries 
become smaller –  partially compensated by the growth 
of aquaculture and marine spatial planning, as well as 
enhanced industrialized fishing efforts
Table 2.3 | Examples of global key risks for different sectors, including the potential for risk reduction through adaptation and mitigation, as well as limits to adaptation. Each 
key risk is assessed as very low, low, medium, high or very high. Risk levels are presented for three time frames: present, near term (here, for 2030–2040) and long term (here, for 
2080–2100). In the near term, projected levels of global mean temperature increase do not diverge substantially across different emission scenarios. For the long term, risk levels 
are presented for two possible futures (2°C and 4°C global mean temperature increase above pre-industrial levels). For each time frame, risk levels are indicated for a continuation 
of current adaptation and assuming high levels of current or future adaptation. Risk levels are not necessarily comparable, especially across regions. Relevant climate variables are 
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Urban risks associated with 
housing (high confidence)
{WGII 8.3}
• Poor quality, inappropriately located housing is often most vulnerable to 
extreme events. Adaptation options include enforcement of building regulations 
and upgrading. Some city studies show the potential to adapt housing and 
promote mitigation, adaptation and development goals simultaneously. Rapidly 
growing cities, or those rebuilding after a disaster, especially have opportunities 
to increase resilience, but this is rarely realised. Without adaptation, risks of 
economic losses from extreme events are substantial in cities with high-value 
infrastructure and housing assets, with broader economic effects possible. 
Declining work productivity, increasing 
morbidity (e.g., dehydration, heat stroke and 
heat exhaustion), and mortality from 
exposure to heat waves. Particularly at risk 
are agricultural and construction workers as 
well as children, homeless people, the 
elderly, and women who have to walk long 
hours to collect water (high confidence)
{WGII 13.2, Box 13-1}
• Adaptation options are limited for people who are dependent on agriculture 
and cannot afford agricultural machinery. 
• Adaptation options are limited in the construction sector where many poor 
people work under insecure arrangements. 
• Adaptation limits may be exceeded in certain areas in a +4oC world. 
Reduced access to water for rural and urban 
poor people due to water scarcity and 
increasing competition for water  
(high confidence)
{WGII 13.2, Box 13-1}
• Adaptation through reducing water use is not an option for the many people 
already lacking adequate access to safe water. Access to water is subject to 
various forms of discrimination, for instance due to gender and location. Poor 
and marginalised water users are unable to compete with water extraction by 
industries, large-scale agriculture and other powerful users.
Adaptation options: 
• Buffering rural incomes against climate shocks, for example through 
livelihood diversification, income transfers and social safety net provision
• Early warning mechanisms to promote effective risk reduction
• Well-established strategies for managing violent conflict that are effective 
but require significant resources, investment and political will
Violent conflict arising from deterioration in 
resource-dependent livelihoods such as 
agriculture and pastoralism (high confidence)
{WGII 12.5}
• Adaptation to extreme events is well understood, but poorly implemented 
even under present climate conditions. Displacement and involuntary migration 
are often temporary. With increasing climate risks, displacement is more likely 
to involve permanent migration. 
Displacement associated with extreme events 
(high confidence)
{WGII 12.4}
• Most urban centers are energy intensive, with energy-related climate policies 
focused only on mitigation measures. A few cities have adaptation initiatives 
underway for critical energy systems. There is potential for non-adapted, 
centralised energy systems to magnify impacts, leading to national and 
transboundary consequences from localised extreme events. 
Urban risks associated with energy systems
(high confidence) 
{WGII 8.2, 8.4}
Urban risks associated with water supply 
systems (high confidence)
{WGII 8.2, 8.3}
• Adaptation options include changes to network infrastructure as well as 
demand-side management to ensure sufficient water supplies and quality, 
increased capacities to manage reduced freshwater availability, and flood risk 
reduction. 
Negative impacts on average crop yields and 
increases in yield variability due to climate 
change (high confidence)
{WGII 7.2 to 7.5, Figure 7-5, Box 7-1}
• Projected impacts vary across crops and regions and adaptation scenarios, 
with about 10% of projections for the period 2030–2049 showing yield gains 
of more than 10%, and about 10% of projections showing yield losses of more 
than 25%, compared to the late 20th century. After 2050 the risk of more 
severe yield impacts increases and depends on the level of warming.
Table 2.3 (continued)
72
Topic 2 Future Climate Changes, Risk and Impacts
2
 
Box 2.4 | Reasons For Concern Regarding Climate Change
Five Reasons For Concern (RFCs) have provided a framework for summarizing key risks since the IPCC Third Assessment Report. They 
illustrate the implications of warming and of adaptation limits for people, economies and ecosystems across sectors and regions. They 
provide one starting point for evaluating dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. All warming levels in the 
text of Box 2.4 are relative to the 1986–2005 period. Adding ~0.6°C to these warming levels roughly gives warming relative to the 
1850–1900 period, used here as a proxy for pre-industrial times (right-hand scale in Box 2.4, Figure 1). {WGII Assessment Box SPM.1}
The five RFCs are associated with:
1. Unique and threatened systems: Some ecosystems and cultures are already at risk from climate change (high confidence). With 
additional warming of around 1°C, the number of unique and threatened systems at risk of severe consequences increases. Many 
systems with limited adaptive capacity, particularly those associated with Arctic sea ice and coral reefs, are subject to very high 
risks with additional warming of 2°C. In addition to risks resulting from the magnitude of warming, terrestrial species are also 
sensitive to the rate of warming, marine species to the rate and degree of ocean acidification and coastal systems to sea level 
rise (Figure 2.5).
2. Extreme weather events: Climate change related risks from extreme events, such as heat waves, heavy precipitation and 
coastal flooding, are already moderate (high confidence). With 1°C additional warming, risks are high (medium confidence). Risks 
associated with some types of extreme events (e.g., extreme heat) increase progressively with further warming (high confidence).
3. Distribution of impacts: Risks are unevenly distributed between groups of people and between regions; risks are generally 
greater for disadvantaged people and communities everywhere. Risks are already moderate because of regional differences in 
observed climate change impacts, particularly for crop production (medium to high confidence). Based on projected decreases in 
regional crop yields and water availability, risks of unevenly distributed impacts are high under additional warming of above 2°C 
(medium confidence).
4. Global aggregate impacts: Risks of global aggregate impacts are moderate under additional warming of between 1°C and 2°C, 
reflecting impacts on both the Earth’s biodiversity and the overall global economy (medium confidence). Extensive biodiversity 
loss, with associated loss of ecosystem goods and services, leads to high risks at around 3°C additional warming (high confidence). 
Aggregate economic damages accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but few quantitative 
estimates are available for additional warming of above 3°C.  
5. Large-scale singular events: With increasing warming, some physical and ecological systems are at risk of abrupt and/or irre-
versible changes (see Section 2.4). Risks associated with such tipping points are moderate between 0 and 1°C additional warming, 
since there are signs that both warm-water coral reefs and Arctic ecosystems are already experiencing irreversible regime shifts 
(medium confidence). Risks increase at a steepening rate under an additional warming of 1 to 2°C and become high above 3°C, 
due to the potential for large and irreversible sea level rise from ice sheet loss. For sustained warming above some threshold 
greater than ~0.5°C additional warming (low confidence) but less than ~3.5°C (medium confidence), near-complete loss of the 
Greenland ice sheet would occur over a millennium or more, eventually contributing up to 7 m to global mean sea level rise.
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Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temper-
ature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global economic 
impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. 
With recognized limitations, the existing incomplete estimates of 
global annual economic losses for warming of ~2.5°C above pre-in-
dustrial levels are 0.2 to 2.0% of income (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). Changes in population, age structure, income, technolo-
gy, relative prices, lifestyle, regulation and governance are projected 
to have relatively larger impacts than climate change, for most eco-
nomic sectors (medium evidence, high agreement). More severe and/
or frequent weather hazards are projected to increase disaster-related 
losses and loss variability, posing challenges for affordable insurance, 
particularly in developing countries. International dimensions such as 
trade and relations among states are also important for understanding 
the risks of climate change at regional scales. (Box 3.1) {WGII 3.5, 10.2, 
10.7, 10.9–10.10, 17.4–17.5, 25.7, 26.7–26.9, Box 25-7}
From a poverty perspective, climate change impacts are pro-
jected to slow down economic growth, make poverty reduction 
more difficult, further erode food security and prolong exist-
ing poverty traps and create new ones, the latter particularly in 
urban areas and emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confi-
dence). Climate change impacts are expected to exacerbate poverty in 
most developing countries and create new poverty pockets in countries 
with increasing inequality, in both developed and developing countries 
(Figure 2.4). {WGII 8.1, 8.3–8.4, 9.3, 10.9, 13.2–13.4, 22.3, 26.8} 
Climate change is projected to increase displacement of people 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Displacement risk increases 
when populations that lack the resources for planned migration expe-
rience higher exposure to extreme weather events, such as floods and 
droughts. Expanding opportunities for mobility can reduce vulnerabili-
ty for such populations. Changes in migration patterns can be respons-
es to both extreme weather events and longer term climate variability 
and change, and migration can also be an effective adaptation strate-
gy. {WGII 9.3, 12.4, 19.4, 22.3, 25.9}
Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict 
by amplifying well-documented drivers of these conflicts, such 
as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). Multiple 
lines of evidence relate climate variability to some forms of conflict. 
{WGII SPM, 12.5, 13.2, 19.4}
2.4 Climate change beyond 2100, 
irreversibility and abrupt changes
Many aspects of climate change and its associated 
impacts will continue for centuries, even if anthropo-
genic emissions of greenhouse gases are stopped. The 
risks of abrupt or irreversible changes increase as the 
magnitude of the warming increases.
Warming will continue beyond 2100 under all RCP scenarios 
except RCP2.6. Surface temperatures will remain approximately con-
stant at elevated levels for many centuries after a complete cessation 
of net anthropogenic CO2 emissions (see Section 2.2.5 for the relation-
ship between CO2 emissions and global temperature change.). A large 
fraction of anthropogenic climate change resulting from CO2 emissions 































































































Undetectable Very high 
Level of additional risk due to climate change
Moderate High
Box 2.4, Figure 1 | Risks associated with Reasons For Concern at a global scale are shown for increasing levels of climate change. The colour shading indicates the 
additional risk due to climate change when a temperature level is reached and then sustained or exceeded. White indicates no associated impacts are detectable and 
attributable to climate change. Yellow indicates that associated impacts are both detectable and attributable to climate change with at least medium confidence. Red 
indicates severe and widespread impacts. Purple, introduced in this assessment, shows that very high risk is indicated by all key risk criteria. {WGII Assessment Box SPM.1, 
Figure 19-4}
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case of a large net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere over a sus-
tained period (Figure 2.8a, b). {WGI SPM E.1, SPM E.8, 12.5.2}
Stabilization of global average surface temperature does not 
imply stabilization for all aspects of the climate system. Shifting 
biomes, re-equilibrating soil carbon, ice sheets, ocean temperatures 
and associated sea level rise all have their own intrinsic long times-
cales that will result in ongoing changes for hundreds to thousands of 
years after global surface temperature has been stabilized. {WGI SPM 
E.8, 12.5.2–12.5.4, WGII 4.2}
Ocean acidification will continue for centuries if CO2 emissions 
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Figure 2.8 |  (a) Atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) and (b) projected global mean 
surface temperature change as simulated by Earth System Models of Intermediate Com-
plexity (EMICs) for the four Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) up to 2300 
(relative to 1986–2005) followed by a constant (year 2300 level) radiative forcing. A 
10-year smoothing was applied. The dashed line on (a) indicates the pre-industrial CO2 
concentration. (c) Sea level change projections grouped into three categories according 
to the concentration of greenhouse gas (in CO2-eq) in 2100 (low: concentrations that 
peak and decline and remain below 500 ppm, as in scenario RCP2.6; medium: 500 to 
700 ppm, including RCP4.5; high: concentrations that are above 700 ppm but below 
1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP6.0 and RCP8.5). The bars in (c) show the maximum pos-
sible spread that can be obtained with the few available model results (and should not 
be interpreted as uncertainty ranges). These models likely underestimate the Antarctica 
ice sheet contribution, resulting in an underestimation of projected sea level rise beyond 
2100. {WGI Figure 12.43, Figure 13.13, Table 13.8, WGII SPM B-2}
dence), and the impact will be exacerbated by rising tempera-
ture extremes (Figure 2.5b). {WGI 3.8.2, 6.4.4, WGII SPM B-2, 
6.3.2, 6.3.5, 30.5, Box CC-OA}
Global mean sea level rise will continue for many centuries 
beyond 2100 (virtually certain). The few available analyses that go 
beyond 2100 indicate sea level rise to be less than 1 m above the 
pre-industrial level by 2300 for GHG concentrations that peak and 
decline and remain below 500 ppm CO2-eq, as in scenario RCP2.6. For 
a radiative forcing that corresponds to a CO2-eq concentration in 2100 
that is above 700 ppm but below 1500 ppm, as in scenario RCP8.5, the 
projected rise is 1 m to more than 3 m by 2300 (medium confidence) 
(Figure 2.8c). There is low confidence in the available models’ abili-
ty to project solid ice discharge from the Antarctic ice sheet. Hence, 
these models likely underestimate the Antarctica ice sheet contribu-
tion, resulting in an underestimation of projected sea level rise beyond 
2100. {WGI SPM E.8, 13.4.4, 13.5.4}
There is little evidence in global climate models of a tipping point or 
critical threshold in the transition from a perennially ice-covered to a 
seasonally ice-free Arctic Ocean, beyond which further sea-ice loss is 
unstoppable and irreversible. {WGI 12.5.5}
There is low confidence in assessing the evolution of the Atlantic 
Meridional Overturning Circulation beyond the 21st century because 
of the limited number of analyses and equivocal results. However, a 
collapse beyond the 21st century for large sustained warming cannot 
be excluded. {WGI SPM E.4, 12.4.7, 12.5.5}
Sustained mass loss by ice sheets would cause larger sea level 
rise, and part of the mass loss might be irreversible. There is 
high confidence that sustained global mean warming greater than a 
threshold would lead to the near-complete loss of the Greenland ice 
sheet over a millennium or more, causing a sea level rise of up to 7 
m. Current estimates indicate that the threshold is greater than about 
1°C (low confidence) but less than about 4°C (medium confidence) 
of global warming with respect to pre-industrial temperatures. Abrupt 
and irreversible ice loss from a potential instability of marine-based 
sectors of the Antarctic ice sheet in response to climate forcing is pos-
sible, but current evidence and understanding is insufficient to make 
a quantitative assessment. {WGI SPM E.8, 5.6.2, 5.8.1, 13.4.3, 13.5.4}
Within the 21st century, magnitudes and rates of climate change 
associated with medium to high emission scenarios (RCP4.5, 
RCP6.0 and RCP8.5) pose a high risk of abrupt and irreversible 
regional-scale change in the composition, structure and function 
of marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems, including wet-
lands (medium confidence), as well as warm water coral reefs 
(high confidence). Examples that could substantially amplify climate 
change are the boreal-tundra Arctic system (medium confidence) and 
the Amazon forest (low confidence). {WGII 4.3.3.1, Box 4.3, Box 4.4, 
5.4.2.4, 6.3.1–6.3.4, 6.4.2, 30.5.3–30.5.6, Box CC-CR, Box CC-MB}
A reduction in permafrost extent is virtually certain with contin-
ued rise in global temperatures. Current permafrost areas are pro-
jected to become a net emitter of carbon (CO2 and CH4) with a loss of 
180 to 920 GtCO2 (50 to 250 GtC) under RCP8.5 over the 21st century 
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Topic 3  Future Pathways for Adaptation, Mitigation and Sustainable Development
3.1 Foundations of decision-making 
about climate change
Effective decision-making to limit climate change and 
its effects can be informed by a wide range of ana-
lytical approaches for evaluating expected risks and 
benefits, recognizing the importance of governance, 
ethical dimensions, equity, value judgments, economic 
assessments and diverse perceptions and responses to 
risk and uncertainty. 
Sustainable development and equity provide a basis for assess-
ing climate policies. Limiting the effects of climate change is 
necessary to achieve sustainable development and equity, 
including poverty eradication. Countries’ past and future contribu-
tions to the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere are different, and 
countries also face varying challenges and circumstances and have dif-
ferent capacities to address mitigation and adaptation. Mitigation and 
adaptation raise issues of equity, justice and fairness and are necessary 
to achieve sustainable development and poverty eradication. Many of 
those most vulnerable to climate change have contributed and contrib- 
ute little to GHG emissions. Delaying mitigation shifts burdens from the 
present to the future, and insufficient adaptation responses to emerg-
ing impacts are already eroding the basis for sustainable development. 
Both adaptation and mitigation can have distributional effects locally, 
nationally and internationally, depending on who pays and who ben-
efits. The process of decision-making about climate change, and the 
degree to which it respects the rights and views of all those affected, 
is also a concern of justice. {WGII 2.2, 2.3, 13.3, 13.4, 17.3, 20.2, 20.5, 
WGIII SPM.2, 3.3, 3.10, 4.1.2, 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, 4.6, 4.8}
Effective mitigation will not be achieved if individual agents 
advance their own interests independently. Climate change has 
the characteristics of a collective action problem at the global scale, 
because most GHGs accumulate over time and mix globally, and emis-
sions by any agent (e.g., individual, community, company, country) 
affect other agents. Cooperative responses, including international 
cooperation, are therefore required to effectively mitigate GHG emis-
sions and address other climate change issues. The effectiveness of 
adaptation can be enhanced through complementary actions across 
levels, including international cooperation. The evidence suggests 
that outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooper-
ation. {WGII 20.3.1, WGIII SPM.2, TS.1, 1.2, 2.6, 3.2, 4.2, 13.2, 13.3} 
Decision-making about climate change involves valuation and 
mediation among diverse values and may be aided by the ana-
lytic methods of several normative disciplines. Ethics analyses the 
different values involved and the relations between them. Recent polit-
ical philosophy has investigated the question of responsibility for the 
effects of emissions. Economics and decision analysis provide quan-
Topic 3: Future Pathways for Adaption, Mitigation and Sustainable Development
Adaptation and mitigation are complementary strategies for reducing and managing the risks of climate change. Sub-
stantial emissions reductions over the next few decades can reduce climate risks in the 21st century and beyond, increase 
prospects for effective adaptation, reduce the costs and challenges of mitigation in the longer term and contribute to 
climate-resilient pathways for sustainable development. 
Adaptation and mitigation are two complementary strategies for responding to climate change. Adaptation is the process of adjustment to actual 
or expected climate and its effects in order to either lessen or avoid harm or exploit beneficial opportunities. Mitigation is the process of reducing 
emissions or enhancing sinks of greenhouse gases (GHGs), so as to limit future climate change. Both adaptation and mitigation can reduce and 
manage the risks of climate change impacts. Yet adaptation and mitigation can also create other risks, as well as benefits. Strategic responses 
to climate change involve consideration of climate-related risks along with the risks and co-benefits of adaptation and mitigation actions. {WGII 
SPM A-3, SPM C, Glossary, WGIII SPM.2, 4.1, 5.1, Glossary} 
Mitigation, adaptation and climate impacts can all result in transformations to and changes in systems. Depending on the rate and magnitude 
of change and the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems, climate change will alter ecosystems, food systems, infrastructure, 
coastal, urban and rural areas, human health and livelihoods. Adaptive responses to a changing climate require actions that range from incre-
mental changes to more fundamental, transformational changes34.20Mitigation can involve fundamental changes in the way that human societies 
produce and use energy services and land. {WGII B, C, TS C, Box TS.8, Glossary, WGIII SPM.4}
Topic 3 of this report examines the factors that influence the assessment of mitigation and adaptation strategies. It considers the benefits, risks, 
incremental changes and potential transformations from different combinations of mitigation, adaptation and residual climate-related impacts. It 
considers how responses in the coming decades will influence options for limiting long-term climate change and opportunities for adapting to it. Final-
ly, it considers factors—including uncertainty, ethical considerations and links to other societal goals—that may influence choices about mitigation 
and adaptation. Topic 4 then assesses the prospects for mitigation and adaptation on the basis of current knowledge of tools, options and policies.
34 Transformation is used in this report to refer to a change in the fundamental attributes of a system (see Glossary). Transformations can occur at multiple levels; at the national 
level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects a country’s own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable development in accordance with its national 
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titative methods of valuation which can be used for estimating the 
social cost of carbon (see Box 3.1), in cost–benefit and cost-effective-
ness analyses, for optimization in integrated models and elsewhere. 
Economic methods can reflect ethical principles, and take account of 
non-marketed goods, equity, behavioural biases, ancillary benefits and 
costs and the differing values of money to different people. They are, 
however, subject to well-documented limitations. {WGII 2.2, 2.3, WGIII 
SPM.2, Box TS.2, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 3.2–3.6, 3.9.4}
Analytical methods of valuation cannot identify a single best 
balance between mitigation, adaptation and residual climate 
impacts. Important reasons for this are that climate change involves 
extremely complex natural and social processes, there is extensive dis-
agreement about the values concerned, and climate change impacts 
and mitigation approaches have important distributional effects. Nev-
ertheless, information on the consequences of emissions pathways 
to alternative climate goals and risk levels can be a useful input into 
decision-making processes. Evaluating responses to climate change 
involves assessment of the widest possible range of impacts, including 
low-probability outcomes with large consequences. {WGII 1.1.4, 2.3, 
2.4, 17.3, 19.6, 19.7, WGIII 2.5, 2.6, 3.4, 3.7, Box 3-9}
Effective decision-making and risk management in the complex 
environment of climate change may be iterative: strategies can 
often be adjusted as new information and understanding devel-
ops during implementation. However, adaptation and mitigation 
choices in the near term will affect the risks of climate change through-
out the 21st century and beyond, and prospects for climate-resilient 
pathways for sustainable development depend on what is achieved 
through mitigation. Opportunities to take advantage of positive syn-
ergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, 
particularly if mitigation is delayed too long. Decision-making about 
climate change is influenced by how individuals and organizations per-
ceive risks and uncertainties and take them into account. They some-
times use simplified decision rules, overestimate or underestimate risks 
and are biased towards the status quo. They differ in their degree of 
risk aversion and the relative importance placed on near-term versus 
long-term ramifications of specific actions. Formalized analytical meth-
ods for decision-making under uncertainty can account accurately for 
risk, and focus attention on both short- and long-term consequences. 
{WGII SPM A-3, SPM C-2, 2.1–2.4, 3.6, 14.1–14.3, 15.2–15.4, 17.1–
17.3, 17.5, 20.2, 20.3, 20.6, WGIII SPM.2, 2.4, 2.5, 5.5, 16.4}
3.2 Climate change risks reduced by 
adaptation and mitigation
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in 
place today, and even with adaptation, warming by the 
end of the 21st century will lead to high to very high 
risk of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts 
globally (high confidence). Mitigation involves some 
level of co-benefits and of risks due to adverse side  
effects, but these risks do not involve the same pos-
sibility of severe, widespread and irreversible impacts 
as risks from climate change, increasing the benefits 
from near-term mitigation efforts.
The risks of climate change, adaptation and mitigation differ in 
nature, timescale, magnitude and persistence (high confidence). 
Risks from adaptation include maladaptation and negative ancillary 
impacts. Risks from mitigation include possible adverse side effects 
of large-scale deployment of low-carbon technology options and eco-
nomic costs. Climate change risks may persist for millennia and can 
involve very high risk of severe impacts and the presence of significant 
irreversibilities combined with limited adaptive capacity. In contrast, 
the stringency of climate policies can be adjusted much more quickly 
in response to observed consequences and costs and create lower risks 
of irreversible consequences (3.3, 3.4, 4.3). {WGI SPM E.8, 12.4, 12.5.2, 
13.5, WGII 4.2, 17.2, 19.6, WGIII TS.3.1.4, Table TS.4, Table TS.5, Table 
TS.6, Table TS.7, Table TS.8, 2.5, 6.6}
Mitigation and adaptation are complementary approaches for 
reducing risks of climate change impacts. They interact with one 
another and reduce risks over different timescales (high confi-
dence). Benefits from adaptation can already be realized in addressing 
current risks and can be realized in the future for addressing emerging 
risks. Adaptation has the potential to reduce climate change impacts 
over the next few decades, while mitigation has relatively little influ-
ence on climate outcomes over this timescale. Near-term and longer-
term mitigation and adaptation, as well as development pathways, will 
determine the risks of climate change beyond mid-century. The poten-
tial for adaptation differs across sectors and will be limited by institu-
tional and capacity constraints, increasing the long-term benefits of 
mitigation (high confidence). The level of mitigation will influence the 
rate and magnitude of climate change, and greater rates and magni-
tude of climate change increase the likelihood of exceeding adaptation 
limits (high confidence) (3.3). {WGI 11.3, 12.4, WGII SPM A-3, SPM B-2, 
SPM C-2, 1.1.4.4, 2.5, 16.3–16.6, 17.3, 19.2, 20.2.3, 20.3, 20.6}
Without additional mitigation efforts beyond those in place 
today, and even with adaptation, warming by the end of the 
21st century will lead to high to very high risk of severe, wide-
spread and irreversible impacts globally (high confidence) 
(Topic 2 and Figure 3.1a). Estimates of warming in 2100 without 
additional climate mitigation efforts are from 3.7°C to 4.8°C compared 
with pre-industrial levels (median climate response); the range is 2.5°C 
to 7.8°C when using the 5th to 95th percentile range of the median 
climate response (Figure 3.1). The risks associated with temperatures 
at or above 4°C include severe and widespread impacts on unique and 
threatened systems, substantial species extinction, large risks to global 
and regional food security, consequential constraints on common 
human activities, increased likelihood of triggering tipping points (criti-
cal thresholds) and limited potential for adaptation in some cases (high 
confidence). Some risks of climate change, such as risks to unique and 
threatened systems and risks associated with extreme weather events, 
are moderate to high at temperatures 1°C to 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. {WGII SPM B-1, SPM C-2, WGIII SPM.3}
Substantial cuts in GHG emissions over the next few decades 
can substantially reduce risks of climate change by limiting 
warming in the second half of the 21st century and beyond 
(high confidence). Global mean surface warming is largely deter-
mined by cumulative emissions, which are, in turn, linked to emissions 
over different timescales (Figure 3.1). Limiting risks across Reasons 
For Concern would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO2. 
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Such a limit would require that global net emissions of CO2 eventu-
ally decrease to zero (Figure 3.1a,b) (high confidence). Reducing risks 
of climate change through mitigation would involve substantial cuts 
in GHG emissions over the next few decades (Figure 3.1c). But some 
risks from residual damages are unavoidable, even with mitigation and 
adaptation (very high confidence). A subset of relevant climate change 
risks has been estimated using aggregate economic indicators. Such 
economic estimates have important limitations and are therefore a 
useful but insufficient basis for decision-making on long-term mitiga-
tion targets (see Box 3.1). {WGII 19.7.1, WGIII SPM.3, Figure 3.1}
Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and risks, but these 
risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, widespread 
and irreversible impacts as risks from climate change (high con-
fidence). Scenarios that are likely to limit warming to below 2°C or 
even 3°C compared with pre-industrial temperatures involve large-scale 
changes in energy systems and potentially land use over the coming 
decades (3.4). Associated risks include those linked to large-scale 
deployment of technology options for producing low-carbon energy, the 
potential for high aggregate economic costs of mitigation and impacts 
on vulnerable countries and industries. Other risks and co-benefits are 

















































































































Cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions from 1870 (GtCO2)












































Level of additional 
risk due to climate 
change (see Box 2.4)
(a) Risks from climate change... (b) ...depend on cumulative CO2 emissions...
(c) …which in turn depend on annual 
GHG emissions over the next decades
Figure 3.1 |  The relationship between risks from climate change, temperature change, cumulative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions and changes in annual greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 2050. Limiting risks across Reasons For Concern (a) would imply a limit for cumulative emissions of CO2 (b), which would constrain annual emissions over the next few 
decades (c). Panel a reproduces the five Reasons For Concern (Box 2.4). Panel b links temperature changes to cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2), from 1870. They are based 
on Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) simulations (pink plume) and on a simple climate model (median climate response in 2100) for the baselines and five 
mitigation scenario categories (six ellipses). Details are provided in Figure 2.3. Panel c shows the relationship between the cumulative CO2 emissions (in GtCO2) of the scenario 
categories and their associated change in annual GHG emissions by 2050, expressed in percentage change (in percent GtCO2-eq per year) relative to 2010. The ellipses correspond 
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reduction, biodiversity conservation, water availability, income distri-
bution, efficiency of taxation systems, labour supply and employment, 
urban sprawl, fossil fuel export revenues and the economic growth of 
developing countries (Table 4.5). {WGIII SPM.4.1, SPM.4.2, TS.3.1.4, 
Table TS.4, Table TS.5, Table TS.6, Table TS.7, Table TS.8, 6.6}
Inertia in the economic and climate systems and the possibil-
ity of irreversible impacts from climate change increase the 
benefits of near-term mitigation efforts (high confidence). The 
actions taken today affect the options available in the future to reduce 
emissions, limit temperature change and adapt to climate change. 
Near-term choices can create, amplify or limit significant elements of 
lock-in that are important for decision-making. Lock-ins and irrevers-
ibilities occur in the climate system due to large inertia in some of its 
components such as heat transfer from the ocean surface to depth 
leading to continued ocean warming for centuries regardless of emis-
sion scenario and the irreversibility of a large fraction of anthropogenic 
climate change resulting from CO2 emissions on a multi-century to mil-
lennial timescale unless CO2 were to be removed from the atmosphere 
through large-scale human interventions over a sustained period (see 
also Box 3.3). Irreversibilities in socio-economic and biological systems 
also result from infrastructure development and long-lived products 
and from climate change impacts, such as species extinction. The 
larger potential for irreversibility and pervasive impacts from climate 
change risks than from mitigation risks increases the benefit of short-
term mitigation efforts. Delays in additional mitigation or constraints 
on technological options limit the mitigation options and increase the 
long-term mitigation costs as well as other risks that would be incurred 
in the medium to long term to hold climate change impacts at a given 
level (Table WGIII SPM.2, blue segment). {WGI SPM E-8, WGII SPM B-2, 
2.1, 19.7, 20.3, Box 20-4, WGIII SPM.4.1, SPM.4.2.1, 3.6, 6.4, 6.6, 6.9}
3.3 Characteristics of adaptation pathways
Adaptation can reduce the risks of climate change 
impacts, but there are limits to its effectiveness, espe-
cially with greater magnitudes and rates of climate 
change. Taking a longer-term perspective, in the con-
text of sustainable development, increases the likeli-
hood that more immediate adaptation actions will 
also enhance future options and preparedness. 
Adaptation can contribute to the well-being of current and 
future populations, the security of assets and the maintenance 
of ecosystem goods, functions and services now and in the 
future. Adaptation is place- and context-specific, with no single 
approach for reducing risks appropriate across all settings (high 
confidence). Effective risk reduction and adaptation strategies con-
sider vulnerability and exposure and their linkages with socio-econom-
ic processes, sustainable development, and climate change. Adaptation 
research since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) has evolved 
from a dominant consideration of engineering and technological adap-
tation pathways to include more ecosystem-based, institutional and 
social measures. A previous focus on cost–benefit analysis, optimiza-
tion and efficiency approaches has broadened with the development of 
multi-metric evaluations that include risk and uncertainty dimensions 
integrated within wider policy and ethical frameworks to assess trade-
offs and constraints. The range of specific adaptation measures has 
also expanded (4.2, 4.4.2.1), as have the links to sustainable devel-
opment (3.5). There are many studies on local and sectoral adaptation 
costs and benefits, but few global analyses and very low confidence 
 
Box 3.1 | The Limits of the Economic Assessment of Climate Change Risks
A subset of climate change risks and impacts are often measured using aggregate economic indicators, such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) or aggregate income. Estimates, however, are partial and affected by important conceptual and 
empirical limitations. These incomplete estimates of global annual economic losses for temperature increases of ~2.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels are between 0.2 and 2.0% of income (medium evidence, medium agreement). Losses are more likely than not to 
be greater, rather than smaller, than this range (limited evidence, high agreement). Estimates of the incremental aggregate economic 
impact of emitting one more tonne of carbon dioxide (the social cost of carbon) are derived from these studies and lie between a few 
dollars and several hundreds of dollars per tonne of carbon in 2000 to 2015 (robust evidence, medium agreement). These impact esti-
mates are incomplete and depend on a large number of assumptions, many of which are disputable. Many estimates do not account 
for the possibility of large-scale singular events and irreversibility, tipping points and other important factors, especially those that are 
difficult to monetize, such as loss of biodiversity. Estimates of aggregate costs mask significant differences in impacts across sectors, 
regions, countries and communities, and they therefore depend on ethical considerations, especially on the aggregation of losses across 
and within countries (high confidence). Estimates of global aggregate economic losses exist only for limited warming levels. These 
levels are exceeded in scenarios for the 21st century unless additional mitigation action is implemented, leading to additional economic 
costs. The total economic effects at different temperature levels would include mitigation costs, co-benefits of mitigation, adverse side  
effects of mitigation, adaptation costs and climate damages. As a result, mitigation cost and climate damage estimates at any given 
temperature level cannot be compared to evaluate the costs and benefits of mitigation. Very little is known about the economic cost 
of warming above 3°C relative to the current temperature level. Accurately estimating climate change risks (and thus the benefits of 
mitigation) takes into account the full range of possible impacts of climate change, including those with high consequences but a low 
probability of occurrence. The benefits of mitigation may otherwise be underestimated (high confidence). Some limitations of current 
estimates may be unavoidable, even with more knowledge, such as issues with aggregating impacts over time and across individuals 
when values are heterogeneous. In view of these limitations, it is outside the scope of science to identify a single best climate change 
target and climate policy (3.1, 3.4). {WGII SPM B-2, 10.9.2, 10.9.4, 13.2, 17.2–17.3, 18.4, 19.6, WGIII 3.6}
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in their results. {WGII SPM C-1, Table SPM.1, 14.1, 14.ES, 15.2, 15.5, 
17.2, 17.ES} 
Adaptation planning and implementation at all levels of gov-
ernance are contingent on societal values, objectives and risk 
perceptions (high confidence). Recognition of diverse interests, cir-
cumstances, social-cultural contexts and expectations can benefit deci-
sion-making processes. Indigenous, local and traditional knowledge 
systems and practices, including indigenous peoples’ holistic view of 
community and environment, are a major resource for adapting to cli-
mate change, but these have not been used consistently in existing 
adaptation efforts. Integrating such forms of knowledge into practices 
increases the effectiveness of adaptation as do effective decision sup-
port, engagement and policy processes (4.4.2). {WGII SPM C-1}
Adaptation planning and implementation can be enhanced 
through complementary actions across levels, from individu-
als to governments (high confidence). National governments can 
coordinate adaptation efforts of local and sub-national governments, 
for example by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic 
diversification and by providing information, policy and legal frame-
works and financial support (robust evidence, high agreement). Local 
government and the private sector are increasingly recognized as crit-
ical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in scaling up adapta-
tion of communities, households and civil society and in managing risk 
information and financing (medium evidence, high agreement). {WGII 
SPM C-1}
A first step towards adaptation to future climate change is 
reducing vulnerability and exposure to present climate variabil-
ity (high confidence), but some near-term responses to climate 
change may also limit future choices. Integration of adaptation 
into planning, including policy design, and decision-making can pro-
mote synergies with development and disaster risk reduction. How-
ever, poor planning or implementation, overemphasizing short-term 
outcomes or failing to sufficiently anticipate consequences can result 
in maladaptation, increasing the vulnerability or exposure of the target 
group in the future or the vulnerability of other people, places or sec-
tors (medium evidence, high agreement). For example, enhanced pro-
tection of exposed assets can lock in dependence on further protection 
measures. Appropriate adaptation options can be better assessed by 
including co-benefits and mitigation implications (3.5 and 4.2). {WGII 
SPM C-1}
Numerous interacting constraints can impede adaptation plan-
ning and implementation (high confidence). Common constraints 
on implementation arise from the following: limited financial and 
human resources; limited integration or coordination of governance; 
uncertainties about projected impacts; different perceptions of risks; 
competing values; absence of key adaptation leaders and advocates; 
and limited tools to monitor adaptation effectiveness. Other con-
straints include insufficient research, monitoring and observation and 
the financial and other resources to maintain them. Underestimating 
the complexity of adaptation as a social process can create unrealis-
tic expectations about achieving intended adaptation outcomes (see 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 for details in relation to implementation). {WGII 
SPM C-1}
Greater rates and magnitude of climate change increase the 
likelihood of exceeding adaptation limits (high confidence). 
Limits to adaptation occur when adaptive actions to avoid intolera-
ble risks for an actor’s objectives or for the needs of a system are not 
possible or are not currently available. Value-based judgments of what 
constitutes an intolerable risk may differ. Limits to adaptation emerge 
from the interaction among climate change and biophysical and/or 
socio-economic constraints. Opportunities to take advantage of positive 
synergies between adaptation and mitigation may decrease with time, 
particularly if limits to adaptation are exceeded. In some parts of the 
world, insufficient responses to emerging impacts are already eroding 
the basis for sustainable development. For most regions and sectors, 
empirical evidence is not sufficient to quantify magnitudes of climate 
change that would constitute a future adaptation limit. Furthermore, 
economic development, technology and cultural norms and values can 
change over time to enhance or reduce the capacity of systems to avoid 
limits. As a consequence, some limits are ‘soft’ in that they may be alle-
viated over time. Other limits are ‘hard’ in that there are no reasonable 
prospects for avoiding intolerable risks. {WGII SPM C-2, TS}
Transformations in economic, social, technological and political 
decisions and actions can enhance adaptation and promote sus-
tainable development (high confidence). Restricting adaptation 
responses to incremental changes to existing systems and structures 
without considering transformational change may increase costs and 
losses and miss opportunities. For example, enhancing infrastructure to 
protect other built assets can be expensive and ultimately not defray 
increasing costs and risks, whereas options such as relocation or using 
ecosystem services to adapt may provide a range of benefits now and 
in the future. Transformational adaptation can include introduction of 
new technologies or practices, formation of new financial structures 
or systems of governance, adaptation at greater scales or magnitudes 
and shifts in the location of activities. Planning and implementation 
of transformational adaptation could reflect strengthened, altered or 
aligned paradigms and consequently may place new and increased 
demands on governance structures to reconcile different goals and 
visions for the future and to address possible equity and ethical impli-
cations: transformational adaptation pathways are enhanced by iter-
ative learning, deliberative processes, and innovation. At the national 
level, transformation is considered most effective when it reflects a 
country’s own visions and approaches to achieving sustainable devel-
opment in accordance with its national circumstances and priorities. 
{WGII SPM C-2, 1.1, 2.5, 5.5, 8.4, 14.1, 14.3, 16.2-7, 20.3.3, 20.5, 
25.10, Table 14-4, Table 16-3, Box 16.1, Box 16.4, Box 25.1}
Building adaptive capacity is crucial for effective selection 
and implementation of adaptation options (robust evidence, 
high agreement). Successful adaptation requires not only identi-
fying adaptation options and assessing their costs and benefits, but 
also increasing the adaptive capacity of human and natural systems 
(medium evidence, high agreement). This can involve complex govern-
ance challenges and new institutions and institutional arrangements. 
(4.2) {WGII 8.1, 12.3, 14.1-3, 16.2, 16.3, 16.5, 16.8}
Significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs exist between 
mitigation and adaptation and among different adaptation 
responses; interactions occur both within and across regions (very 
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change imply an increasing complexity of interactions, particularly at the 
intersections among water, energy, land use and biodiversity, but tools 
to understand and manage these interactions remain limited. Examples 
of actions with co-benefits include (i) improved energy efficiency and 
cleaner energy sources, leading to reduced emissions of health-damag-
ing, climate-altering air pollutants; (ii) reduced energy and water con-
sumption in urban areas through greening cities and recycling water; (iii) 
sustainable agriculture and forestry; and (iv) protection of ecosystems for 
carbon storage and other ecosystem services. {WGII SPM C-1}
3.4 Characteristics of mitigation pathways
There are multiple mitigation pathways that are likely 
to limit warming to below 2°C relative to pre-indus-
trial levels. These pathways would require substantial 
emissions reductions over the next few decades and 
near zero emissions of CO2 and other long-lived green-
house gases by the end of the century. Implement-
ing such reductions poses substantial technological, 
economic, social and institutional challenges, which 
increase with delays in additional mitigation and if 
key technologies are not available. Limiting warming 
to lower or higher levels involves similar challenges 
but on different timescales.
Without additional efforts to reduce GHG emissions beyond 
those in place today, global emission growth is expected to 
persist driven by growth in global population and economic 
activities (high confidence) (Figure 3.2). Global GHG emissions 
under most scenarios without additional mitigation (baseline scenar-
ios) are between about 75 GtCO2-eq/yr and almost 140 GtCO2-eq/yr 
in 21003520which is approximately between the 2100 emission levels 
in the RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 pathways (Figure 3.2)3621. Baseline scenarios 
exceed 450 ppm CO2-eq by 2030 and reach CO2-eq concentration levels 
between about 750 ppm CO2-eq and more than 1300 ppm CO2-eq by 
2100. Global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 range from 
about 3.7°C to 4.8°C above the average for 1850–1900 for a median 
climate response. They range from 2.5°C to 7.8°C when including cli-
mate uncertainty (5th to 95th percentile range)372.  The future scenarios 
do not account for possible changes in natural forcings in the climate 
system (see Box 1.1). {WGIII SPM.3, SPM.4.1, TS.2.2, TS.3.1, 6.3, Box 
TS.6}
Many different combinations of technological, behavioural and 
policy options can be used to reduce emissions and limit tem-
perature change (high confidence). To evaluate possible pathways 
to long-term climate goals, about 900 mitigation scenarios were col-
lected for this assessment, each of which describes different techno-
logical, socio-economic and institutional changes. Emission reductions 
under these scenarios lead to concentrations in 2100 from 430 ppm 
CO2-eq to above 720 ppm CO2-eq which is comparable to the 2100 
forcing levels between RCP2.6 and RCP6.0. Scenarios with concen-
tration levels of below 430 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 were also assessed. 
{WGIII SPM.4.1, TS3.1, 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, Annex II}
Scenarios leading to CO2-eq concentrations in 2100 of about 450 
ppm or lower are likely to maintain warming below 2°C over the 
21st century relative to pre-industrial levels (high confidence). 
Mitigation scenarios reaching concentration levels of about 500 ppm 
CO2-eq by 2100 are more likely than not to limit warming to less than 
2°C relative to pre-industrial levels, unless concentration levels tempo-
rarily exceed roughly 530 ppm CO2-eq before 2100. In this case, warm-
ing is about as likely as not to remain below 2°C relative to pre-indus-
trial levels. Scenarios that exceed about 650 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 are 
unlikely to limit warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. 
Mitigation scenarios in which warming is more likely than not to be less 
than 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100 are characterized 
by concentration levels by 2100 of below 430 ppm CO2-eq. In these 
scenarios, temperature peaks during the century and subsequently 
declines (Table 3.1).  {WGIII SPM.4.1, Table SPM.1, TS.3.1, Box TS.6, 6.3}
Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 
(consistent with a likely chance to keep warming below 2°C rel-
ative to pre-industrial level) typically involve temporary over-
shoot3823 of atmospheric concentrations, as do many scenarios 
reaching about 500 ppm CO2-eq to about 550 ppm CO2-eq by 
2100 (Table 3.1). Depending on the level of overshoot, over-
shoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and wide-
spread deployment of bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture 
and storage (BECCS) and afforestation in the second half of the 
century (high confidence). The availability and scale of these and 
other Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies and methods are 
uncertain, and CDR technologies and methods are, to varying degrees, 
associated with challenges and risks (see Box 3.3)3924.  CDR is also prev-
alent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residu-
al emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. {WGIII 
SPM.4.1, Table SPM.1, TS.3.1, 6.3, 6.9.1, Figure 6.7, 7.11, 11.13}
35 Unless otherwise noted, scenario ranges cited in Topic 3 and Topic 4 refer to the 10th to 90th percentile ranges (see Table 3.1).
36 For a discussion on CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emissions and concentrations, see Box 3.2 on GHG metrics and mitigation pathways and the Glossary. 
37 The range quoted here is based on the warming results of a simple climate model for the emissions of around 300 baseline scenarios, expressed compared to the 1850–1900 
period. The warming results quoted in Section 2.2 are obtained by prescribing future concentrations of GHG in CMIP5 Earth System Models. This results in a mean warming of 
1.0°C (5th to 95th percentile range: 0.3°C to 1.7°C) for RCP2.6, and a mean warming of 3.7°C (2.6°C to 4.8°C) for RCP8.5 relative to the period 1986–2005. For the same 
concentration-driven experiments, the simple climate model approach gives consistent results. The median warming is 0.9°C (0.5°C to 1.6°C) for RCP2.6 and 3.7°C (2.5°C 
to 5.9°C) for RCP8.5 relative to the period 1986–2005. However, the high-end of the CMIP5 ESMs range is more constrained. In addition, the baseline temperature increase 
quoted here is wider than that of the concentration-driven RCP8.5 experiments mentioned above as it is based on a wider set of scenarios, includes carbon cycle response 
uncertainty, and uses a different base year (2.2, 3.4).
38 In concentration ‘overshoot’ scenarios, concentrations peak during the century and then decline. 
39 CDR methods have biogeochemical and technological limitations to their potential on the global scale. There is insufficient knowledge to quantify how much CO2 emissions 
could be partially offset by CDR on a century timescale. CDR methods may carry side effects and long-term consequences on a global scale.
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Limiting warming with a likely chance to less than 2°C rela-
tive to pre-industrial levels would require substantial cuts in 
anthropogenic GHG emissions4025 by mid-century through large-
scale changes in energy systems and possibly land use. Limit-
ing warming to higher levels would require similar changes but 
less quickly. Limiting warming to lower levels would require 
these changes more quickly (high confidence). Scenarios that 
are likely to maintain warming at below 2°C are characterized by a 40 
to 70% reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, relative to 2010 levels, 
and emissions levels near zero or below in 2100 (Figure 3.2, Table 3.1). 
Scenarios with higher emissions in 2050 are characterized by a great-
er reliance on CDR technologies beyond mid-century, and vice versa. 
Scenarios that are likely to maintain warming at below 2°C include 
more rapid improvements in energy efficiency and a tripling to nearly 
a quadrupling of the share of zero- and low-carbon energy supply from 
renewable energy, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide 
capture and storage (CCS) or BECCS by the year 2050 (Figure 3.2b). 
The scenarios describe a wide range of changes in land use, reflecting 




















































































































580–720 ppm CO2-eq 530–580 ppm CO2-eq 480–530 ppm CO2-eq 430–480 ppm CO2-eq
Figure 3.2 |  Global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (gigatonne of CO2-equivalent per year, GtCO2-eq/yr) in baseline and mitigation scenarios for different long-term concentration 
levels (a) and associated scale-up requirements of low-carbon energy (% of primary energy) for 2030, 2050 and 2100, compared to 2010 levels, in mitigation scenarios (b). {WGIII 
SPM.4, Figure 6.7, Figure 7.16} [Note: CO2-eq emissions include the basket of Kyoto gases (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) as well as fluorinated gases) 
calculated based on 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP100) values from the IPCC Second Assessment Report.]
40 This range differs from the range provided for a similar concentration category in AR4 (50 to 85% lower than in 2000 for CO2 only). Reasons for this difference include that this 
report has assessed a substantially larger number of scenarios than in AR4 and looks at all GHGs. In addition, a large proportion of the new scenarios include CDR technologies. 
Other factors include the use of 2100 concentration levels instead of stabilization levels and the shift in reference year from 2000 to 2010. Scenarios with higher emission levels 
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different assumptions about the scale of bioenergy production, affores-
tation and reduced deforestation. Scenarios leading to concentrations 
of 500 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 are characterized by a 25 to 55% reduction 
in GHG emissions by 2050, relative to 2010 levels. Scenarios that are 
likely to limit warming to 3°C relative to pre-industrial levels reduce 
emissions less rapidly than those limiting warming to 2°C. Only a limited 
number of studies provide scenarios that are more likely than not to limit 
warming to 1.5°C by 2100; these scenarios are characterized by concen-
trations below 430 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 and 2050 emission reduction 
between 70 and 95% below 2010. For a comprehensive overview of the 
characteristics of emissions scenarios, their CO2-equivalent concentra-
tions and their likelihood to keep warming to below a range of tempera-
ture levels, see Table 3.1. {WGIII SPM.4.1, TS.3.1, 6.3, 7.11}











Change in CO2-eq emissions 
compared to 2010 (in %) c
Likelihood of staying below a specific temperature level 
over the 21st century (relative to 1850–1900) d, e
2050 2100 1.5ºC 2ºC 3ºC 4ºC
<430 Only a limited number of individual model studies have explored levels below 430 ppm CO2-eq j
 450 
(430 to 480)








No overshoot of 
530 ppm CO2-eq




Overshoot of 530 
ppm CO2-eq





No overshoot of 
580 ppm CO2-eq
–47 to –19 –81 to –59
More unlikely 
than likely iOvershoot of 580 
ppm CO2-eq
–16 to 7 –183 to –86
(580 to 650) Total range
RCP4.5
–38 to 24 –134 to –50













a The ‘total range’ for the 430 to 480 ppm CO2-eq concentrations scenarios corresponds to the range of the 10th to 90th percentile of the subcategory of these scenarios shown in 
Table 6.3 of the Working Group III report.
b Baseline scenarios fall into the >1000 and 720 to 1000 ppm CO2-eq categories. The latter category also includes mitigation scenarios. The baseline scenarios in the latter category 
reach a temperature change of 2.5°C to 5.8°C above the average for 1850–1900 in 2100. Together with the baseline scenarios in the >1000 ppm CO2-eq category, this leads 
to an overall 2100 temperature range of 2.5°C to 7.8°C (range based on median climate response: 3.7°C to 4.8°C) for baseline scenarios across both concentration categories.
c The global 2010 emissions are 31% above the 1990 emissions (consistent with the historic greenhouse gas emission estimates presented in this report). CO2-eq emissions include 
the basket of Kyoto gases (carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) as well as fluorinated gases).
d The assessment here involves a large number of scenarios published in the scientific literature and is thus not limited to the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs). To 
evaluate the CO2-eq concentration and climate implications of these scenarios, the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC) was used in a 
probabilistic mode. For a comparison between MAGICC model results and the outcomes of the models used in WGI, see WGI 12.4.1.2, 12.4.8 and WGIII 6.3.2.6.
e The assessment in this table is based on the probabilities calculated for the full ensemble of scenarios in WGIII using MAGICC and the assessment in WGI of the uncertainty of the 
temperature projections not covered by climate models. The statements are therefore consistent with the statements in WGI, which are based on the Coupled Model Intercomparison 
Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) runs of the RCPs and the assessed uncertainties. Hence, the likelihood statements reflect different lines of evidence from both WGs. This WGI method was 
also applied for scenarios with intermediate concentration levels where no CMIP5 runs are available. The likelihood statements are indicative only {WGIII 6.3} and follow broadly 
the terms used by the WGI SPM for temperature projections: likely 66–100%, more likely than not >50–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, and unlikely 0–33%. In addition 
the term more unlikely than likely 0–<50% is used. 
f The CO2-equivalent concentration (see Glossary) is calculated on the basis of the total forcing from a simple carbon cycle/climate model, MAGICC. The CO2-equivalent concentra-
tion in 2011 is estimated to be 430 ppm (uncertainty range 340 to 520 ppm). This is based on the assessment of total anthropogenic radiative forcing for 2011 relative to 1750 in 
WGI, i.e., 2.3 W/m2, uncertainty range 1.1 to 3.3 W/m2. 
g The vast majority of scenarios in this category overshoot the category boundary of 480 ppm CO2-eq concentration.
h For scenarios in this category, no CMIP5 run or MAGICC realization stays below the respective temperature level. Still, an unlikely assignment is given to reflect uncertainties that 
may not be reflected by the current climate models.
i Scenarios in the 580 to 650 ppm CO2-eq category include both overshoot scenarios and scenarios that do not exceed the concentration level at the high end of the category 
(e.g., RCP4.5). The latter type of scenarios, in general, have an assessed probability of more unlikely than likely to stay below the 2°C temperature level, while the former are mostly 
assessed to have an unlikely probability of staying below this level.
j In these scenarios, global CO2-eq emissions in 2050 are between 70 to 95% below 2010 emissions, and they are between 110 to 120% below 2010 emissions in 2100.
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Reducing emissions of non-CO2 climate forcing agents can be 
an important element of mitigation strategies. Emissions of non-
CO2 gases (methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and fluorinated gases) 
contributed about 27% to the total emissions of Kyoto gases in 2010. 
For most non-CO2 gases, near-term, low-cost options are available to 
reduce their emissions. However, some sources of these non-CO2 gases 
are difficult to mitigate, such as N2O emissions from fertilizer use and 
CH4 emissions from livestock. As a result, emissions of most non-CO2 
gases will not be reduced to zero, even under stringent mitigation 
scenarios (see Figure 4.1). The differences in radiative properties and 
lifetimes of CO2 and non-CO2 climate forcing agents have important 
implications for mitigation strategies (see also Box 3.2). {WGIII 6.3.2}
All current GHG emissions and other climate forcing agents 
affect the rate and magnitude of climate change over the next 
few decades. Reducing the emissions of certain short-lived climate 
forcing agents can reduce the rate of warming in the short term 
but will have only a limited effect on long-term warming, which is 
driven mainly by CO2 emissions. There are large uncertainties relat-
ed to the climate impacts of some of the short-lived climate forcing 
agents. Although the effects of CH4 emissions are well understood, 
there are large uncertainties related to the effects of black carbon. 
Co-emitted components with cooling effects may further complicate 
and reduce the climate impacts of emission reductions. Reducing emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) would cause warming. Near-term reduc-
tions in short-lived climate forcing agents can have a relatively fast 
impact on climate change and possible co-benefits for air pollution. 
{WGI 8.2.3, 8.3.2, 8.3.4, 8.5.1, 8.7.2, FAQ 8.2, 12.5, WGIII 6.6.2.1} 
Delaying additional mitigation to 2030 will substantially 
increase the challenges associated with limiting warming over 
the 21st century to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels 
(high confidence). GHG emissions in 2030 lie between about 30 
GtCO2-eq/yr and 50 GtCO2-eq/yr in cost-effective scenarios that are 
likely to about as likely as not to limit warming to less than 2°C this 
century relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 atmospheric concen-
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Figure 3.3 |  The implications of different 2030 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions levels for the rate of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission reductions and low-carbon energy upscaling 
in mitigation scenarios that are at least about as likely as not to keep warming throughout the 21st century below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 CO2-eq concentrations 
430 to 530 ppm). The scenarios are grouped according to different emissions levels by 2030 (coloured in different shades of green). The left panel shows the pathways of GHG 
emissions (GtCO2-eq/yr) leading to these 2030 levels. Black dot with whiskers gives historic GHG emission levels and associated uncertainties in 2010 as reported in Figure 1.6. 
The black bar shows the estimated uncertainty range of GHG emissions implied by the Cancún Pledges. The middle panel denotes the average annual CO2 emission reduction rates 
for the 2030–2050 period. It compares the median and interquartile range across scenarios from recent intermodel comparisons with explicit 2030 interim goals to the range of 
scenarios in the Scenario Database for WGIII AR5. Annual rates of historical emission changes (sustained over a period of 20 years) are shown as well. The arrows in the right panel 
show the magnitude of zero and low-carbon energy supply upscaling from between 2030 and 2050, subject to different 2030 GHG emission levels. Zero- and low-carbon energy 
supply includes renewable energy, nuclear energy and fossil energy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) or bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Only scenarios that apply the 
full, unconstrained mitigation technology portfolio of the underlying models (default technology assumption) are shown. Scenarios with large net negative global emissions (>20 
GtCO2-eq/yr), scenarios with exogenous carbon price assumptions, and scenarios with 2010 emission levels that are significantly outside the historical range are excluded. {WGIII 
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3tration levels of about 450 ppm CO2-eq to about 500 ppm CO2-eq) 
(Figure 3.3, left panel). Scenarios with GHG emission levels of above 55 
GtCO2-eq/yr require substantially higher rates of emissions reductions 
between 2030 and 2050 (median estimate of 6%/yr as compared to 
3%/yr in cost-effective scenarios; Figure 3.3, middle panel); much more 
rapid scale-up of zero and low-carbon energy over this period (more 
than a tripling compared to a doubling of the low-carbon energy share 
relative to 2010; Figure 3.3, right panel); a larger reliance on CDR tech-
nologies in the long term; and higher transitional and long-term eco-
nomic impacts (Table 3.2). (3.5, 4.3) {WGIII SPM.4.1, TS.3.1, 6.4, 7.11}
Estimated global emission levels by 2020 based on the Cancún 
Pledges are not consistent with cost-effective long-term mitiga-
tion trajectories that are at least about as likely as not to limit 
warming to below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels (2100 
concentration levels of about 500 ppm CO2-eq or below), but 
they do not preclude the option to meet this goal (high confi-
dence). The Cancún Pledges are broadly consistent with cost-effective 
scenarios that are likely to limit temperature change to below 3°C rel-
ative to pre-industrial levels. {WGIII SPM.4.1, 6.4, 13.13, Figure TS.11}
Estimates of the aggregate economic costs of mitigation vary 
widely depending on methodologies and assumptions but 
increase with the stringency of mitigation (high confidence). 
Scenarios in which all countries of the world begin mitigation immedi-
ately, in which there is a single global carbon price, and in which all key 
technologies are available have been used as a cost-effective bench-
mark for estimating macroeconomic mitigation costs (Figure 3.4). 
Under these assumptions, mitigation scenarios that are likely to limit 
warming to below 2°C through the 21st century relative to pre-indus-
trial levels entail losses in global consumption—not including benefits 
of reduced climate change (3.2) as well as co-benefits and adverse side 
effects of mitigation (3.5, 4.3)—of 1 to 4% (median: 1.7%) in 2030, 
2 to 6% (median: 3.4%) in 2050, and 3% to 11% (median: 4.8%) in 
2100, relative to consumption in baseline scenarios that grows any-
where from 300% to more than 900% over the century4126. These num-
bers correspond to an annualized reduction of consumption growth by 
0.04 to 0.14 (median: 0.06) percentage points over the century relative 
to annualized consumption growth in the baseline that is between 
1.6% and 3% per year (Figure 3.4). In the absence or under limited 
availability of mitigation technologies (such as bioenergy, CCS, and 
their combination BECCS, nuclear, wind and solar), mitigation costs 
can increase substantially depending on the technology considered 
(Table 3.2). Delaying additional mitigation reduces near-term costs 
but increases mitigation costs in the medium- to long-term (Table 3.2). 
Many models could not limit likely warming to below 2°C over the 21st 
century relative to pre-industrial levels, if additional mitigation is con-
siderably delayed, or if availability of key technologies, such as bioen-
ergy, CCS and their combination (BECCS) are limited (high confidence) 














































































































Figure 3.4 |  Global mitigation costs in cost-effective scenarios at different atmospheric concentrations levels in 2100 (right panel) and growth in economic consumption in the 
corresponding baseline scenarios (those without additional mitigation) (left panel). The table at the top shows percentage points of annualized consumption growth reductions 
relative to consumption growth in the baseline of 1.6 to 3% per year (e.g., if the reduction is 0.06 percentage points per year due to mitigation, and baseline growth is 2.0% per 
year, then the growth rate with mitigation would be 1.94% per year). Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and 
they impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models’ default technology assumptions. Consumption losses are shown relative to a baseline development 
without climate policy. Cost estimates shown in this table do not consider the benefits of reduced climate change nor co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation. Estimates 
at the high end of these cost ranges are from models that are relatively inflexible to achieve the deep emissions reductions that would be required in the long run to meet these 
goals and/or include assumptions about market imperfections that would raise costs. {WGIII Table SPM.2, Figure TS.12, 6.3.6, Figure 6.21} 
41 Mitigation cost ranges cited here refer to the 16th to 84th percentile of the underlying sample (see Figure 3.4).
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Mitigation efforts and associated cost are expected to vary 
across countries. The distribution of costs can differ from the 
distribution of the actions themselves (high confidence). In glob-
ally cost-effective scenarios, the majority of mitigation efforts takes 
place in countries with the highest future GHG emissions in baseline 
scenarios. Some studies exploring particular effort-sharing frameworks, 
under the assumption of a global carbon market, have estimated sub-
stantial global financial flows associated with mitigation in scenarios 
that are likely to more unlikely than likely to limit warming during the 
21st century to less than 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels. {WGIII 
SPM.4.1, TS.3.1, Box 3.5, 4.6, 6.3.6, Table 6.4, Figure 6.9, Figure 6.27, 
Figure 6.28, Figure 6.29, 13.4.2.4}
Table 3.2 | Increase in global mitigation costs due to either limited availability of specific technologies or delays in additional mitigation a relative to cost-effective scenarios b. The 
increase in costs is given for the median estimate and the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenarios (in parentheses). The sample size of each scenario set is provided in the 
coloured symbols c. The colours of the symbols indicate the fraction of models from systematic model comparison exercises that could successfully reach the targeted concentration 
level. {WGIII Table SPM.2,Table TS.2, Figure TS.13, Figure 6.24, Figure 6.25}
Mitigation cost increases in scenarios with  
limited availability of technologies d
[% increase in total discounted e mitigation costs  
(2015–2100) relative to default technology assumptions]
Mitigation cost increases due to delay-
ed additional mitigation until 2030
[% increase in mitigation costs 




no CCS nuclear phase out limited solar/wind limited bioenergy
medium term costs 
(2030–2050)


























(2 to 23%) 
8% 
(5 to 15%) 
18% 
(4 to 66%) 
}
15%  
(3 to 32%) 
16%  
(5 to 24%) 
580 to 650 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Symbol legend—fraction of models successful in producing scenarios (numbers indicate the number of successful models) 
: all models successful 
 
: between 80 and 100% of models successful
: between 50 and 80% of models successful 
 
: less than 50% of models successful
Notes:
a Delayed mitigation scenarios are associated with greenhouse gas emission of more than 55 GtCO2-eq in 2030, and the increase in mitigation costs is measured relative to cost-
effective mitigation scenarios for the same long-term concentration level.
b Cost-effective scenarios assume immediate mitigation in all countries and a single global carbon price, and impose no additional limitations on technology relative to the models’ 
default technology assumptions.
c The range is determined by the central scenarios encompassing the 16th to 84th percentile range of the scenario set. Only scenarios with a time horizon until 2100 are included. 
Some models that are included in the cost ranges for concentration levels above 530 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 could not produce associated scenarios for concentration levels below 
530 ppm CO2-eq in 2100 with assumptions about limited availability of technologies and/or delayed additional mitigation.
d No CCS: carbon dioxide capture and storage is not included in these scenarios. Nuclear phase out: no addition of nuclear power plants beyond those under construction, and 
operation of existing plants until the end of their lifetime. Limited Solar/Wind: a maximum of 20% global electricity generation from solar and wind power in any year of these 
scenarios. Limited Bioenergy: a maximum of 100 EJ/yr modern bioenergy supply globally (modern bioenergy used for heat, power, combinations and industry was around 18 EJ/yr 
in 2008). EJ = Exajoule =  1018 Joule.
e Percentage increase of net present value of consumption losses in percent of baseline consumption (for scenarios from general equilibrium models) and abatement costs in percent 
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Box 3.2 | Greenhouse Gas Metrics and Mitigation Pathways
This box focuses on emission-based metrics that are used for calculating CO2-equivalent emissions for the formulation and evaluation 
of mitigation strategies. These emission metrics are distinct from the concentration-based metric used in SYR (CO2-equivalent concen-
tration). For an explanation of CO2-equivalent emissions and CO2-equivalent concentrations, see Glossary. 
Emission metrics facilitate multi-component climate policies by allowing emissions of different greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
and other climate forcing agents to be expressed in a common unit (so-called ‘CO2-equivalent emissions’). The Global 
Warming Potential (GWP) was introduced in the IPCC First Assessment Report, where it was also used to illustrate the difficulties in 
comparing components with differing physical properties using a single metric. The 100-year GWP (GWP100) was adopted by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol and is now used widely as the default metric. It 
is only one of several possible emission metrics and time horizons. {WGI 8.7, WGIII 3.9}
The choice of emission metric and time horizon depends on type of application and policy context; hence, no single metric 
is optimal for all policy goals. All metrics have shortcomings, and choices contain value judgments, such as the climate effect con-
sidered and the weighting of effects over time (which explicitly or implicitly discounts impacts over time), the climate policy goal and 
the degree to which metrics incorporate economic or only physical considerations. There are significant uncertainties related to metrics, 
and the magnitudes of the uncertainties differ across metric type and time horizon. In general, the uncertainty increases for metrics 
along the cause–effect chain from emission to effects. {WGI 8.7, WGIII 3.9}
The weight assigned to non-CO2 climate forcing agents relative to CO2 depends strongly on the choice of metric and time 
horizon (robust evidence, high agreement). GWP compares components based on radiative forcing, integrated up to a chosen time 
horizon. Global Temperature change Potential (GTP; see Glossary) is based on the temperature response at a specific point in time with 
no weight on temperature response before or after the chosen point in time. Adoption of a fixed horizon of, for example, 20, 100 or 500 
years for these metrics will inevitably put no weight on climate outcomes beyond the time horizon, which is significant for CO2 as well 
as other long-lived gases. The choice of time horizon markedly affects the weighting especially of short-lived climate forcing agents, 
such as methane (CH4) (see Box 3.2, Table 1; Box 3.2, Figure 1a). For some metrics (e.g., the dynamic GTP; see Glossary), the weighting 
changes over time as a chosen target year is approached. {WGI 8.7, WGIII 3.9}
Box 3.2, Table 1 | Examples of emission metric values from WGI a.
GWP GTP





change after 20 
years
Temperature 
change after 100 
years
CO2 b 1 1 1 1
CH4 12.4 84 28 67 4
N2O 121.0 264 265 277 234
CF4 50,000.0 4880 6630 5270 8040
HFC-152a 1.5 506 138 174 19
 
Notes:
a Global Warming Potential (GWP) values have been updated in successive IPCC reports; the AR5 GWP100 values are different from those adopted for the Kyoto Protocol’s 
First Commitment Period which are from the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Note that for consistency, equivalent CO2 emissions given elsewhere in this Synthesis 
Report are also based on SAR, not AR5 values. For a comparison of emissions using SAR and AR5 GWP100 values for 2010 emissions, see Figure 1.6.
b No single lifetime can be given for CO2. {WGI Box 6.1, 6.1.1, 8.7}
The choice of emission metric affects the timing and emphasis placed on abating short- and long-lived climate forcing 
agents. For most metrics, global cost differences are small under scenarios of global participation and cost-minimizing 
mitigation pathways, but implications for some individual countries and sectors could be more significant (medium evi-
dence, high agreement). Different metrics and time horizons significantly affect the contributions from various sources/sectors and 
components, particularly short-lived climate forcing agents (Box 3.2, Figure 1b). A fixed time independent metric that gives less weight 
to short-lived agents such as CH4 (e.g., using GTP100 instead of GWP100) would require earlier and more stringent CO2 abatement to 
achieve the same climate outcome for 2100. Using a time-dependent metric, such as a dynamic GTP, leads to less CH4 mitigation 
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in the near term but to more in the long term as the target date is being approached. This implies that for some (short-lived) agents, 
the metric choice influences the choice of policies and the timing of mitigation (especially for sectors and countries with high non-CO2 
emission levels). {WGI 8.7, WGIII 6.3}
Contributions by sectors to total GHG emissions using different metrics





































































































Box 3.2, Figure 1 |  Implications of metric choices on the weighting of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and contributions by sectors for illustrative time horizons. 
Panel (a): integrated radiative forcing (left panel) and warming resulting at a given future point in time (right panel) from global net emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), 
methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) in the year 2010 (and no emissions thereafter), for time horizons of up to 200 years. Integrated radiative forcing is used in the 
calculation of Global Warming Potentials (GWP), while the warming at a future point in time is used in the calculation of Global Temperature change Potentials (GTP). 
Radiative forcing and warming were calculated based on global 2010 emission data from WGIII 5.2 and absolute GWPs and absolute GTPs from WGI 8.7, normalized 
to the integrated radiative forcing and warming, respectively, after 100 years, due to 2010 net CO2 emissions. Panel (b): Illustrative examples showing contributions 
from different sectors to total metric-weighted global GHG emissions in the year 2010, calculated using 100-year GWP (GWP100, left), 20-year GWP (GWP20, middle) 
or 100-year GTP (GTP100, right) and the WGIII 2010 emissions database. {WGIII 5.2} Note that percentages differ slightly for the GWP100 case if values from the IPCC 
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Box 3.3 | Carbon Dioxide Removal and Solar Radiation Management Geoengineering Technologies—
Possible Roles, Options, Risks and Status
Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies operating on a large scale that aim to deliberately alter the climate 
system in order to alleviate the impacts of climate change. Most methods seek to either reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy 
in the climate system (Solar Radiation Management, SRM) or increase the removal of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere by 
sinks to alter climate (Carbon Dioxide Removal, CDR, see Glossary). Limited evidence precludes a comprehensive assessment of feasi-
bility, cost, side effects and environmental impacts of either CDR or SRM. {WGI SPM E.8, 6.5, 7.7, WGII 6.4, Table 6-5, Box 20-4, WGIII 
TS.3.1.3, 6.9}
CDR plays a major role in many mitigation scenarios. Bioenergy with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS) and afforesta-
tion are the only CDR methods included in these scenarios. CDR technologies are particularly important in scenarios that temporarily 
overshoot atmospheric concentrations, but they are also prevalent in many scenarios without overshoot to compensate for residual 
emissions from sectors where mitigation is more expensive. Similar to mitigation, CDR would need to be deployed on a large scale and 
over a long time period to be able to significantly reduce CO2 concentrations (see Section 3.1). {WGII 6.4, WGIII SPM 4.1, TS.3.1.2, TS 
3.1.3, 6.3, 6.9}
Several CDR techniques could potentially reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) levels. However, there are biogeo-
chemical, technical and societal limitations that, to varying degrees, make it difficult to provide quantitative estimates 
of the potential for CDR. The emission mitigation from CDR is less than the removed CO2, as some CO2 is released from that previ-
ously stored in oceans and terrestrial carbon reservoirs. Sub-sea geologic storage has been implemented on a regional scale, with no 
evidence to date of ocean impact from leakage. The climatic and environmental side effects of CDR depend on technology and scale. 
Examples are associated with altered surface reflectance from afforestation and ocean de-oxygenation from ocean fertilization. Most 
terrestrial CDR techniques would involve competing demands for land and could involve local and regional risks, while maritime CDR 
techniques may involve significant risks for ocean ecosystems, so that their deployment could pose additional challenges for coopera-
tion between countries. {WGI 6.5, FAQ 7.3, WGII 6.4, Table 6.5, WGIII 6.9}
SRM is untested, and is not included in any of the mitigation scenarios, but, if realisable, could to some degree offset 
global temperature rise and some of its effects. It could possibly provide rapid cooling in comparison to CO2 mitigation. 
There is medium confidence that SRM through stratospheric aerosol injection is scalable to counter radiative forcing from a twofold 
increase in CO2 concentrations and some of the climate responses associated with warming. Due to insufficient understanding there is 
no consensus on whether a similarly large negative counter radiative forcing could be achieved from cloud brightening. Land albedo 
change does not appear to be able to produce a large counter radiative forcing. Even if SRM could counter the global mean warming, 
differences in spatial patterns would remain. The scarcity of literature on other SRM techniques precludes their assessment. {WGI 7.7, 
WGIII TS.3.1.3, 6.9}
If it were deployed, SRM would entail numerous uncertainties, side effects, risks and shortcomings. Several lines of evidence 
indicate that SRM would itself produce a small but significant decrease in global precipitation (with larger differences on regional 
scales). Stratospheric aerosol SRM is likely to modestly increase ozone losses in the polar stratosphere. SRM would not prevent the CO2 
effects on ecosystems and ocean acidification that are unrelated to warming. There could also be other unanticipated consequences. 
For all future scenarios considered in AR5, SRM would need to increase commensurately, to counter the global mean warming, which 
would exacerbate side effects. Additionally, if SRM were increased to substantial levels and then terminated, there is high confidence 
that surface temperatures would rise very rapidly (within a decade or two). This would stress systems that are sensitive to the rate of 
warming. {WGI 7.6–7.7, FAQ 7.3, WGII 19.5, WGIII 6.9}
SRM technologies raise questions about costs, risks, governance and ethical implications of development and deploy-
ment. There are special challenges emerging for international institutions and mechanisms that could coordinate research 
and possibly restrain testing and deployment. Even if SRM would reduce human-made global temperature increase, it would 
imply spatial and temporal redistributions of risks. SRM thus introduces important questions of intragenerational and intergenerational 
justice. Research on SRM, as well as its eventual deployment, has been subject to ethical objections. In spite of the estimated low 
potential costs of some SRM deployment technologies, they will not necessarily pass a benefit–cost test that takes account of the range 
of risks and side effects. The governance implications of SRM are particularly challenging, especially as unilateral action might lead to 
significant effects and costs for others. {WGIII TS.3.1.3, 1.4, 3.3, 6.9, 13.4}
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3.5 Interaction among mitigation, adaptation 
and sustainable development
Climate change is a threat to equitable and sustain-
able development. Adaptation, mitigation and sus-
tainable development are closely related, with poten-
tial for synergies and trade-offs.
Climate change poses an increasing threat to equitable and 
sustainable development (high confidence). Some climate-related 
impacts on development are already being observed. Climate change 
is a threat multiplier. It exacerbates other threats to social and natural 
systems, placing additional burdens particularly on the poor and con-
straining possible development paths for all. Development along cur-
rent global pathways can contribute to climate risk and vulnerability, 
further eroding the basis for sustainable development. {WGII SPM B-2, 
2.5, 10.9, 13.1–13.3, 20.1, 20.2, 20.6, WGIII SPM.2, 4.2}
Aligning climate policy with sustainable development requires 
attention to both adaptation and mitigation (high confidence). 
Interaction among adaptation, mitigation and sustainable develop-
ment occurs both within and across regions and scales, often in the 
context of multiple stressors. Some options for responding to climate 
change could impose risks of other environmental and social costs, 
have adverse distributional effects and draw resources away from 
other development priorities, including poverty eradication. {WGII 2.5, 
8.4, 9.3, 13.3–13.4, 20.2–20.4, 21.4, 25.9, 26.8, WGIII SPM.2, 4.8, 6.6}
Both adaptation and mitigation can bring substantial co-ben-
efits (medium confidence). Examples of actions with co-benefits 
include (i) improved air quality (see Figure 3.5); (ii) enhanced energy 
security, (iii) reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas 
through greening cities and recycling water; (iv) sustainable agricul-
ture and forestry; and (v) protection of ecosystems for carbon storage 
and other ecosystem services. {WGII SPM C-1, WGIII SPM.4.1}
Strategies and actions can be pursued now that will move 
towards climate-resilient pathways for sustainable develop-
ment, while at the same time helping to improve livelihoods, 
social and economic well-being and effective environmental 
management (high confidence). Prospects for climate-resilient 
pathways are related fundamentally to what the world accomplish-
es with climate change mitigation (high confidence). Since mitigation 
reduces the rate as well as the magnitude of warming, it also increas-
es the time available for adaptation to a particular level of climate 
change, potentially by several decades. Delaying mitigation actions 
may reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in the future. {WGII 









Stringent climate policy Stringent climate policyBaseline Baseline
Co-benefits of climate change mitigation for air quality




















Figure 3.5 |  Air pollutant emission levels of black carbon (BC) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) by 2050, relative to 2005 (0 = 2005 levels). Baseline scenarios without additional efforts 
to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions beyond those in place today are compared to scenarios with stringent mitigation policies, which are consistent with reaching about 450 
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Box 3.4 | Co-benefits and Adverse Side effects
A government policy or a measure intended to achieve one objective often affects other objectives, either positively or 
negatively. For example, mitigation policies can influence local air quality (see Figure 3.5). When the effects are positive they are 
called ‘co-benefits’, also referred to as ‘ancillary benefits’. Negative effects are referred to as ‘adverse side effects’. Some measures 
are labelled ‘no or low regret’ when their co-benefits are sufficient to justify their implementation, even in the absence of immediate 
direct benefits. Co-benefits and adverse side effects can be measured in monetary or non-monetary units. The effect of co-benefits and 
adverse side effects from climate policies on overall social welfare has not yet been quantitatively examined, with the exception of a 
few recent multi-objective studies. Many of these have not been well quantified, and effects can be case and site-specific as they will 
depend on local circumstances. {WGII 11.9, 16.3.1, 17.2, 20.4.1, WGIII Box TS.11, 3.6, 5.7}
Co-benefits of mitigation could affect achievement of other objectives, such as those related to energy security, air qual-
ity, efforts to address ecosystem impacts, income distribution, labour supply and employment and urban sprawl (see 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.5). In the absence of complementary policies, however, some mitigation measures may have adverse side  
effects (at least in the short term), for example on biodiversity, food security, energy access, economic growth and income distribu-
tion. The co-benefits of adaptation policies may include improved access to infrastructure and services, extended education and health 
systems, reduced disaster losses, better governance and others. {WGII 4.4.4, 11.9, 15.2, 17.2, 20.3.3, 20.4.1, WGIII Box TS.11, 6.6}  
Comprehensive strategies in response to climate change that are consistent with sustainable development take into 
account the co-benefits, adverse side effects and risks that may arise from both adaptation and mitigation options. The 
assessment of overall social welfare impacts is complicated by this interaction between climate change response options and pre-
existing non-climate policies. For example, in terms of air quality, the value of the extra tonne of sulfur dioxide (SO2) reduction that 
occurs with climate change mitigation through reduced fossil fuel combustion depends greatly on the stringency of SO2 control policies. 
If SO2 policy is weak, the value of SO2 reductions may be large, but if SO2 policy is stringent, it may be near zero. Similarly, in terms of 
adaptation and disaster risk management, weak policies can lead to an adaptation deficit that increases human and economic losses 
from natural climate variability. ‘Adaptation deficit’ refers to the lack of capacity to manage adverse impacts of current climate vari-
ability. An existing adaptation deficit increases the benefits of adaptation policies that improve the management of climate variability 
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4.1 Common enabling factors and constraints 
for adaptation and mitigation responses
Adaptation and mitigation responses are underpinned 
by common enabling factors. These include effective 
institutions and governance, innovation and invest-
ments in environmentally sound technologies and 
infrastructure, sustainable livelihoods and behavioural 
and lifestyle choices.
Innovation and investments in environmentally sound infra-
structure and technologies can reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions and enhance resilience to climate change (very high 
confidence). Innovation and change can expand the availability and/
or effectiveness of adaptation and mitigation options. For example, 
investments in low-carbon and carbon-neutral energy technologies 
can reduce the energy intensity of economic development, the carbon 
intensity of energy, GHG emissions, and the long-term costs of mitiga-
tion. Similarly, new technologies and infrastructure can increase the 
resilience of human systems while reducing adverse impacts on natural 
systems. Investments in technology and infrastructure rely on an ena-
bling policy environment, access to finance and technology and broad-
er economic development that builds capacity (Table 4.1, Section 4.4). 
{WGII SPM C-2, Table SPM.1, Table TS.8, WGIII SPM.4.1, Table SPM.2, 
TS.3.1.1, TS 3.1.2, TS.3.2.1}
Adaptation and mitigation are constrained by the inertia of 
global and regional trends in economic development, GHG emis-
sions, resource consumption, infrastructure and settlement pat-
terns, institutional behaviour and technology (medium evidence, 
high agreement). Such inertia may limit the capacity to reduce GHG 
emissions, remain below particular climate thresholds or avoid adverse 
impacts (Table 4.1). Some constraints may be overcome through new 
technologies, financial resources, increased institutional effectiveness 
and governance or changes in social and cultural attitudes and behav-
iours. {WGII SPM C-1, WGIII SPM.3, SPM.4.2, Table SPM.2}
Vulnerability to climate change, GHG emissions, and the capac-
ity for adaptation and mitigation are strongly influenced by 
livelihoods, lifestyles, behaviour and culture (medium evidence, 
medium agreement) (Table 4.1). Shifts toward more energy-in-
tensive lifestyles can contribute to higher energy and resource con-
sumption, driving greater energy production and GHG emissions and 
increasing mitigation costs. In contrast, emissions can be substan-
tially lowered through changes in consumption patterns (see 4.3 for 
details). The social acceptability and/or effectiveness of climate policies 
are influenced by the extent to which they incentivize or depend on 
regionally appropriate changes in lifestyles or behaviours. Similarly, 
livelihoods that depend on climate-sensitive sectors or resources may 
be particularly vulnerable to climate change and climate change poli-
cies. Economic development and urbanization of landscapes exposed 
to climate hazards may increase the exposure of human settlements 
and reduce the resilience of natural systems. {WGII SPM A-2, SPM B-2, 
Table SPM.1, TS A-1, TS A-2, TS C-1, TS C-2, 16.3.2.7, WGIII SPM.4.2, 
TS.2.2, 4.2}
For many regions and sectors, enhanced capacities to mitigate 
and adapt are part of the foundation essential for managing 
climate change risks (high confidence). Such capacities are place- 
and context-specific and therefore there is no single approach for 
reducing risk that is appropriate across all settings. For example, devel-
oping nations with low income levels have the lowest financial, tech-
nological and institutional capacities to pursue low-carbon, climate-re-
silient development pathways. Although developed nations generally 
have greater relative capacity to manage the risks of climate change, 
such capacity does not necessarily translate into the implementation of 
adaptation and mitigation options. {WGII SPM B-1, SPM B-2, TS B-1, TS 
B-2, 16.3.1.1, 16.3.2, 16.5, WGIII SPM.5.1, TS.4.3, TS.4.5, 4.6}
Improving institutions as well as enhancing coordination and 
cooperation in governance can help overcome regional con-
straints associated with mitigation, adaptation and disaster risk 
reduction (very high confidence). Despite the presence of a wide 
array of multilateral, national and sub-national institutions focused on 
adaptation and mitigation, global GHG emissions continue to increase 
and identified adaptation needs have not been adequately addressed. 
The implementation of effective adaptation and mitigation options 
may necessitate new institutions and institutional arrangements that 
span multiple scales (medium confidence) (Table 4.1). {WGII SPM B-2, TS 
C-1, 16.3.2.4, 16.8, WGIII SPM.4.2.5, SPM.5.1, SPM.5.2, TS.1, TS.3.1.3, 
TS.4.1, TS.4.2, TS.4.4}
Topic 4: Adaptation and Mitigation
Many adaptation and mitigation options can help address climate change, but no single option is sufficient by itself. 
Effective implementation depends on policies and cooperation at all scales and can be enhanced through integrated 
responses that link mitigation and adaptation with other societal objectives.
Topic 3 demonstrates the need and strategic considerations for both adaptation and global-scale mitigation to manage risks from climate change. 
Building on these insights, Topic 4 presents near-term response options that could help achieve such strategic goals. Near-term adaptation and 
mitigation actions will differ across sectors and regions, reflecting development status, response capacities and near- and long-term aspirations 
with regard to both climate and non-climate outcomes. Because adaptation and mitigation inevitably take place in the context of multiple 
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4.2 Response options for adaptation
Adaptation options exist in all sectors, but their con-
text for implementation and potential to reduce cli-
mate-related risks differs across sectors and regions. 
Some adaptation responses involve significant co-
benefits, synergies and trade-offs. Increasing climate 
change will increase challenges for many adaptation 
options.
People, governments and the private sector are starting to adapt 
to a changing climate. Since the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report 
(AR4), understanding of response options has increased, with 
improved knowledge of their benefits, costs and links to sus-
tainable development. Adaptation can take a variety of approaches 
depending on its context in vulnerability reduction, disaster risk man-
agement or proactive adaptation planning. These include (see Table 4.2 
for examples and details):
• Social, ecological asset and infrastructure development
• Technological process optimization 
• Integrated natural resources management 
• Institutional, educational and behavioural change or reinforcement 
• Financial services, including risk transfer 
• Information systems to support early warning and proactive plan-
ning
There is increasing recognition of the value of social (including local 
and indigenous), institutional, and ecosystem-based measures and of 
the extent of constraints to adaptation. Effective strategies and actions 
consider the potential for co-benefits and opportunities within wider 
strategic goals and development plans. {WGII SPM A-2, SPM C-1, TS 
A-2, 6.4, 8.3, 9.4, 15.3}
Opportunities to enable adaptation planning and implemen-
tation exist in all sectors and regions, with diverse potential 
and approaches depending on context. The need for adaptation 
along with associated challenges is expected to increase with 
climate change (very high confidence). Examples of key adaptation 
approaches for particular sectors, including constraints and limits, are 
summarized below. {WGII SPM B, SPM C, 16.4, 16.6, 17.2, 19.6, 19.7, 
Table 16.3}
Table 4.1 | Common factors that constrain the implementation of adaptation and mitigation options
Constraining Factor Potential Implications for Adaptation Potential Implications for Mitigation
Adverse externalities of popula-
tion growth and urbanization
Increase exposure of human populations to climate variability 
and change as well as demands for, and pressures on, natural 
resources and ecosystem services {WGII 16.3.2.3, Box 16-3}
Drive economic growth, energy demand and energy consumption, 
resulting in increases in greenhouse gas emissions {WGIII SPM.3}
Deficits of knowledge, edu-
cation and human capital
Reduce national, institutional and individual perceptions of 
the risks posed by climate change as well as the costs and 
benefits of different adaptation options {WGII 16.3.2.1}
Reduce national, institutional and individual risk perception, 
willingness to change behavioural patterns and practices and to 
adopt social and technological innovations to reduce emissions 
{WGIII SPM.3, SPM.5.1, 2.4.1, 3.10.1.5, 4.3.5, 9.8, 11.8.1}
Divergences in social and cultural 
attitudes, values and behaviours 
Reduce societal consensus regarding climate risk and therefore 
demand for specific adaptation policies and measures {WGII 
16.3.2.7}
Influence emission patterns, societal perceptions of the 
utility of mitigation policies and technologies, and willing-
ness to pursue sustainable behaviours and technologies 
{WGIII SPM.2, 2.4.5, 2.6.6.1, 3.7.2.2, 3.9.2, 4.3.4, 5.5.1}
Challenges in governance and 
institutional arrangements
Reduce the ability to coordinate adaptation policies and 
measures and to deliver capacity to actors to plan and implement 
adaptation {WGII 16.3.2.8}
Undermine policies, incentives and cooperation regarding the 
development of mitigation policies and the implementation of 
efficient, carbon-neutral and renewable energy technologies 
{WGIII SPM.3, SPM.5.2, 4.3.2, 6.4.3, 14.1.3.1, 14.3.2.2, 15.12.2, 
16.5.3}
Lack of access to national and 
international climate finance
Reduces the scale of investment in adaptation policies and 
measures and therefore their effectiveness {WGII 16.3.2.5}
Reduces the capacity of developed and, particularly, developing 
nations to pursue policies and technologies that reduce emissi-
ons. {WGIII TS.4.3, 12.6.2, 16.2.2.2}
Inadequate technology Reduces the range of available adaptation options as well as 
their effectiveness in reducing or avoiding risk from increasing 
rates or magnitudes of climate change {WGII 16.3.2.1}
Slows the rate at which society can reduce the carbon intensity 
of energy services and transition toward low-carbon and car-
bon-neutral technologies {WGIII TS.3.1.3, 4.3.6, 6.3.2.2, 11.8.4}
Insufficient quality and/or quan-
tity of natural resources
Reduce the coping range of actors, vulnerability to non-climatic 
factors and potential competition for resources that enhances 
vulnerability {WGII 16.3.2.3}
Reduce the long-term sustainability of different energy  
technologies {WGIII 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 11.8.3} 
Adaptation and development deficits Increase vulnerability to current climate variability as well as 
future climate change {WGII TS A-1, Table TS 5, 16.3.2.4}
Reduce mitigative capacity and undermine international 
cooperative efforts on climate owing to a contentious legacy 
of cooperation on development {WGIII 4.3.1, 4.6.1}
Inequality Places the impacts of climate change and the burden of adapta-
tion disproportionately on the most vulnerable and/or transfers 
them to future generations {WGII TS B-2, Box TS 4, Box 13-1, 
16.7}
Constrains the ability for developing nations with low income 
levels, or different communities or sectors within nations, to 
contribute to greenhouse gas mitigation {WGIII 4.6.2.1}
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Table 4.2 | Approaches for managing the risks of climate change through adaptation. These approaches should be considered overlapping rather than discrete, and they are often 

































































































Approaches Category Examples WGII References
Human 
development
Improved access to education, nutrition, health facilities, energy, safe housing & settlement structures, 
& social support structures; Reduced gender inequality & marginalization in other forms.
8.3, 9.3, 13.1-3, 14.2-3, 22.4
Poverty alleviation Improved access to & control of local resources; Land tenure; Disaster risk reduction; Social safety nets & social protection; Insurance schemes.
8.3-4, 9.3, 13.1-3
Livelihood security
Income, asset & livelihood diversification; Improved infrastructure; Access to technology & decision-
making fora; Increased decision-making power; Changed cropping, livestock & aquaculture practices; 
Reliance on social networks.
7.5, 9.4, 13.1-3, 22.3-4, 23.4, 26.5, 
27.3, 29.6, Table SM24-7
Disaster risk 
management
Early warning systems; Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Diversifying water resources; Improved 
drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & wastewater management; 
Transport & road infrastructure improvements.
8.2-4, 11.7, 14.3, 15.4, 22.4, 24.4, 
26.6, 28.4, Box 25-1, Table 3-3
Ecosystem 
management
Maintaining wetlands & urban green spaces; Coastal afforestation; Watershed & reservoir 
management; Reduction of other stressors on ecosystems & of habitat fragmentation; Maintenance 
of genetic diversity; Manipulation of disturbance regimes; Community-based natural resource 
management.
4.3-4, 8.3, 22.4, Table 3-3, Boxes 4-3, 
8-2, 15-1, 25-8, 25-9 & CC-EA
Spatial or land-use 
planning
Provisioning of adequate housing, infrastructure & services; Managing development in flood prone & 
other high risk areas; Urban planning & upgrading programs; Land zoning laws; Easements; Protected 
areas.
4.4, 8.1-4, 22.4, 23.7-8, 27.3, Box 25-8
Structural/physical
Engineered & built-environment options: Sea walls & coastal protection structures; Flood levees;  
Water storage; Improved drainage; Flood & cyclone shelters; Building codes & practices; Storm & 
wastewater management; Transport & road infrastructure improvements; Floating houses; Power plant 
& electricity grid adjustments.
3.5-6, 5.5, 8.2-3, 10.2, 11.7, 23.3, 
24.4, 25.7, 26.3, 26.8, Boxes 15-1, 
25-1, 25-2 & 25-8
Technological options: New crop & animal varieties; Indigenous, traditional & local knowledge, 
technologies & methods; Efficient irrigation; Water-saving technologies; Desalinisation; Conservation 
agriculture; Food storage & preservation facilities; Hazard & vulnerability mapping & monitoring; Early 
warning systems; Building insulation; Mechanical & passive cooling; Technology development, transfer 
& diffusion.
7.5, 8.3, 9.4, 10.3, 15.4, 22.4, 24.4, 
26.3, 26.5, 27.3, 28.2, 28.4, 29.6-7, 
Boxes 20-5 & 25-2, Tables 3-3 & 15-1
Ecosystem-based options: Ecological restoration; Soil conservation; Afforestation & reforestation; 
Mangrove conservation & replanting; Green infrastructure (e.g., shade trees, green roofs); Controlling 
overfishing; Fisheries co-management; Assisted species migration & dispersal; Ecological corridors; 
Seed banks, gene banks & other ex situ conservation; Community-based natural resource management.
4.4, 5.5, 6.4, 8.3, 9.4, 11.7, 15.4, 22.4, 
23.6-7, 24.4, 25.6, 27.3, 28.2, 29.7, 
30.6, Boxes 15-1, 22-2, 25-9, 26-2 
& CC-EA
Services: Social safety nets & social protection; Food banks & distribution of food surplus; Municipal 
services including water & sanitation; Vaccination programs; Essential public health services; Enhanced 
emergency medical services.
3.5-6, 8.3, 9.3, 11.7, 11.9, 22.4, 29.6, 
Box 13-2
Institutional
Economic options: Financial incentives; Insurance; Catastrophe bonds; Payments for ecosystem 
services; Pricing water to encourage universal provision and careful use; Microfinance; Disaster 
contingency funds; Cash transfers; Public-private partnerships.
8.3-4, 9.4, 10.7, 11.7, 13.3, 15.4, 17.5, 
22.4, 26.7, 27.6, 29.6, Box 25-7
Laws & regulations: Land zoning laws; Building standards & practices; Easements; Water regulations 
& agreements; Laws to support disaster risk reduction; Laws to encourage insurance purchasing; 
Defined property rights & land tenure security; Protected areas; Fishing quotas; Patent pools & 
technology transfer.
4.4, 8.3, 9.3, 10.5, 10.7, 15.2, 15.4, 
17.5, 22.4, 23.4, 23.7, 24.4, 25.4, 26.3, 
27.3, 30.6, Table 25-2, Box CC-CR
National & government policies & programs: National & regional adaptation plans including 
mainstreaming; Sub-national & local adaptation plans; Economic diversification; Urban upgrading 
programs; Municipal water management programs; Disaster planning & preparedness; Integrated 
water resource management; Integrated coastal zone management; Ecosystem-based management; 
Community-based adaptation.
2.4, 3.6, 4.4, 5.5, 6.4, 7.5, 8.3, 11.7, 
15.2-5, 22.4, 23.7, 25.4, 25.8, 26.8-9, 
27.3-4, 29.6, Boxes 25-1, 25-2 & 25-9, 
Tables 9-2 & 17-1
Social
Educational options: Awareness raising & integrating into education; Gender equity in education; 
Extension services; Sharing indigenous, traditional & local knowledge; Participatory action research & 
social learning; Knowledge-sharing & learning platforms.
8.3-4, 9.4, 11.7, 12.3, 15.2-4, 22.4, 
25.4, 28.4, 29.6, Tables 15-1 & 25-2
Informational options: Hazard & vulnerability mapping; Early warning & response systems; 
Systematic monitoring & remote sensing; Climate services; Use of indigenous climate observations; 
Participatory scenario development; Integrated assessments.
2.4, 5.5, 8.3-4, 9.4, 11.7, 15.2-4, 22.4, 
23.5, 24.4, 25.8, 26.6, 26.8, 27.3, 28.2, 
28.5, 30.6, Table 25-2, Box 26-3
Behavioural options: Household preparation & evacuation planning; Migration; Soil & water 
conservation; Storm drain clearance; Livelihood diversification; Changed cropping, livestock & 
aquaculture practices; Reliance on social networks.
5.5, 7.5, 9.4, 12.4, 22.3-4, 23.4, 23.7, 
25.7, 26.5, 27.3, 29.6, Table SM24-7, 
Box 25-5
Spheres of change
Practical: Social & technical innovations, behavioural shifts, or institutional & managerial changes that 
produce substantial shifts in outcomes.
8.3, 17.3, 20.5, Box 25-5
Political: Political, social, cultural & ecological decisions & actions consistent with reducing 
vulnerability & risk & supporting adaptation, mitigation & sustainable development.
14.2-3, 20.5, 25.4, 30.7, Table 14-1
Personal: Individual & collective assumptions, beliefs, values & worldviews influencing climate-change 
responses.
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Freshwater resources 
Adaptive water management techniques, including scenario 
planning, learning-based approaches and flexible and low-re-
gret solutions, can help adjust to uncertain hydrological chang-
es due to climate change and their impacts (limited evidence, 
high agreement). Strategies include adopting integrated water man-
agement, augmenting supply, reducing the mismatch between water 
supply and demand, reducing non-climate stressors, strengthening 
institutional capacities and adopting more water-efficient technologies 
and water-saving strategies. {WGII SPM B-2, Assessment Box SPM.2 
Table 1, SPM B-3, 3.6, 22.3–22.4, 23.4, 23.7, 24.4, 27.2–27.3, Box 25-2}
Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems
Management actions can reduce but not eliminate risks of 
impacts to terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems due to climate 
change (high confidence). Actions include maintenance of genet-
ic diversity, assisted species migration and dispersal, manipula-
tion of disturbance regimes (e.g., fires, floods) and reduction 
of other stressors. Management options that reduce non-climatic 
stressors, such as habitat modification, overexploitation, pollution and 
invasive species, increase the inherent capacity of ecosystems and their 
species to adapt to a changing climate. Other options include improv-
ing early warning systems and associated response systems. Enhanced 
connectivity of vulnerable ecosystems may also assist autonomous 
adaptation. Translocation of species is controversial and is expected to 
become less feasible where whole ecosystems are at risk. {WGII SPM 
B-2, SPM B-3, Figure SPM.5, Table TS.8, 4.4, 25.6, 26.4, Box CC-RF}
Coastal systems and low-lying areas
Increasingly, coastal adaptation options include those based on 
integrated coastal zone management, local community partici-
pation, ecosystems-based approaches and disaster risk reduc-
tion, mainstreamed into relevant strategies and management 
plans (high confidence). The analysis and implementation of coastal 
adaptation has progressed more significantly in developed countries 
than in developing countries (high confidence). The relative costs of 
coastal adaptation are expected to vary strongly among and within 
regions and countries. {WGII SPM B-2, SPM B-3, 5.5, 8.3, 22.3, 24.4, 
26.8, Box 25-1}
Marine systems and oceans 
Marine forecasting and early warning systems as well as reduc-
ing non-climatic stressors have the potential to reduce risks 
for some fisheries and aquaculture industries, but options for 
unique ecosystems such as coral reefs are limited (high confi-
dence). Fisheries and some aquaculture industries with high-technol-
ogy and/or large investments have high capacities for adaptation due 
to greater development of environmental monitoring, modelling and 
resource assessments. Adaptation options include large-scale translo-
cation of industrial fishing activities and flexible management that can 
react to variability and change. For smaller-scale fisheries and nations 
with limited adaptive capacities, building social resilience, alternative 
livelihoods and occupational flexibility are important strategies. Adap-
tation options for coral reef systems are generally limited to reduc-
ing other stressors, mainly by enhancing water quality and limiting 
pressures from tourism and fishing, but their efficacy will be severely 
reduced as thermal stress and ocean acidification increase. {WGII SPM 
B-2, SPM Assessment Box SPM.2 Table 1, TS B-2, 5.5, 6.4, 7.5, 25.6.2, 
29.4, 30.6-7, Box CC-MB, Box CC-CR}
Food production system/Rural areas 
Adaptation options for agriculture include technological 
responses, enhancing smallholder access to credit and other 
critical production resources, strengthening institutions at local 
to regional levels and improving market access through trade 
reform (medium confidence). Responses to decreased food pro-
duction and quality include: developing new crop varieties adapted 
to changes in CO2, temperature, and drought; enhancing the capacity 
for climate risk management; and offsetting economic impacts of land 
use change. Improving financial support and investing in the produc-
tion of small-scale farms can also provide benefits. Expanding agri-
cultural markets and improving the predictability and reliability of the 
world trading system could result in reduced market volatility and help 
manage food supply shortages caused by climate change. {WGII SPM 
B-2, SPM B-3, 7.5, 9.3, 22.4, 22.6, 25.9, 27.3}
Urban areas/Key economic sectors and services
Urban adaptation benefits from effective multi-level govern-
ance, alignment of policies and incentives, strengthened local 
government and community adaptation capacity, synergies 
with the private sector and appropriate financing and institu-
tional development (medium confidence). Enhancing the capacity 
of low-income groups and vulnerable communities and their partner-
ships with local governments can also be an effective urban climate 
adaptation strategy. Examples of adaptation mechanisms include 
large-scale public-private risk reduction initiatives and economic diver-
sification and government insurance for the non-diversifiable portion 
of risk. In some locations, especially at the upper end of projected cli-
mate changes, responses could also require transformational changes 
such as managed retreat. {WGII SPM B-2, 8.3–8.4, 24.4, 24.5, 26.8, 
Box 25-9}
Human health, security and livelihoods
Adaptation options that focus on strengthening existing deliv-
ery systems and institutions, as well as insurance and social pro-
tection strategies, can improve health, security and livelihoods 
in the near term (high confidence). The most effective vulnerability 
reduction measures for health in the near term are programmes that 
implement and improve basic public health measures such as provision 
of clean water and sanitation, secure essential health care including 
vaccination and child health services, increase capacity for disaster pre-
paredness and response and alleviate poverty (very high confidence). 
Options to address heat related mortality include health warning sys-
tems linked to response strategies, urban planning and improvements 
to the built environment to reduce heat stress. Robust institutions can 
manage many transboundary impacts of climate change to reduce risk 
of conflicts over shared natural resources. Insurance programmes, social 
protection measures and disaster risk management may enhance long-
term livelihood resilience among the poor and marginalized people, if 
policies address multi-dimensional poverty. {WGII SPM B-2, SPM B-3, 
8.2, 10.8, 11.7–11.8, 12.5–12.6, 22.3, 23.9, 25.8, 26.6, Box CC-HS}
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Significant co-benefits, synergies and trade-offs exist between 
adaptation and mitigation and among different adaptation 
responses; interactions occur both within and across regions 
and sectors (very high confidence). For example, investments in 
crop varieties adapted to climate change can increase the capacity to 
cope with drought, and public health measures to address vector-borne 
diseases can enhance the capacity of health systems to address other 
challenges. Similarly, locating infrastructure away from low-lying 
coastal areas helps settlements and ecosystems adapt to sea level 
rise while also protecting against tsunamis. However, some adapta-
tion options may have adverse side effects that imply real or perceived 
trade-offs with other adaptation objectives (see Table 4.3 for exam-
ples), mitigation objectives or broader development goals. For exam-
ple, while protection of ecosystems can assist adaptation to climate 
change and enhance carbon storage, increased use of air conditioning 
to maintain thermal comfort in buildings or the use of desalination 
to enhance water resource security can increase energy demand, and 
therefore, GHG emissions. {WGII SPM B-2, SPM C-1, 5.4.2, 16.3.2.9, 
17.2.3.1, Table 16-2}
4.3 Response options for mitigation
Mitigation options are available in every major sector. 
Mitigation can be more cost-effective if using an inte-
grated approach that combines measures to reduce 
energy use and the greenhouse gas intensity of end-
use sectors, decarbonize energy supply, reduce net 
emissions and enhance carbon sinks in land-based 
sectors.
A broad range of sectoral mitigation options is available that 
can reduce GHG emission intensity, improve energy intensity 
through enhancements of technology, behaviour, production 
and resource efficiency and enable structural changes or chang-
es in activity. In addition, direct options in agriculture, forestry and 
other land use (AFOLU) involve reducing CO2 emissions by reducing 
deforestation, forest degradation and forest fires; storing carbon in 
terrestrial systems (for example, through afforestation); and provid-
ing bioenergy feedstocks. Options to reduce non-CO2 emissions exist 
across all sectors but most notably in agriculture, energy supply and 
Table 4.3 | Examples of potential trade-offs associated with an illustrative set of adaptation options that could be implemented by actors to achieve specific management objec-
tives. {WGII Table 16-2}
Sector Actor’s adaptation objective Adaptation option Real or perceived trade-off
Agriculture Enhance drought and pest resistance; enhance yields Biotechnology and 
genetically modified crops
Perceived risk to public health and safety; 
ecological risks associated with introduction of 
new genetic variants to natural environments
Provide financial safety net for farmers to 
ensure continuation of farming enterprises
Subsidized drought 
assistance; crop insurance
Creates moral hazard and distributional 
inequalities if not appropriately administered
Maintain or enhance crop yields; suppress 
opportunistic agricultural pests and invasive species
Increased use of chemical 
fertilizer and pesticides
Increased discharge of nutrients and chemical pollution 
to the environment; adverse impacts of pesticide use on 
non-target species; increased emissions of greenhouse 
gases; increased human exposure to pollutants
Biodiversity Enhance capacity for natural adaptation and 




Unknown efficacy; concerns over property rights 
regarding land acquisition; governance challenges
Enhance regulatory protections for species potentially 
at risk due to climate and non-climatic changes
Protection of critical habitat 
for vulnerable species
Addresses secondary rather than primary pressures 
on species; concerns over property rights; regulatory 
barriers to regional economic development
Facilitate conservation of valued species 
by shifting populations to alternative 
areas as the climate changes
Assisted migration Difficult to predict ultimate success of assisted migration; 
possible adverse impacts on indigenous flora and fauna 
from introduction of species into new ecological regions
Coasts Provide near-term protection to financial 
assets from inundation and/or erosion
Sea walls High direct and opportunity costs; equity concerns; 
ecological impacts to coastal wetlands
Allow natural coastal and ecological processes to 
proceed; reduce long-term risk to property and assets
Managed retreat Undermines private property rights; significant governance 
challenges associated with implementation
Preserve public health and safety; minimize 
property damage and risk of stranded assets
Migration out of 
low-lying areas
Loss of sense of place and cultural identity; erosion of 
kinship and familial ties; impacts to receiving communities
Water resources 
management
Increase water resource reliability 
and drought resilience
Desalination Ecological risk of saline discharge; high energy 
demand and associated carbon emissions; 
creates disincentives for conservation
Maximize efficiency of water management 
and use; increase flexibility
Water trading Undermines public good/social aspects of water
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industry. An overview of sectoral mitigation options and potentials is 
provided in Table 4.4. {WGIII TS 3.2.1}
Well-designed systemic and cross-sectoral mitigation strate-
gies are more cost-effective in cutting emissions than a focus 
on individual technologies and sectors with efforts in one 
sector affecting the need for mitigation in others (medium 
confidence). In baseline scenarios without new mitigation policies, 
GHG emissions are projected to grow in all sectors, except for net CO2 
emissions in the AFOLU sector (Figure 4.1, left panel). Mitigation sce-
narios reaching around 450 ppm CO2-eq4227 concentration by 21004328 
(likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) show large-
scale global changes in the energy supply sector (Figure 4.1, middle 
and right panel). While rapid decarbonization of energy supply gen-
erally entails more flexibility for end-use and AFOLU sectors, stronger 
demand reductions lessen the mitigation challenge for the supply side 
of the energy system (Figures 4.1 and 4.2). There are thus strong inter-
dependencies across sectors and the resulting distribution of the miti-
gation effort is strongly influenced by the availability and performance 
of future technologies, particularly BECCS and large scale afforestation 
(Figure 4.1, middle and right panel). The next two decades present a 
window of opportunity for mitigation in urban areas, as a large portion 
of the world’s urban areas will be developed during this period. {WGIII 
SPM.4.2, TS.3.2} 
Decarbonizing (i.e., reducing the carbon intensity of) electrici-
ty generation is a key component of cost-effective mitigation 
strategies in achieving low stabilization levels (of about 450 to 
about 500 ppm CO2-eq, at least about as likely as not to limit 
warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) (medium evidence, 
high agreement). In most integrated modelling scenarios, decar-
bonization happens more rapidly in electricity generation than in the 
industry, buildings and transport sectors. In scenarios reaching 450 
ppm CO2-eq concentrations by 2100, global CO2 emissions from the 
energy supply sector are projected to decline over the next decade 
and are characterized by reductions of 90% or more below 2010 levels 
between 2040 and 2070. {WGIII SPM.4.2, 6.8, 7.11}
Efficiency enhancements and behavioural changes, in order to 
reduce energy demand compared to baseline scenarios without 
compromising development, are a key mitigation strategy in 
scenarios reaching atmospheric CO2-eq concentrations of about 
450 to about 500 ppm by 2100 (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). Near-term reductions in energy demand are an important ele-
Sectoral CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions in baseline and mitigation scenarios with and without CCS
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Figure 4.1 |  Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by sector and total non-CO2 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Kyoto gases) across sectors in baseline (left panel) and mitigation 
scenarios that reach about 450 (430 to 480) ppm CO2-eq (likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) with carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS, middle panel) 
and without CCS (right panel). Light yellow background denotes direct CO2 and non-CO2 GHG emissions for both the baseline and mitigation scenarios. In addition, for the baseline 
scenarios, the sum of direct and indirect emissions from the energy end-use sectors (transport, buildings and industry) is also shown (dark yellow background). Mitigation scenarios 
show direct emissions only. However, mitigation in the end-use sectors leads also to indirect emissions reductions in the upstream energy supply sector. Direct emissions of the end-
use sectors thus do not include the emission reduction potential at the supply-side due to, for example, reduced electricity demand. Note that for calculating the indirect emissions 
only electricity emissions are allocated from energy supply to end-use sectors. The numbers at the bottom of the graphs refer to the number of scenarios included in the range, 
which differs across sectors and time due to different sectoral resolution and time horizon of models. Note that many models cannot reach concentrations of about 450 ppm CO2-eq 
by 2100 in the absence of CCS, resulting in a low number of scenarios for the right panel. Negative emissions in the electricity sector are due to the application of bioenergy with 
carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS). ‘Net’ agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU) emissions consider afforestation, reforestation as well as deforestation activities. 
{WGIII Figure SPM.7, Figure TS.15}
42 See Glossary for definition of CO2-eq concentrations and emissions; also Box 3.2 for metrics to calculate the CO2-equivalence of non-CO2 emissions and their influence on 
sectoral abatement strategies. 
43 For comparison, the CO2-eq concentration in 2011 is estimated to be 430 [340 to 520] ppm. 
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ment of cost-effective mitigation strategies, provide more flexibility for 
reducing carbon intensity in the energy supply sector, hedge against 
related supply-side risks, avoid lock-in to carbon-intensive infrastruc-
tures and are associated with important co-benefits (Figure 4.2, Table 
4.4). Emissions can be substantially lowered through changes in con-
sumption patterns (e.g., mobility demand and mode, energy use in 
households, choice of longer-lasting products) and dietary change and 
reduction in food wastes. A number of options including monetary and 
non-monetary incentives as well as information measures may facili-
tate behavioural changes. {WGIII SPM.4.2}
Decarbonization of the energy supply sector (i.e., reducing the 
carbon intensity) requires upscaling of low- and zero-carbon 
electricity generation technologies (high confidence). In the 
majority of low-concentration stabilization scenarios (about 450 to 
about 500 ppm CO2-eq , at least about as likely as not to limit warming 
to 2°C above pre-industrial levels), the share of low-carbon electricity 
supply (comprising renewable energy (RE), nuclear and CCS, includ-
ing BECCS) increases from the current share of approximately 30% 
to more than 80% by 2050 and 90% by 2100, and fossil fuel power 
generation without CCS is phased out almost entirely by 2100. Among 
these low-carbon technologies, a growing number of RE technologies 
have achieved a level of maturity to enable deployment at significant 
scale since AR4 (robust evidence, high agreement) and nuclear energy 
is a mature low-GHG emission source of baseload power, but its share 
of global electricity generation has been declining (since 1993). GHG 
emissions from energy supply can be reduced significantly by replacing 
current world average coal-fired power plants with modern, highly effi-
cient natural gas combined-cycle power plants or combined heat and 
power plants, provided that natural gas is available and the fugitive 
emissions associated with extraction and supply are low or mitigated. 
{WGIII SPM.4.2}
Behaviour, lifestyle and culture have a considerable influence 
on energy use and associated emissions, with high mitigation 
potential in some sectors, in particular when complementing 
technological and structural change (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). In the transport sector, technical and behavioural mitiga-
tion measures for all modes, plus new infrastructure and urban rede-
velopment investments, could reduce final energy demand significant-
ly below baseline levels (robust evidence, medium agreement) (Table 
4.4). While opportunities for switching to low-carbon fuels exist, the 
rate of decarbonization in the transport sector might be constrained 
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of oil supply. 
In high energy demand scenarios, alternative
liquid and hydrogen technologies are scaled
up more rapidly. 
High energy demand scenarios show
a more rapid up-scaling of CCS
technologies but a more rapid phase-
out of unabated fossil fuel conversion
technologies.  
In high energy demand scenarios non-fossil 
electricity generation technologies are scaled up 
more rapidly. 
Figure 4.2 |  Influence of energy demand on the deployment of energy supply technologies in 2050 in mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 to about 500 ppm CO2-eq con-
centrations by 2100 (at least about as likely as not to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels). Blue bars for ‘low energy demand’ show the deployment range of scenarios 
with limited growth in final energy demand of <20% in 2050 compared to 2010. Red bars show the deployment range of technologies in a case of ‘high energy demand’ (>20% 
growth in 2050 compared to 2010). For each technology, the median, interquartile and full deployment range is displayed. Notes: Scenarios assuming technology restrictions are 
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Table 4.4 | Sectoral carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, associated energy system changes and examples of mitigation measures (including for non-CO2 gases; see Box 3.2 for metrics 
regarding the weighting and abatement of non-CO2 emissions). {WGIII SPM.7, Figure SPM.8, Table TS.2, 7.11.3, 7.13, 7.14}









































Examples for sectoral mitigation measures
Renewables (wind, solar 
bioenergy, geothermal, hydro, 
etc.), nuclear, CCS, BECCS, 
fossil fuel switching
Energy efficiency improve-
ments of energy supply 
technologies, improved 
transmission and distribution, 
CHP and cogeneration
Fugitive CH4 emissions control 
Fuel switching to low-carbon 
fuels (e.g., hydrogen/electricity 
from low-carbon sources), 
biofuels
Efficiency improvements 
(engines, vehicle design, 
appliances, lighter materials), 
modal shift (e.g., from LDVs 
to public transport or from 
aviation to HDVs to rail), 
eco-driving, improved freight 
logistics, journey avoidance, 
higher occupancy rates
Transport (infrastructure) 
planning, urban planning 
Building integrated RES, fuel 
switching to low-carbon 
fuels (e.g., electricity from  
low-carbon sources, biofuels) 
Device efficiency 
(heating/cooling systems, 
water heating, cooking, 
lighting, appliances), systemic 
efficiency (integrated design, 
low/zero energy buildings, 
district heating/cooling, CHP, 
smart meters/grids), 
behavioural and lifestyle 
changes (e.g., appliance use, 
thermostat setting, dwelling 
size)
Urban planning, building 
lifetime, durability of building 
components and appliances, 
low energy/GHG intensive 
construction and materials
Process emissions reductions, 
use of waste and CCS in 
industry, fuel switching among 
fossil fuels and switch to 
low-carbon energy (e.g., 
electricity) or biomass
Energy efficiency and BAT 
(e.g., furnace/boilers, steam 
systems, electric motors and 
control systems, (waste) 
heat exchanges,  recycling), 
reduction of demand for 
goods, more intensive use of 
goods (e.g., improve durability 
or car sharing)
HFC replacement and leak 
repair, material efficiency (e.g., 
process innovation, re-using 
old materials, product design, 
etc.) 
Sequestration options:
Increasing existing carbon 





Methane (e.g., livestock management), 
nitrous oxide (e.g., fertilizer use), 
conservation of existing carbon pools 
(sustainable forest management, reduced 
deforestation and forest degradation, fire 
prevention, agroforestry), reduction in 
emissions intensity
Substitution options:
Use of biological products 
instead of fossil/GHG 




Reduction of loss and 
waste of food, changes 
in human diets, use of 
long-lived wood products
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a   CO2 emissions, low carbon fuel shares, and final energy demand are shown for electricity generation only
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energy density of low-carbon transport fuels (medium confidence). In 
the building sector, recent advances in technologies, know-how and 
policies provide opportunities to stabilize or reduce global energy use 
to about current levels by mid-century. In addition, recent improve-
ments in performance and costs make very low energy construction 
and retrofits of buildings economically attractive, sometimes even at 
net negative costs (robust evidence, high agreement). In the industry 
sector, improvements in GHG emission efficiency and in the efficiency 
of material use, recycling and reuse of materials and products, and 
overall reductions in product demand (e.g., through a more intensive 
use of products) and service demand could, in addition to energy effi-
ciency, help reduce GHG emissions below the baseline level. Prevalent 
approaches for promoting energy efficiency in industry include infor-
mation programmes followed by economic instruments, regulatory 
approaches and voluntary actions. Important options for mitigation 
in waste management are waste reduction, followed by re-use, recy-
cling and energy recovery (robust evidence, high agreement). {WGIII 
SPM.4.2, Box TS.12, TS.3.2}
The most cost-effective mitigation options in forestry are 
afforestation, sustainable forest management and reducing 
deforestation, with large differences in their relative impor-
tance across regions. In agriculture, the most cost-effective mit-
igation options are cropland management, grazing land man-
agement and restoration of organic soils (medium evidence, 
high agreement). About a third of mitigation potential in forestry 
can be achieved at a cost <20 USD/tCO2-eq emission. Demand-side 
measures, such as changes in diet and reductions of losses in the food 
supply chain, have a significant, but uncertain, potential to reduce 
GHG emissions from food production (medium evidence, medium 
agreement). {WGIII SPM 4.2.4}
Bioenergy can play a critical role for mitigation, but there are 
issues to consider, such as the sustainability of practices and 
the efficiency of bioenergy systems (robust evidence, medium 
agreement). Evidence suggests that bioenergy options with low life-
cycle emissions, some already available, can reduce GHG emissions; 
outcomes are site-specific and rely on efficient integrated ‘biomass-
to-bioenergy systems’, and sustainable land use management and 
governance. Barriers to large-scale deployment of bioenergy include 
concerns about GHG emissions from land, food security, water resourc-
es, biodiversity conservation and livelihoods. {WGIII SPM.4.2}
Mitigation measures intersect with other societal goals, cre-
ating the possibility of co-benefits or adverse side-effects. 
These intersections, if well-managed, can strengthen the basis 
for undertaking climate mitigation actions (robust evidence, 
medium agreement). Mitigation can positively or negatively influ-
ence the achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to 
human health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, 
energy access, livelihoods and equitable sustainable development (see 
also Section 4.5). On the other hand, policies towards other societal 
goals can influence the achievement of mitigation and adaptation 
objectives. These influences can be substantial, although sometimes 
difficult to quantify, especially in welfare terms. This multi-objective 
perspective is important in part because it helps to identify areas 
where support for policies that advance multiple goals will be robust. 
Potential co-benefits and adverse side effects of the main sectoral mit-
igation measures are summarized in Table 4.5. Overall, the potential 
for co-benefits for energy end-use measures outweigh the potential 
for adverse side effects, whereas the evidence suggests this may not 
be the case for all energy supply and AFOLU measures. {WGIII SPM.2} 
4.4 Policy approaches for adaptation and 
mitigation, technology and finance
Effective adaptation and mitigation responses will 
depend on policies and measures across multiple 
scales: international, regional, national and sub-nation-
al. Policies across all scales supporting technology 
development, diffusion and transfer, as well as finance 
for responses to climate change, can complement and 
enhance the effectiveness of policies that directly pro-
mote adaptation and mitigation.
4.4.1 International and regional cooperation 
on adaptation and mitigation
Because climate change has the characteristics of a collective action 
problem at the global scale (see 3.1), effective mitigation will not be 
achieved if individual agents advance their own interests independent-
ly, even though mitigation can also have local co-benefits. Cooperative 
responses, including international cooperation, are therefore required 
to effectively mitigate GHG emissions and address other climate 
change issues. While adaptation focuses primarily on local to national 
scale outcomes, its effectiveness can be enhanced through coordina-
tion across governance scales, including international cooperation. 
In fact, international cooperation has helped to facilitate the crea-
tion of adaptation strategies, plans, and actions at national, sub-na-
tional, and local levels. A variety of climate policy instruments have 
been employed, and even more could be employed, at international 
and regional levels to address mitigation and to support and promote 
adaptation at national and sub-national scales. Evidence suggests that 
outcomes seen as equitable can lead to more effective cooperation. 
{WGII SPM C-1, 2.2, 15.2, WGIII 13.ES, 14.3, 15.8, SREX SPM, 7.ES} 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is the main multilateral forum focused on address-
ing climate change, with nearly universal participation. UNFCCC 
activities since 2007, which include the 2010 Cancún Agreements 
and the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, have sought to 
enhance actions under the Convention, and have led to an increas-
ing number of institutions and other arrangements for international 
climate change cooperation. Other institutions organized at different 
levels of governance have resulted in diversifying international climate 
change cooperation. {WGIII SPM.5.2, 13.5}
Existing and proposed international climate change coopera-
tion arrangements vary in their focus and degree of centrali-
zation and coordination. They span: multilateral agreements, har-
monized national policies and decentralized but coordinated national 
policies, as well as regional and regionally-coordinated policies (see 
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While a number of new institutions are focused on adaptation 
funding and coordination, adaptation has historically received 
less attention than mitigation in international climate policy 
(robust evidence, medium agreement). Inclusion of adaptation is 
increasingly important to reduce the risk from climate change impacts 
and may engage a greater number of countries. {WGIII 13.2, 13.3.3, 
13.5.1.1, 13.14}
The Kyoto Protocol offers lessons towards achieving the ulti-
mate objective of the UNFCCC, particularly with respect to par-
ticipation, implementation, flexibility mechanisms, and environ-
mental effectiveness (medium evidence, low agreement). The 
Protocol was the first binding step toward implementing the princi-
ples and goals provided by the UNFCCC. According to national GHG 
inventories through 2012 submitted to the UNFCCC by October 2013, 
Annex B Parties with quantified emission limitations (and reduction 
obligations) in aggregate may have bettered their collective emission 
reduction target in the first commitment period,4429 but some emissions 
reductions that would have occurred even in its absence were also 
counted. The Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) created 
a market for emissions offsets from developing countries, the purpose 
being two-fold: to help Annex I countries fulfill their commitments and 
to assist non-Annex I countries achieve sustainable development. The 
CDM generated Certified Emission Reductions (offsets) equivalent to 
emissions of over 1.4 GtCO2-eq4242 by October 2013, led to significant 
project investments, and generated investment flows for a variety of 
functions, including the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund. However, its envi-
ronmental effectiveness has been questioned by some, particularly 
UNFCCC Objective
Other IO GHG Regulation
Linked Cap-and-Trade Systems 
and Harmonized Carbon Taxes
International Cooperation
for Supporting Adaptation Planning






































Loose coordination of policies: examples include transnational city networks and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs); R&D 
technology cooperation: examples include the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF), Global Methane Initiative (GMI), or 
Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP); Other international organization (IO) GHG regulation: examples include the 
Montreal Protocol, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), International Maritime Organization (IMO); See WGIII Figure 13.1 for the 
details of these examples.   
Figure 4.3 |  Alternative forms of international cooperation. The figure represents a compilation of existing and possible forms of international cooperation, based upon a survey of 
published research, but is not intended to be exhaustive of existing or potential policy architectures, nor is it intended to be prescriptive. Examples in orange are existing agreements. 
Examples in blue are structures for agreements proposed in the literature. The width of individual boxes indicates the range of possible degrees of centralization for a particular 
agreement. The degree of centralization indicates the authority an agreement confers on an international institution, not the process of negotiating the agreement. {WGIII Figure 
13.2}
44 The final conclusion regarding compliance of Annex B Parties remains subject to the review process under the Kyoto Protocol as of October 2014.
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in regard to its early years, due to concerns about the additionality 
of projects (that is, whether projects bring about emissions that are 
different from business as usual (BAU) circumstances), the validity of 
baselines, and the possibility of emissions leakage (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). Such concerns about additionality are common 
to any emission-reduction-credit (offset) program, and are not specific 
to the CDM. Due to market forces, the majority of single CDM projects 
have been concentrated in a limited number of countries, while Pro-
grammes of Activities, though less frequent, have been more evenly 
distributed. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol created two other ‘flexibility 
mechanisms’: Joint Implementation and International Emissions Trad-
ing. {WGIII SPM.5.2, Table TS.9, 13.7, 13.13.1.1, 14.3}
Several conceptual models for effort-sharing have been iden-
tified in research. However, realized distributional impacts from 
actual international cooperative agreements depend not only on the 
approach taken but also on criteria applied to operationalize equity 
and the manner in which developing countries’ emissions reduction 
plans are financed. {WGIII 4.6, 13.4}
Policy linkages among regional, national and sub-national cli-
mate policies offer potential climate change mitigation ben-
efits (medium evidence, medium agreement). Linkages have 
been established between carbon markets and in principle could also 
be established between and among a heterogeneous set of policy 
instruments including non-market-based policies, such as perfor-
mance standards. Potential advantages include lower mitigation costs, 
decreased emission leakage and increased market liquidity. {WGIII 
SPM.5.2, 13.3, 13.5, 13.6, 13.7, 14.5}
Regional initiatives between national and global scales are 
being developed and implemented, but their impact on global 
mitigation has been limited to date (medium confidence). Some 
climate policies could be more environmentally and economically 
effective if implemented across broad regions, such as by embodying 
mitigation objectives in trade agreements or jointly constructing infra-
structures that facilitate reduction in carbon emissions. {WGIII Table 
TS.9, 13.13, 14.4, 14.5}
International cooperation for supporting adaptation planning 
and implementation has assisted in the creation of adaptation 
strategies, plans and actions at national, sub-national and local 
levels (high confidence). For example, a range of multilateral and 
regionally targeted funding mechanisms have been established for 
adaptation; UN agencies, international development organizations and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have provided information, 
methodologies and guidelines; and global and regional initiatives sup-
ported and promoted the creation of national adaptation strategies in 
both developing and developed countries. Closer integration of disas-
ter risk reduction and climate change adaptation at the international 
level, and the mainstreaming of both into international development 
assistance, may foster greater efficiency in the use of resources and 
capacity. However, stronger efforts at the international level do not 
necessarily lead to substantive and rapid results at the local level. 
{WGII 15.2, 15.3, SREX SPM, 7.4, 8.2, 8.5}
4.4.2 National and sub-national policies
4.4.2.1 Adaptation
Adaptation experience is accumulating across regions in the 
public and private sector and within communities (high confi-
dence). Adaptation options adopted to date (see Table 4.6) emphasize 
incremental adjustments and co-benefits and are starting to emphasize 
flexibility and learning (medium evidence, medium agreement). Most 
assessments of adaptation have been restricted to impacts, vulnerabil-
ity and adaptation planning, with very few assessing the processes of 
implementation or the effects of adaptation actions (medium evidence, 
high agreement). {WGII SPM A-2, TS A-2}
Table 4.6 | Recent adaptation actions in the public and private sector across regions. {WGII SPM A-2}
Region Example of actions
Africa Most national governments are initiating governance systems for adaptation. Disaster risk management, adjustments in technologies and infrastructure, 
ecosystem-based approaches, basic public health measures and livelihood diversification are reducing vulnerability, although efforts to date tend to be 
isolated.
Europe Adaptation policy has been developed across all levels of government, with some adaptation planning integrated into coastal and water management, 
into environmental protection and land planning and into disaster risk management.
Asia Adaptation is being facilitated in some areas through mainstreaming climate adaptation action into sub-national development planning, early warning 
systems, integrated water resources management, agroforestry and coastal reforestation of mangroves.
Australasia Planning for sea level rise, and in southern Australia for reduced water availability, is becoming adopted widely. Planning for sea level rise has evolved 
considerably over the past two decades and shows a diversity of approaches, although its implementation remains piecemeal.
North America Governments are engaging in incremental adaptation assessment and planning, particularly at the municipal level. Some proactive adaptation is 
occurring to protect longer-term investments in energy and public infrastructure.
Central and 
South America
Ecosystem-based adaptation including protected areas, conservation agreements and community management of natural areas is occurring. Resilient 
crop varieties, climate forecasts and integrated water resources management are being adopted within the agricultural sector in some areas.
The Arctic Some communities have begun to deploy adaptive co-management strategies and communications infrastructure, combining traditional and scientific 
knowledge.
Small Islands Small islands have diverse physical and human attributes; community-based adaptation has been shown to generate larger benefits when delivered in 
conjunction with other development activities.
The Ocean International cooperation and marine spatial planning are starting to facilitate adaptation to climate change, with constraints from challenges of spatial 
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National governments play key roles in adaptation planning 
and implementation (robust evidence, high agreement). There 
has been substantial progress since the AR4 in the development of 
national adaptation strategies and plans. This includes National Adap-
tation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) by least developed countries, the 
National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process, and strategic frameworks for 
national adaptation in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. National governments can coordinate 
adaptation efforts of local and sub-national governments, for example 
by protecting vulnerable groups, by supporting economic diversifica-
tion, and by providing information, policy and legal frameworks and 
financial support. {WGII SPM C-1, 15.2}
While local government and the private sector have different 
functions, which vary regionally, they are increasingly recog-
nized as critical to progress in adaptation, given their roles in 
scaling up adaptation of communities, households and civil soci-
ety and in managing risk information and financing (medium 
evidence, high agreement). There is a significant increase in the 
number of planned adaptation responses at the local level in rural and 
urban communities of developed and developing countries since the 
AR4. However, local councils and planners are often confronted by the 
complexity of adaptation without adequate access to guiding infor-
mation or data on local vulnerabilities and potential impacts. Steps for 
mainstreaming adaptation into local decision-making have been iden-
tified but challenges remain in their implementation. Hence, scholars 
stress the important role of linkages with national and sub-national 
levels of government as well as partnerships among public, civic and 
private sectors in implementing local adaptation responses. {WGII SPM 
A-2, SPM C-1, 14.2, 15.2}
Institutional dimensions of adaptation governance, including 
the integration of adaptation into planning and decision-mak-
ing, play a key role in promoting the transition from planning 
to implementation of adaptation (robust evidence, high agree-
ment). The most commonly emphasized institutional barriers or ena-
blers for adaptation planning and implementation are: 1) multilevel 
institutional co-ordination between different political and administra-
tive levels in society; 2) key actors, advocates and champions initiating, 
mainstreaming and sustaining momentum for climate adaptation; 3) 
horizontal interplay between sectors, actors and policies operating at 
similar administrative levels; 4) political dimensions in planning and 
implementation; and 5) coordination between formal governmen-
tal, administrative agencies and private sectors and stakeholders to 
increase efficiency, representation and support for climate adaptation 
measures. {WGII 15.2, 15.5, 16.3, Box 15-1}
Existing and emerging economic instruments can foster adap-
tation by providing incentives for anticipating and reducing 
impacts (medium confidence). Instruments include public-private 
finance partnerships, loans, payments for environmental services, 
improved resource pricing, charges and subsidies, norms and regula-
tions and risk sharing and transfer mechanisms. Risk financing mecha-
nisms in the public and private sector, such as insurance and risk pools, 
can contribute to increasing resilience, but without attention to major 
design challenges, they can also provide disincentives, cause market 
failure and decrease equity. Governments often play key roles as regu-
lators, providers or insurers of last resort. {WGII SPM C-1}
4.4.2.2 Mitigation
There has been a considerable increase in national and sub-
national mitigation plans and strategies since AR4. In 2012, 67% 
of global GHG emissions42 were subject to national legislation or strat-
egies versus 45% in 2007. However, there has not yet been a substan-
tial deviation in global emissions from the past trend. These plans and 
strategies are in their early stages of development and implementation 
in many countries, making it difficult to assess their aggregate impact 
on future global emissions (medium evidence, high agreement). {WGIII 
SPM.5.1}
Since AR4, there has been an increased focus on policies 
designed to integrate multiple objectives, increase co-benefits 
and reduce adverse side effects (high confidence). Governments 
often explicitly reference co-benefits in climate and sectoral plans and 
strategies. {WGIII SPM.5.1} 
Sector-specific policies have been more widely used than econ-
omy-wide policies (Table 4.7) (medium evidence, high agree-
ment). Although most economic theory suggests that economy-wide 
policies for mitigation would be more cost-effective than sector-spe-
cific policies, administrative and political barriers may make econo-
my-wide policies harder to design and implement than sector-specific 
policies. The latter may be better suited to address barriers or market 
failures specific to certain sectors and may be bundled in packages of 
complementary policies {WGIII SPM.5.1}
In principle, mechanisms that set a carbon price, including cap 
and trade systems and carbon taxes, can achieve mitigation in 
a cost-effective way, but have been implemented with diverse 
effects due in part to national circumstances as well as policy 
design. The short-run environmental effects of cap and trade sys-
tems have been limited as a result of loose caps or caps that have not 
proved to be constraining (limited evidence, medium agreement). In 
some countries, tax-based policies specifically aimed at reducing GHG 
emissions—alongside technology and other policies—have helped to 
weaken the link between GHG emissions and gross domestic product 
(GDP) (high confidence). In addition, in a large group of countries, fuel 
taxes (although not necessarily designed for the purpose of mitigation) 
have had effects that are akin to sectoral carbon taxes (robust evi-
dence, medium agreement). Revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned 
emission allowances are used in some countries to reduce other taxes 
and/or to provide transfers to low-income groups. This illustrates the 
general principle that mitigation policies that raise government reve-
nue generally have lower social costs than approaches which do not. 
{WGIII SPM.5.1}
Economic instruments in the form of subsidies may be applied 
across sectors, and include a variety of policy designs, such as tax 
rebates or exemptions, grants, loans and credit lines. An increas-
ing number and variety of RE policies including subsidies—motivated 
by many factors—have driven escalated growth of RE technologies in 
recent years. Government policies play a crucial role in accelerating the 
deployment of RE technologies. Energy access and social and economic 
development have been the primary drivers in most developing coun-
tries whereas secure energy supply and environmental concerns have 
been most important in developed countries. The focus of policies is 
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Table 4.7 | Sectoral Policy Instruments. {WGIII Table 15.2}
 
Policy 









- Carbon tax (e.g., 
applied to electricity 
or fuels)
- Fuel taxes




- Carbon and/or 
energy taxes (either 
sectoral or 
economy-wide)
- Carbon tax or energy 
tax
- Waste disposal taxes 
or charges
- Fertilizer or nitrogen 
taxes to reduce 
nitrous oxide (N2O)
- Sprawl taxes, Impact 
fees, exactions, 
split-rate property 











- Emission credits 
under the Clean 
Development 
Mechanism (CDM)
- Tradable Green 
Certificates
- Fuel and vehicle 
standards
- Tradable certificates 




- Emission credits 
under CDM
- Tradable Green 
Certificates 
- Emission credits 
under CDM




- Voluntary carbon 
markets





- Fossil fuel subsidy 
removal
- Feed in tariffs (FITs) 
for renewable energy
- Biofuel subsidies
- Vehicle purchase 
subsidies
- Feebates 







- Subsidies (e.g., for 
energy audits)
- Fiscal incentives (e.g., 
for fuel switching)













- Renewable Portfolio 
Standards (RPS) for 
renewable energy 
(RE)
- Equitable access to 
electricity grid
- Legal status of 
long-term CO2 
storage
- Fuel economy 
performance 
standards
- Fuel quality 
standards







shifts (road to rail) 
- Restriction on use of 





- Urban planning and 
zoning restrictions
- Building codes and 
standards
- Equipment and 
appliance standards
- Mandates for energy 
retailers to assist 
customers invest in 
energy efficiency
- Energy efficiency 
standards for 
equipment






- Labelling and public 
procurement 
regulations





- Forest laws to reduce 
deforestation
- Air and water 
pollution control GHG 
precursors
- Land use planning 
and governance 
- Mixed use zoning
- Development 
restrictions
- Affordable housing 
mandates
- Site access controls


















- Brokerage for 
industrial 
cooperation
- Certification schemes  
for sustainable forest   
practices
- Information policies 






Public Goods or 
Services






- Investment in transit 
and human powered 
transport
- Investment in 
alternative fuel 
infrastructure
- Low-emission vehicle 
procurement
- Public procurement 
of efficient buildings 
and appliances
- Training and 
education
- Brokerage for 
industrial 
cooperation
- Protection of 
national, state, and 
local forests.























- Voluntary agreements 
on energy targets, 
adoption of energy 
management systems, 
or resource efficiency
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broadening from a concentration primarily on RE electricity to include 
RE heating and cooling and transportation. {SRREN SPM.7}
The reduction of subsidies for GHG-related activities in vari-
ous sectors can achieve emission reductions, depending on the 
social and economic context (high confidence). While subsidies 
can affect emissions in many sectors, most of the recent literature has 
focused on subsidies for fossil fuels. Since AR4 a small but growing 
literature based on economy-wide models has projected that com-
plete removal of subsidies to fossil fuels in all countries could result 
in reductions in global aggregate emissions by mid-century (medium 
evidence, medium agreement). Studies vary in methodology, the type 
and definition of subsidies and the time frame for phase out consid-
ered. In particular, the studies assess the impacts of complete removal 
of all fossil fuel subsides without seeking to assess which subsidies 
are wasteful and inefficient, keeping in mind national circumstances. 
{WGIII SPM.5.1}
Regulatory approaches and information measures are widely 
used and are often environmentally effective (medium evi-
dence, medium agreement). Examples of regulatory approaches 
include energy efficiency standards; examples of information pro-
grammes include labelling programmes that can help consumers make 
better-informed decisions. {WGIII SPM.5.1}
Mitigation policy could devalue fossil fuel assets and reduce rev-
enues for fossil fuel exporters, but differences between regions 
and fuels exist (high confidence). Most mitigation scenarios are 
associated with reduced revenues from coal and oil trade for major 
exporters. The effect on natural gas export revenues is more uncertain. 
The availability of CCS would reduce the adverse effect of mitigation 
on the value of fossil fuel assets (medium confidence). {WGIII SPM.5.1}
Interactions between or among mitigation policies may be syn-
ergistic or may have no additive effect on reducing emissions 
(medium evidence, high agreement). For instance, a carbon tax can 
have an additive environmental effect to policies such as subsidies for 
the supply of RE. By contrast, if a cap and trade system has a sufficient-
ly stringent cap to affect emission-related decisions, then other poli-
cies have no further impact on reducing emissions (although they may 
affect costs and possibly the viability of more stringent future targets) 
(medium evidence, high agreement). In either case, additional policies 
may be needed to address market failures relating to innovation and 
technology diffusion. {WGIII SPM.5.1}
Sub-national climate policies are increasingly prevalent, both 
in countries with national policies and in those without. These 
policies include state and provincial climate plans combining market, 
regulatory and information instruments, and sub-national cap-and-
trade systems. In addition, transnational cooperation has arisen among 
sub-national actors, notably among institutional investors, NGOs seek-
ing to govern carbon offset markets, and networks of cities seeking 
to collaborate in generating low-carbon urban development. {WGIII 
13.5.2, 15.2.4, 15.8}
Co-benefits and adverse side effects of mitigation could affect 
achievement of other objectives such as those related to human 
health, food security, biodiversity, local environmental quality, 
energy access, livelihoods and equitable sustainable develop-
ment: {WGIII SPM.2}
• Mitigation scenarios reaching about 450 or 500 ppm CO2-equiv-
alent by 2100 show reduced costs for achieving air quality and 
energy security objectives, with significant co-benefits for human 
health, ecosystem impacts and sufficiency of resources and resil-
ience of the energy system. {WGIII SPM.4.1}
• Some mitigation policies raise the prices for some energy ser-
vices and could hamper the ability of societies to expand access 
to modern energy services to underserved populations (low con-
fidence). These potential adverse side effects can be avoided with 
the adoption of complementary policies such as income tax rebates 
or other benefit transfer mechanisms (medium confidence). The 
costs of achieving nearly universal access to electricity and clean 
fuels for cooking and heating are projected to be between USD 
72 to 95 billion per year until 2030 with minimal effects on GHG 
emissions (limited evidence, medium agreement) and multiple 
benefits in health and air pollutant reduction (high confidence). 
{WGIII SPM.5.1}
Whether or not side effects materialize, and to what extent side effects 
materialize, will be case- and site-specific, and depend on local cir-
cumstances and the scale, scope and pace of implementation. Many 
co-benefits and adverse side effects have not been well-quantified. 
{WGIII SPM.4.1}
4.4.3 Technology development and transfer
Technology policy (development, diffusion and transfer) com-
plements other mitigation policies across all scales from inter-
national to sub-national, but worldwide investment in research 
in support of GHG mitigation is small relative to overall public 
research spending (high confidence). Technology policy includes 
technology-push (e.g., publicly-funded R&D) and demand-pull (e.g., 
governmental procurement programmes). Such policies address 
a pervasive market failure because, in the absence of government 
policy such as patent protection, the invention of new technologies 
and practices from R&D efforts has aspects of a public good and 
thus tends to be under-provided by market forces alone. Technology 
support policies have promoted substantial innovation and diffusion 
of new technologies, but the cost-effectiveness of such policies is 
often difficult to assess. Technology policy can increase incentives for 
participation and compliance with international cooperative efforts, 
particularly in the long run. {WGIII SPM.5.1, 2.6.5, 3.11, 13.9, 13.12, 
15.6.5}
Many adaptation efforts also critically rely on diffusion and 
transfer of technologies and management practices, but their 
effective use depends on a suitable institutional, regulatory, 
social and cultural context (high confidence). Adaptation tech-
nologies are often familiar and already applied elsewhere. However, 
the success of technology transfer may involve not only the provision 
of finance and information, but also strengthening of policy and reg-
ulatory environments and capacities to absorb, employ and improve 
technologies appropriate to local circumstances. {WGII 15.4}
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Substantial reductions in emissions would require large chang-
es in investment patterns (high confidence). Mitigation scenarios 
in which policies stabilize atmospheric concentrations (without over-
shoot) in the range from 430 to 530 ppm CO2-eq by 21004530 lead to sub-
stantial shifts in annual investment flows during the period 2010–2029 
compared to baseline scenarios. Over the next two decades (2010–
2029), annual investments in conventional fossil fuel technologies 
associated with the electricity supply sector are projected to decline in 
the scenarios by about USD 30 (2 to 166) billion (median: –20% com- 
pared to 2010) while annual investment in low carbon electricity supply 
(i.e., renewables, nuclear and electricity with CCS) is projected to rise 
in the scenarios by about USD 147 (31 to 360) billion (median: +100% 
compared to 2010) (limited evidence, medium agreement). In addition, 
annual incremental energy efficiency investments in transport, industry 
and buildings is projected to rise in the scenarios by about USD 336 
(1 to 641) billion. Global total annual investment in the energy system 
is presently about USD 1,200 billion. This number includes only energy 
supply of electricity and heat and respective upstream and downstream 
activities. Energy efficiency investment or underlying sector investment 
is not included (Figure 4.4). {WGIII SPM.5.1, 16.2}
There is no widely agreed definition of what constitutes climate 
finance, but estimates of the financial flows associated with cli-
mate change mitigation and adaptation are available. See Figure 
4.5 for an overview of climate finance flows. Published assessments of 
all current annual financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce 
net GHG emissions and/or to enhance resilience to climate change 






























































Figure 4.4 |  Change in annual investment flows from the average baseline level over the next two decades (2010 to 2029) for mitigation scenarios that stabilize concentrations 
(without overshoot) within the range of approximately 430 to 530 ppm CO2-eq by 2100. Total electricity generation (leftmost column) is the sum of renewable and nuclear energy, 
power plants with CCS, and fossil-fuel power plants without CCS. The vertical bars indicate the range between the minimum and maximum estimate; the horizontal bar indicates 
the median. The numbers in the bottom row show the total number of studies in the literature used in the assessment. Individual technologies shown are found to be used in dif-
ferent model scenarios in either a complementary or a synergistic way, depending largely on technology-specific assumptions and the timing and ambition level of the phase-in of 
global climate policies. {WGIII Figure SPM.9}
45 This range comprises scenarios that reach 430 to 480 ppm CO2-eq by 2100 (likely to limit warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels) and scenarios that reach 480 to 530 ppm 
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ly (medium confidence). Out of this, total public climate finance that 
flowed to developing countries is estimated to be between USD 35 and 
49 billion per year in 2011 and 2012 (medium confidence). Estimates 
of international private climate finance flowing to developing coun-
tries range from USD 10 to 72 billion per year including foreign direct 
investment as equity and loans in the range of USD 10 to 37 billion 
per year over the period of 2008–2011 (medium confidence). {WGIII 
SPM.5.1}
In many countries, the private sector plays central roles in the 
processes that lead to emissions as well as to mitigation and 
adaptation. Within appropriate enabling environments, the pri-
vate sector, along with the public sector, can play an impor-
tant role in financing mitigation and adaptation (medium evi-
dence, high agreement). The share of total mitigation finance from 
the private sector, acknowledging data limitations, is estimated to be 
on average between two-thirds and three-fourths on the global level 
(2010–2012) (limited evidence, medium agreement). In many coun-
tries, public finance interventions by governments and international 
development banks encourage climate investments by the private 
sector and provide finance where private sector investment is limited. 
The quality of a country’s enabling environment includes the effective-
ness of its institutions, regulations and guidelines regarding the pri-
vate sector, security of property rights, credibility of policies and other 
factors that have a substantial impact on whether private firms invest 
in new technologies and infrastructures. Dedicated policy instruments 
and financial arrangements, for example, credit insurance, feed-in tar-
iffs, concessional finance or rebates provide an incentive for mitigation 
investment by improving the return adjusted for the risk for private 
actors. Public-private risk reduction initiatives (such as in the context 
of insurance systems) and economic diversification are examples of 
adaptation action enabling and relying on private sector participation. 
{WGII SPM B-2, SPM C-1, WGIII SPM.5.1}
Financial resources for adaptation have become available 
more slowly than for mitigation in both developed and devel-
oping countries. Limited evidence indicates that there is a gap 
between global adaptation needs and the funds available for 
adaptation (medium confidence). Potential synergies between 
international finance for disaster risk management and adaptation 
to climate change have not yet been fully realized (high confidence). 
There is a need for better assessment of global adaptation costs, fund-
ing and investment. Studies estimating the global cost of adaptation 
are characterized by shortcomings in data, methods and coverage 
(high confidence). {WGII SPM C-1, 14.2, SREX SPM}
Source of capital
Carbon taxes 



















































Figure 4.5 |  Overview of climate finance flows. Note: Capital should be understood to include all relevant financial flows. The size of the boxes is not related to the magnitude of 
the financial flow. {WGIII Figure TS.40}
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4.5 Trade-offs, synergies and 
integrated responses
There are many opportunities to link mitigation, adap-
tation and the pursuit of other societal objectives 
through integrated responses (high confidence). Suc-
cessful implementation relies on relevant tools, suit-
able governance structures and enhanced capacity to 
respond (medium confidence).
A growing evidence base indicates close links between adaptation and 
mitigation, their co-benefits and adverse side effects, and recognizes 
sustainable development as the overarching context for climate policy 
(see Sections 3.5, 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3). Developing tools to address these 
linkages is critical to the success of climate policy in the context of 
sustainable development (see also Sections 4.4 and 3.5). This section 
presents examples of integrated responses in specific policy arenas, as 
well as some of the factors that promote or impede policies aimed at 
multiple objectives.
Increasing efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change 
imply an increasing complexity of interactions, encompassing 
connections among human health, water, energy, land use and 
biodiversity (very high confidence). Mitigation can support the 
achievement of other societal goals, such as those related to human 
health, food security, environmental quality, energy access, livelihoods 
and sustainable development, although there can also be negative 
effects. Adaptation measures also have the potential to deliver miti-
gation co-benefits, and vice versa, and support other societal goals, 
though trade-offs can also arise. {WGII SPM C-1, SPM C-2, 8.4, 9.3–9.4, 
11.9, Box CC-WE, WGIII Table TS.3, Table TS.4, Table TS.5, Table TS.6, 
Table TS.7}
Integration of adaptation and mitigation into planning and 
decision-making can create synergies with sustainable develop-
ment (high confidence). Synergies and trade-offs among mitigation 
and adaptation policies and policies advancing other societal goals 
can be substantial, although sometimes difficult to quantify especially 
in welfare terms (see also Section 3.5). A multi-objective approach to 
policy-making can help manage these synergies and trade-offs. Policies 
advancing multiple goals may also attract greater support. {WGII SPM 
C-1, SPM C-2, 20.3, WGIII 1.2.1, 3.6.3, 4.3, 4.6, 4.8, 6.6.1}
Effective integrated responses depend on suitable tools and 
governance structures, as well as adequate capacity (medium 
confidence). Managing trade-offs and synergies is challenging and 
requires tools to help understand interactions and support deci-
sion-making at local and regional scales. Integrated responses also 
depend on governance that enables coordination across scales and 
sectors, supported by appropriate institutions. Developing and imple-
menting suitable tools and governance structures often requires 
upgrading the human and institutional capacity to design and deploy 
integrated responses. {WGII SPM C-1, SPM C-2, 2.2, 2.4, 15.4, 15.5, 
16.3, Table 14-1, Table 16-1, WGIII TS.1, TS.3, 15.2}
An integrated approach to energy planning and implementation 
that explicitly assesses the potential for co-benefits and the 
presence of adverse side effects can capture complementarities 
across multiple climate, social and environmental objectives 
(medium confidence). There are strong interactive effects across 
various energy policy objectives, such as energy security, air quality, 
health and energy access (see Figure 3.5) and between a range of 
social and environmental objectives and climate mitigation objectives 
(see Table 4.5). An integrated approach can be assisted by tools such as 
cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-criteria analysis 
and expected utility theory. It also requires appropriate coordinating 
institutions. {WGIII Figure SPM.6, TS.1, TS.3}
Explicit consideration of interactions among water, food, energy 
and biological carbon sequestration plays an important role in 
supporting effective decisions for climate resilient pathways 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Both biofuel-based power 
generation and large-scale afforestation designed to mitigate climate 
change can reduce catchment run-off, which may conflict with alter-
native water uses for food production, human consumption or the 
maintenance of ecosystem function and services (see also Box 3.4). 
Conversely, irrigation can increase the climate resilience of food and 
fibre production but reduces water availability for other uses. {WGII 
Box CC-WE, Box TS.9}
An integrated response to urbanization provides substantial 
opportunities for enhanced resilience, reduced emissions and 
more sustainable development (medium confidence). Urban 
areas account for more than half of global primary energy use and 
energy-related CO2 emissions (medium evidence, high agreement) and 
contain a high proportion of the population and economic activities at 
risk from climate change. In rapidly growing and urbanizing regions, 
mitigation strategies based on spatial planning and efficient infrastruc-
ture supply can avoid the lock-in of high emission patterns. Mixed-
use zoning, transport-oriented development, increased density and 
co-located jobs and homes can reduce direct and indirect energy use 
across sectors. Compact development of urban spaces and intelligent 
densification can preserve land carbon stocks and land for agriculture 
and bioenergy. Reduced energy and water consumption in urban areas 
through greening cities and recycling water are examples of mitigation 
actions with adaptation benefits. Building resilient infrastructure sys-
tems can reduce vulnerability of urban settlements and cities to coastal 
flooding, sea level rise and other climate-induced stresses. {WGII SPM 
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Abrupt change/abrupt climate change
Abrupt change refers to a change that is substantially faster than the 
rate of change in the recent history of the affected components of a 
system. Abrupt climate change refers to a large-scale change in the 
climate system that takes place over a few decades or less, persists (or 
is anticipated to persist) for at least a few decades and causes substan-
tial disruptions in human and natural systems. {WGI, II, III} 
Adaptation
The process of adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects. 
In human systems, adaptation seeks to moderate or avoid harm or 
exploit beneficial opportunities. In some natural systems, human inter-
vention may facilitate adjustment to expected climate and its effects1.  
{WGII, III}
Adaptation deficit
The gap between the current state of a system and a state that mini-
mizes adverse impacts from existing climate conditions and variability. 
{WGII}
Adaptation limit
The point at which an actor’s objectives (or system needs) cannot be 
secured from intolerable risks through adaptive actions. {WGII}
Hard adaptation limit 
No adaptive actions are possible to avoid intolerable risks.
Soft adaptation limit
Options are currently not available to avoid intolerable risks 
through adaptive action. 
Adaptive capacity
The ability of systems, institutions, humans and other organisms to 
adjust to potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to 
respond to consequences2. {WGII, III}
Adverse side effects
The negative effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective 
might have on other objectives, irrespective of the net effect on overall 
social welfare. Adverse side effects are often subject to uncertainty and 
depend on local circumstances and implementation practices, among 
other factors. See also Co-benefits and Risk. {WGIII}
Afforestation
Planting of new forests on lands that historically have not contained 
forests. For a discussion of the term forest and related terms such as 
afforestation, reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special 
Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b). 
See also information provided by the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the report on Defini-
tions and Methodological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct 
Human-induced Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other 
Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). {WGI, III}
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU and FOLU/
LULUCF)
AFOLU plays a central role for food security and sustainable devel-
opment. The main mitigation options within AFOLU involve one or 
more of three strategies: prevention of emissions to the atmosphere by 
conserving existing carbon pools in soils or vegetation or by reducing 
emissions of methane and nitrous oxide; sequestration—increasing 
the size of existing carbon pools and thereby extracting carbon dioxide 
(CO2) from the atmosphere; and substitution—substituting biological 
products for fossil fuels or energy-intensive products, thereby reduc-
ing CO2 emissions. Demand-side measures (e.g., reducing losses and 
wastes of food, changes in human diet, or changes in wood consump-
tion) may also play a role.
FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use)—also referred to as LULUCF 
(Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry)—is the subset of AFOLU 
emissions and removals of greenhouse gases (GHGs) resulting from 
direct human-induced land use, land-use change, and forestry activi-
ties excluding agricultural emissions. {WGIII}
Albedo 
The fraction of solar radiation reflected by a surface or object, often 
expressed as a percentage. Snow-covered surfaces have a high albedo, 
the albedo of soils ranges from high to low and vegetation-covered 
surfaces and oceans have a low albedo. The Earth’s planetary albedo 
varies mainly through varying cloudiness, snow, ice, leaf area and land 
cover changes. {WGI, III}
Altimetry 
A technique for measuring the height of the Earth’s surface with 
respect to the geocentre of the Earth within a defined terrestrial refer-
ence frame (geocentric sea level). {WGI}
Ancillary benefits
See Co-benefits. {WGII, III}
Attribution
See Detection and attribution. {WGI, II}.
Baseline/reference
The baseline (or reference) is the state against which change is meas-
ured. A baseline period is the period relative to which anomalies are 
computed. In the context of transformation pathways, the term base-
This glossary defines some specific terms as the Core Writing 
Team of the Synthesis Report intends them to be interpreted 
in the context of this report. Red, italicized words indicate 
that the term is defined in the glossary. The references to 
Working Groups (WG) I, II and III in italics at the end of each 
term in this glossary refer to the AR5 WG glossaries and 
should be read as: WGI (IPCC, 2013a), WGII (IPCC, 2014a), 
and WGIII (IPCC, 2014b).
1 Reflecting progress in science, this glossary entry differs in breadth and focus from the entry used in the Fourth Assessment Report and other IPCC reports.




line scenarios refers to scenarios that are based on the assumption that 
no mitigation policies or measures will be implemented beyond those 
that are already in force and/or are legislated or planned to be adopt-
ed. Baseline scenarios are not intended to be predictions of the future, 
but rather counterfactual constructions that can serve to highlight the 
level of emissions that would occur without further policy effort. Typ-
ically, baseline scenarios are then compared to mitigation scenarios 
that are constructed to meet different goals for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions, atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The 
term baseline scenario is used interchangeably with reference scenar-
io and no policy scenario. In much of the literature the term is also 
synonymous with the term business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, although 
the term BAU has fallen out of favour because the idea of business as 
usual in century-long socio-economic projections is hard to fathom. 
See also Emission scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) and SRES scenarios. {WGI, II, III}
Biodiversity
The variability among living organisms from terrestrial, marine and 
other ecosystems. Biodiversity includes variability at the genetic, spe-
cies and ecosystem levels3. {WGII, III}
Bioenergy and Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS)
The application of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS) technol-
ogy to bioenergy conversion processes. Depending on the total life-
cycle emissions, including total marginal consequential effects (from 
indirect land-use change (iLUC) and other processes), BECCS has the 
potential for net carbon dioxide (CO2) removal from the atmosphere. 
See also Sequestration. {WGIII}
Burden sharing/effort sharing
In the context of mitigation, burden sharing refers to sharing the effort 
of reducing the sources or enhancing the sinks of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) from historical or projected levels, usually allocated by some 
criteria, as well as sharing the cost burden across countries. {WGIII}
Cancún Agreements
A set of decisions adopted at the 16th Session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), including the following, among others: the newly 
established Green Climate Fund (GCF), a newly established technolo-
gy mechanism, a process for advancing discussions on adaptation, a 
formal process for reporting mitigation commitments, a goal of limiting 
global mean surface temperature increase to 2°C and an agreement on 
MRV—Measurement, Reporting and Verification for those countries 
that receive international support for their mitigation efforts. {WGIII}
Cancún Pledges
During 2010, many countries submitted their existing plans for con-
trolling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the Climate Change Sec-
retariat and these proposals have now been formally acknowledged 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). Developed countries presented their plans in the shape of 
economy-wide targets to reduce emissions, mainly up to 2020, while 
developing countries proposed ways to limit their growth of emissions 
in the shape of plans of action. {WGIII}
Carbon cycle
The term used to describe the flow of carbon (in various forms, e.g., as 
carbon dioxide (CO2)) through the atmosphere, ocean, terrestrial and 
marine biosphere and lithosphere. In this report, the reference unit for 
the global carbon cycle is GtCO2 or GtC (Gigatonne of carbon = 1 GtC 
= 1015 grams of carbon. This corresponds to 3.667 GtCO2). {WGI, II, III}
Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS)
A process in which a relatively pure stream of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
from industrial and energy-related sources is separated (captured), con-
ditioned, compressed and transported to a storage location for long-
term isolation from the atmosphere. See also Bioenergy and Carbon 
Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Sequestration. {WGIII}
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)
Carbon Dioxide Removal methods refer to a set of techniques that aim 
to remove CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either (1) increasing 
natural sinks for carbon or (2) using chemical engineering to remove 
the CO2, with the intent of reducing the atmospheric CO2 concentration. 
CDR methods involve the ocean, land and technical systems, including 
such methods as iron fertilization, large-scale afforestation and direct 
capture of CO2 from the atmosphere using engineered chemical means. 
Some CDR methods fall under the category of geoengineering, though 
this may not be the case for others, with the distinction being based on 
the magnitude, scale and impact of the particular CDR activities. The 
boundary between CDR and mitigation is not clear and there could be 
some overlap between the two given current definitions (IPCC, 2012b, 
p. 2). See also Solar Radiation Management (SRM). {WGI, III} 
Carbon intensity
The amount of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) released per unit of 
another variable such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), output energy 
use or transport. {WGIII}
Carbon price
The price for avoided or released carbon dioxide (CO2) or CO2-equiva-
lent emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon tax, or the price of 
emission permits. In many models that are used to assess the economic 
costs of mitigation, carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the 
level of effort in mitigation policies. {WGIII}
Carbon tax
A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels. Because virtually all of the 
carbon in fossil fuels is ultimately emitted as carbon dioxide (CO2), a 
carbon tax is equivalent to an emission tax on CO2 emissions. {WGIII}
Climate
Climate in a narrow sense is usually defined as the average weather, or 
more rigorously, as the statistical description in terms of the mean and var-
iability of relevant quantities over a period of time ranging from months 
to thousands or millions of years. The classical period for averaging these 




variables is 30 years, as defined by the World Meteorological Organiza-
tion. The relevant quantities are most often surface variables such as tem-
perature, precipitation and wind. Climate in a wider sense is the state, 
including a statistical description, of the climate system. {WGI, II, III}
Climate change
Climate change refers to a change in the state of the climate that can 
be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the mean 
and/or the variability of its properties and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. Climate change may be due to nat-
ural internal processes or external forcings such as modulations of the 
solar cycles, volcanic eruptions and persistent anthropogenic changes 
in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use. Note that the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in its Article 
1, defines climate change as: ‘a change of climate which is attributed 
directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the 
global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variabil-
ity observed over comparable time periods’. The UNFCCC thus makes 
a distinction between climate change attributable to human activities 
altering the atmospheric composition and climate variability attributa-
ble to natural causes. See also Detection and Attribution. {WGI, II, III}
Climate extreme (extreme weather or climate event)
See Extreme weather event. {WGI, II}
Climate feedback 
An interaction in which a perturbation in one climate quantity causes 
a change in a second and the change in the second quantity ultimately 
leads to an additional change in the first. A negative feedback is one in 
which the initial perturbation is weakened by the changes it causes; a 
positive feedback is one in which the initial perturbation is enhanced. 
In the Fifth Assessment Report, a somewhat narrower definition is 
often used in which the climate quantity that is perturbed is the global 
mean surface temperature, which in turn causes changes in the global 
radiation budget. In either case, the initial perturbation can either be 
externally forced or arise as part of internal variability. {WGI, II, III}
Climate finance
There is no agreed definition of climate finance. The term climate 
finance is applied both to the financial resources devoted to addressing 
climate change globally and to financial flows to developing countries 
to assist them in addressing climate change. The literature includes 
several concepts in these categories, among which the most commonly 
used include: {WGIII}
Incremental costs 
The cost of capital of the incremental investment and the change 
of operating and maintenance costs for a mitigation or adaptation 
project in comparison to a reference project. It can be calculated as 
the difference of the net present values of the two projects.
Incremental investment
The extra capital required for the initial investment for a mitigation 
or adaptation project in comparison to a reference project.
Total climate finance 
All financial flows whose expected effect is to reduce net green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and/or to enhance resilience to the 
impacts of climate variability and the projected climate change. This 
covers private and public funds, domestic and international flows 
and expenditures for mitigation and adaptation to current climate 
variability as well as future climate change.
Total climate finance flowing to developing countries
The amount of the total climate finance invested in developing 
countries that comes from developed countries. This covers private 
and public funds. 
Private climate finance flowing to developing countries
Finance and investment by private actors in/from developed coun-
tries for mitigation and adaptation activities in developing countries.
Public climate finance flowing to developing countries
Finance provided by developed countries’ governments and bilater-
al institutions as well as by multilateral institutions for mitigation 
and adaptation activities in developing countries. Most of the funds 
provided are concessional loans and grants. 
Climate model (spectrum or hierarchy) 
A numerical representation of the climate system based on the phys-
ical, chemical and biological properties of its components, their inter-
actions and feedback processes and accounting for some of its known 
properties. The climate system can be represented by models of varying 
complexity; that is, for any one component or combination of compo-
nents a spectrum or hierarchy of models can be identified, differing in 
such aspects as the number of spatial dimensions, the extent to which 
physical, chemical or biological processes are explicitly represented, or 
the level at which empirical parametrizations are involved. Coupled 
Atmosphere–Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) provide a 
representation of the climate system that is near or at the most com-
prehensive end of the spectrum currently available. There is an evo-
lution towards more complex models with interactive chemistry and 
biology. Climate models are applied as a research tool to study and 
simulate the climate and for operational purposes, including monthly, 
seasonal and interannual climate predictions. {WGI, II, III}
Climate projection
A climate projection is the simulated response of the climate system 
to a scenario of future emission or concentration of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) and aerosols, generally derived using climate models. Climate 
projections are distinguished from climate predictions by their depend-
ence on the emission/concentration/radiative forcing scenario used, 
which is in turn based on assumptions concerning, for example, future 
socio-economic and technological developments that may or may not 
be realized. {WGI, II, III}
Climate-resilient pathways
Iterative processes for managing change within complex systems in 
order to reduce disruptions and enhance opportunities associated with 
climate change. {WGII}
Climate response
See Climate sensitivity. {WGI}
Climate sensitivity




equilibrium (steady state) change in the annual global mean surface 
temperature following a doubling of the atmospheric equivalent carbon 
dioxide (CO2 ) concentration. Owing to computational constraints, the 
equilibrium climate sensitivity in a climate model is sometimes esti-
mated by running an atmospheric general circulation model coupled 
to a mixed-layer ocean model, because equilibrium climate sensitivity 
is largely determined by atmospheric processes. Efficient models can 
be run to equilibrium with a dynamic ocean. The climate sensitivity 
parameter (units: °C (W m–2)–1) refers to the equilibrium change in the 
annual global mean surface temperature following a unit change in 
radiative forcing. 
The effective climate sensitivity (units: °C) is an estimate of the global 
mean surface temperature response to doubled CO2 concentration that 
is evaluated from model output or observations for evolving non-equi-
librium conditions. It is a measure of the strengths of the climate feed-
backs at a particular time and may vary with forcing history and climate 
state and therefore may differ from equilibrium climate sensitivity. 
The transient climate response (units: °C) is the change in the global 
mean surface temperature, averaged over a 20-year period, centered 
at the time of atmospheric CO2 doubling, in a climate model simulation 
in which CO2 increases at 1%/yr. It is a measure of the strength and 
rapidity of the surface temperature response to greenhouse gas (GHG) 
forcing. {WGI, II, III} 
Climate system
The climate system is the highly complex system consisting of five 
major components: the atmosphere, the hydrosphere, the cryosphere, 
the lithosphere and the biosphere and the interactions between them. 
The climate system evolves in time under the influence of its own inter-
nal dynamics and because of external forcings such as volcanic erup-
tions, solar variations and anthropogenic forcings such as the changing 
composition of the atmosphere and land-use change. {WGI, II, III}
Climate variability 
Climate variability refers to variations in the mean state and other sta-
tistics (such as standard deviations, the occurrence of extremes, etc.) of 
the climate on all spatial and temporal scales beyond that of individual 
weather events. Variability may be due to natural internal processes 
within the climate system (internal variability), or to variations in nat-
ural or anthropogenic external forcing (external variability). See also 
Climate change. {WGI, II, III}
CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) concentration 
The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) that would cause the same 
radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO2 and other forcing compo-
nents. Those values may consider only greenhouse gases (GHGs), or a 
combination of GHGs, aerosols and surface albedo change. CO2-equiv-
alent concentration is a metric for comparing radiative forcing of a 
mix of different forcing components at a particular time but does not 
imply equivalence of the corresponding climate change responses nor 
future forcing. There is generally no connection between CO2-equiva-
lent emissions and resulting CO2-equivalent concentrations. {WGI, III} 
CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) emission 
The amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emission that would cause the 
same integrated radiative forcing, over a given time horizon, as an 
emitted amount of a greenhouse gas (GHG) or a mixture of GHGs. The 
CO2-equivalent emission is obtained by multiplying the emission of a 
GHG by its Global Warming Potential (GWP) for the given time horizon 
(see WGI Chapter 8, Table 8.A.1 and WGIII Annex II.9.1 for GWP values 
of the different GHGs used here). For a mix of GHGs it is obtained 
by summing the CO2-equivalent emissions of each gas. CO2-equivalent 
emission is a common scale for comparing emissions of different GHGs 
but does not imply equivalence of the corresponding climate change 
responses. There is generally no connection between CO2-equivalent 
emissions and resulting CO2-equivalent concentrations. {WGI, III}
Co-benefits
The positive effects that a policy or measure aimed at one objective 
might have on other objectives, irrespective of the net effect on overall 
social welfare. Co-benefits are often subject to uncertainty and depend 
on local circumstances and implementation practices, among other 
factors. Co-benefits are also referred to as ancillary benefits. {WGII, III}
Confidence
The validity of a finding based on the type, amount, quality and con-
sistency of evidence (e.g., mechanistic understanding, theory, data, 
models, expert judgment) and on the degree of agreement. In this 
report, confidence is expressed qualitatively (Mastrandrea et al., 2010). 
See WGI AR5 Figure 1.11 for the levels of confidence; see WGI AR5 
Table 1.2 for the list of likelihood qualifiers; see WGII AR5 Box 1-1. See 
also Uncertainty. {WGI, II, III}
Cost-effectiveness
A policy is more cost-effective if it achieves a given policy goal at lower 
cost. Integrated models approximate cost-effective solutions, unless 
they are specifically constrained to behave otherwise. Cost-effective 
mitigation scenarios are those based on a stylized implementation 
approach in which a single price on carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) is applied across the globe in every sector 
of every country and that rises over time in a way that achieves lowest 
global discounted costs. {WGIII}
Decarbonization
The process by which countries or other entities aim to achieve a 
low-carbon economy, or by which individuals aim to reduce their con-
sumption of carbon. {WGII, III}
Deforestation
Conversion of forest to non-forest. For a discussion of the term forest 
and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation and deforesta-
tion, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use Change, and 
Forestry (IPCC, 2000b). See also information provided by the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 2013) 
and the report on Definitions and Methodological Options to Invento-
ry Emissions from Direct Human-induced Degradation of Forests and 
Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 2003). {WGI, II}
Detection and attribution
Detection of change is defined as the process of demonstrating that 
climate or a system affected by climate has changed in some defined 
statistical sense, without providing a reason for that change. An iden-
tified change is detected in observations if its likelihood of occurrence 




for example, <10%. Attribution is defined as the process of evaluat-
ing the relative contributions of multiple causal factors to a change 
or event with an assignment of statistical confidence (Hegerl et al., 
2010). {WGI, II}
Detection of impacts of climate change
For a natural, human or managed system, identification of a change 
from a specified baseline. The baseline characterizes behavior in the 
absence of climate change and may be stationary or non-stationary 
(e.g., due to land-use change). {WGII}
Disaster 
Severe alterations in the normal functioning of a community or a soci-
ety due to hazardous physical events interacting with vulnerable social 
conditions, leading to widespread adverse human, material, economic 
or environmental effects that require immediate emergency response 
to satisfy critical human needs and that may require external support 
for recovery. {WGII}
Discounting
A mathematical operation making monetary (or other) amounts received 
or expended at different times (years) comparable across time. The dis-
counter uses a fixed or possibly time-varying discount rate (>0) from 
year to year that makes future value worth less today. {WGII, III}
Drought
A period of abnormally dry weather long enough to cause a serious 
hydrological imbalance. Drought is a relative term; therefore any dis-
cussion in terms of precipitation deficit must refer to the particular 
precipitation-related activity that is under discussion. For example, 
shortage of precipitation during the growing season impinges on 
crop production or ecosystem function in general (due to soil mois-
ture drought, also termed agricultural drought) and during the runoff 
and percolation season primarily affects water supplies (hydrological 
drought). Storage changes in soil moisture and groundwater are also 
affected by increases in actual evapotranspiration in addition to reduc-
tions in precipitation. A period with an abnormal precipitation deficit is 
defined as a meteorological drought. A megadrought is a very lengthy 
and pervasive drought, lasting much longer than normal, usually a 
decade or more. For the corresponding indices, see WGI AR5 Box 2.4. 
{WGI, II}
Early warning system 
The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and 
meaningful warning information to enable individuals, communities 
and organizations threatened by a hazard to prepare to act promptly 
and appropriately to reduce the possibility of harm or loss4. {WGII}
Earth System Model (ESM)
A coupled atmosphere–ocean general circulation model in which a 
representation of the carbon cycle is included, allowing for interactive 
calculation of atmospheric CO2 or compatible emissions. Additional 
components (e.g., atmospheric chemistry, ice sheets, dynamic vegeta-
tion, nitrogen cycle, but also urban or crop models) may be included. 
See also Climate model. {WGI, II}
Ecosystem
An ecosystem is a functional unit consisting of living organisms, their 
non-living environment and the interactions within and between them. 
The components included in a given ecosystem and its spatial boun- 
daries depend on the purpose for which the ecosystem is defined: in 
some cases they are relatively sharp, while in others they are diffuse. 
Ecosystem boundaries can change over time. Ecosystems are nested 
within other ecosystems and their scale can range from very small to 
the entire biosphere. In the current era, most ecosystems either contain 
people as key organisms, or are influenced by the effects of human 
activities in their environment. {WGI, II, III}
Ecosystem services
Ecological processes or functions having monetary or non-monetary 
value to individuals or society at large. These are frequently classified 
as (1) supporting services such as productivity or biodiversity mainte-
nance, (2) provisioning services such as food, fiber or fish, (3) regulat-
ing services such as climate regulation or carbon sequestration and (4) 
cultural services such as tourism or spiritual and aesthetic apprecia-
tion. {WGII, III}
El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
The term El Niño was initially used to describe a warm-water current 
that periodically flows along the coast of Ecuador and Peru, disrupt-
ing the local fishery. It has since become identified with a basin-wide 
warming of the tropical Pacific Ocean east of the dateline. This oceanic 
event is associated with a fluctuation of a global-scale tropical and 
subtropical surface pressure pattern called the Southern Oscillation. 
This coupled atmosphere–ocean phenomenon, with preferred time 
scales of two to about seven years, is known as the El Niño-Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO). It is often measured by the surface pressure anom-
aly difference between Tahiti and Darwin or the sea surface temper-
atures in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific. During an ENSO 
event, the prevailing trade winds weaken, reducing upwelling and 
altering ocean currents such that the sea surface temperatures warm, 
further weakening the trade winds. This event has a great impact on 
the wind, sea surface temperature and precipitation patterns in the 
tropical Pacific. It has climatic effects throughout the Pacific region and 
in many other parts of the world, through global teleconnections. The 
cold phase of ENSO is called La Niña. For the corresponding indices, see 
WGI AR5 Box 2.5. {WGI, II}
Emission scenario
A plausible representation of the future development of emissions of 
substances that are potentially radiatively active (e.g., greenhouse 
gases (GHGs), aerosols) based on a coherent and internally consist-
ent set of assumptions about driving forces (such as demographic and 
socio-economic development, technological change, energy and land 
use) and their key relationships. Concentration scenarios, derived from 
emission scenarios, are used as input to a climate model to compute 
climate projections. In IPCC (1992) a set of emission scenarios was pre-
sented which were used as a basis for the climate projections in IPCC 
(1996). These emission scenarios are referred to as the IS92 scenarios. 
In the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC, 2000a) emis-
sion scenarios, the so-called SRES scenarios, were published, some of 




which were used, among others, as a basis for the climate projections 
presented in Chapters 9 to 11 of IPCC WGI TAR (IPCC, 2001a) and Chap-
ters 10 and 11 of IPCC WGI AR4 (IPCC, 2007) as well as in the IPCC WGI 
AR5 (IPCC, 2013b). New emission scenarios for climate change, the four 
Representative Concentration Pathways, were developed for, but inde-
pendently of, the present IPCC assessment. See also Baseline/reference, 
Mitigation scenario and Transformation pathway. {WGI, II, III}
Energy access
Access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking 
and heating, lighting, communications and productive uses (AGECC, 
2010). {WGIII}
Energy intensity
The ratio of energy use to economic or physical output. {WGIII}
Energy security 
The goal of a given country, or the global community as a whole, to 
maintain an adequate, stable and predictable energy supply. Measures 
encompass safeguarding the sufficiency of energy resources to meet 
national energy demand at competitive and stable prices and the resil-
ience of the energy supply; enabling development and deployment of 
technologies; building sufficient infrastructure to generate, store and 
transmit energy supplies and ensuring enforceable contracts of deliv-
ery. {WGIII}
Ensemble
A collection of model simulations characterizing a climate prediction 
or projection. Differences in initial conditions and model formulation 
result in different evolutions of the modeled system and may give 
information on uncertainty associated with model error and error in 
initial conditions in the case of climate forecasts and on uncertainty 
associated with model error and with internally generated climate var-
iability in the case of climate projections. {WGI, II}
Equilibrium climate sensitivity
See Climate sensitivity. {WGI}
Eutrophication
Over-enrichment of water by nutrients such as nitrogen and phospho-
rus. It is one of the leading causes of water quality impairment. The 
two most acute symptoms of eutrophication are hypoxia (or oxygen 
depletion) and harmful algal blooms. {WGII}
Exposure
The presence of people, livelihoods, species or ecosystems, environ-
mental functions, services, and resources, infrastructure, or economic, 
social, or cultural assets in places and settings that could be adversely 
affected. {WGII}
External forcing
External forcing refers to a forcing agent outside the climate system 
causing a change in the climate system. Volcanic eruptions, solar var-
iations and anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmos-
phere and land-use change are external forcings. Orbital forcing is also 
an external forcing as the insolation changes with orbital parameters 
eccentricity, tilt and precession of the equinox. {WGI, II}
Extreme weather event
An extreme weather event is an event that is rare at a particular place 
and time of year. Definitions of rare vary, but an extreme weather event 
would normally be as rare as or rarer than the 10th or 90th percentile 
of a probability density function estimated from observations. By defi-
nition, the characteristics of what is called extreme weather may vary 
from place to place in an absolute sense. When a pattern of extreme 
weather persists for some time, such as a season, it may be classed as 
an extreme climate event, especially if it yields an average or total that 
is itself extreme (e.g., drought or heavy rainfall over a season). {WGI, II}
Feedback 
See Climate feedback. {WGI, II}
Flood
The overflowing of the normal confines of a stream or other body 
of water, or the accumulation of water over areas not normally sub-
merged. Floods include river (fluvial) floods, flash floods, urban floods, 
pluvial floods, sewer floods, coastal floods and glacial lake outburst 
floods. {WGII}
Food security
A state that prevails when people have secure access to sufficient 
amounts of safe and nutritious food for normal growth, development 
and an active and healthy life. {WGII, III}
Forest
A vegetation type dominated by trees. Many definitions of the term 
forest are in use throughout the world, reflecting wide differences in 
biogeophysical conditions, social structure and economics. For a dis-
cussion of the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land 
Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b). See also informa-
tion provided by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC, 2013) and the Report on Definitions and Method-
ological Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced 
Degradation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types 
(IPCC, 2003). {WGI, III}
Fuel poverty
A condition in which a household is unable to guarantee a certain level 
of consumption of domestic energy services (especially heating) or suf-
fers disproportionate expenditure burdens to meet these needs. {WGIII}
Geoengineering
Geoengineering refers to a broad set of methods and technologies that 
aim to deliberately alter the climate system in order to alleviate the 
impacts of climate change. Most, but not all, methods seek to either 
(1) reduce the amount of absorbed solar energy in the climate system 
(Solar Radiation Management) or (2) increase net carbon sinks from 
the atmosphere at a scale sufficiently large to alter climate (Carbon 
Dioxide Removal). Scale and intent are of central importance. Two key 
characteristics of geoengineering methods of particular concern are 
that they use or affect the climate system (e.g., atmosphere, land or 
ocean) globally or regionally and/or could have substantive unintend-
ed effects that cross national boundaries. Geoengineering is different 
from weather modification and ecological engineering, but the bound-




Global climate model (also referred to as general circulation 
model, both abbreviated as GCM)
See Climate model. {WGI, II}
Global Temperature change Potential (GTP) 
An index measuring the change in global mean surface temperature at 
a chosen point in time following an emission of a unit mass of a given 
substance, relative to that of the reference substance, carbon dioxide 
(CO2). The Global Temperature change Potential (GTP) thus represents 
the combined effect of the differing times these substances remain in 
the atmosphere, their effectiveness in causing radiative forcing and 
the response of the climate system. The GTP has been defined in two 
different ways: 
•	 Fixed GTP: based on a fixed time horizon in the future (such 
as GTP100 for a time horizon of 100 years) 
•	 Dynamic GTP: based on a target year (such as the year when 
global mean temperature is expected to reach a target level). 
In the dynamic GTP, the time horizon reduces over time as 
the target year is approached and hence the GTP value 
changes for emissions occurring further in the future. {WGI 
Chapter 8} 
Global warming
Global warming refers to the gradual increase, observed or projected, 
in global surface temperature, as one of the consequences of radiative 
forcing caused by anthropogenic emissions. {WGIII}
Global Warming Potential (GWP)
An index measuring the radiative forcing following an emission of a 
unit mass of a given substance, accumulated over a chosen time hori-
zon, relative to that of the reference substance, carbon dioxide (CO2). 
The GWP thus represents the combined effect of the differing times 
these substances remain in the atmosphere and their effectiveness in 
causing radiative forcing. (WGI, III}
Hazard
The potential occurrence of a natural or human-induced physical event 
or trend or physical impact that may cause loss of life, injury, or other 
health impacts, as well as damage and loss to property, infrastructure, 
livelihoods, service provision, ecosystems and environmental resourc-
es. In this report, the term hazard usually refers to climate-related 
physical events or trends or their physical impacts. {WGII}
Heat wave 
A period of abnormally and uncomfortably hot weather. {WGI, II}
Hydrological cycle 
The cycle in which water evaporates from the oceans and the land 
surface, is carried over the Earth in atmospheric circulation as water 
vapour, condenses to form clouds, precipitates over ocean and land as 
rain or snow, which on land can be intercepted by trees and vegeta-
tion, provides runoff on the land surface, infiltrates into soils, recharg-
es groundwater, discharges into streams and ultimately flows out into 
the oceans, from which it will eventually evaporate again. The various 
systems involved in the hydrological cycle are usually referred to as 
hydrological systems. {WGI, II}
Impacts (consequences, outcomes)
Effects on natural and human systems. In this report, the term impacts 
is used primarily to refer to the effects on natural and human systems 
of extreme weather and climate events and of climate change. Impacts 
generally refer to effects on lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems, econ-
omies, societies, cultures, services and infrastructure due to the interac-
tion of climate changes or hazardous climate events occurring within 
a specific time period and the vulnerability of an exposed society or 
system. Impacts are also referred to as consequences and outcomes. 
The impacts of climate change on geophysical systems, including 
floods, droughts and sea level rise, are a subset of impacts called phys-
ical impacts. {WGII}
Indirect emissions
Emissions that are a consequence of the activities within well-defined 
boundaries of, for instance, a region, an economic sector, a compa-
ny or process, but which occur outside the specified boundaries. For 
example, emissions are described as indirect if they relate to the use of 
heat but physically arise outside the boundaries of the heat user, or to 
electricity production but physically arise outside of the boundaries of 
the power supply sector. {WGIII}
Industrial Revolution 
A period of rapid industrial growth with far-reaching social and eco-
nomic consequences, beginning in Britain during the second half of 
the 18th century and spreading to Europe and later to other countries 
including the United States. The invention of the steam engine was an 
important trigger of this development. The industrial revolution marks 
the beginning of a strong increase in the use of fossil fuels and emis-
sion of, in particular, fossil carbon dioxide (CO2). In this report the terms 
pre-industrial and industrial refer, somewhat arbitrarily, to the periods 
before and after 1750, respectively. {WGI, II, III}
Integrated assessment
A method of analysis that combines results and models from the 
physical, biological, economic and social sciences and the interactions 
among these components in a consistent framework to evaluate the 
status and the consequences of environmental change and the policy 
responses to it. See also Integrated models. {WGII, III}
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM)
An integrated approach for sustainably managing coastal areas, taking 
into account all coastal habitats and uses. {WGII}
Integrated models
Integrated models explore the interactions between multiple sectors 
of the economy or components of particular systems, such as the 
energy system. In the context of transformation pathways, they refer to 
models that, at a minimum, include full and disaggregated representa-
tions of the energy system and its linkage to the overall economy that 
will allow for consideration of interactions among different elements 
of that system. Integrated models may also include representations of 
the full economy, land use and land-use change (LUC) and the climate 
system. See also Integrated assessment. {WGIII}
Internal variability 





A perturbed state of a dynamical system is defined as irreversible on a 
given timescale, if the recovery timescale from this state due to natural 
processes is substantially longer than the time it takes for the system to 
reach this perturbed state. In the context of this report, the time scale 
of interest is centennial to millennial. See also Tipping point. {WGI}
Land use and land-use change
Land use refers to the total of arrangements, activities and inputs 
undertaken in a certain land cover type (a set of human actions). The 
term land use is also used in the sense of the social and economic 
purposes for which land is managed (e.g., grazing, timber extraction 
and conservation). In urban settlements it is related to land uses within 
cities and their hinterlands. Urban land use has implications on city 
management, structure and form and thus on energy demand, green-
house gas (GHG) emissions and mobility, among other aspects. {WGI, 
II, III}
Land-use change (LUC)
Land-use change refers to a change in the use or management of 
land by humans, which may lead to a change in land cover. Land 
cover and land-use change may have an impact on the surface 
albedo, evapotranspiration, sources and sinks of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), or other properties of the climate system and may thus give 
rise to radiative forcing and/or other impacts on climate, locally or 
globally. See also the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use 
Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b). 
Indirect land-use change (iLUC)
Indirect land-use change refers to shifts in land use induced by a 
change in the production level of an agricultural product elsewhere, 
often mediated by markets or driven by policies. For example, if 
agricultural land is diverted to fuel production, forest clearance may 
occur elsewhere to replace the former agricultural production. See 
also Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU), Afforesta-
tion, Deforestation and Reforestation. 
Leakage
Phenomena whereby the reduction in emissions (relative to a baseline) 
in a jurisdiction/sector associated with the implementation of mitiga-
tion policy is offset to some degree by an increase outside the juris-
diction/sector through induced changes in consumption, production, 
prices, land use and/or trade across the jurisdictions/sectors. Leakage 
can occur at a number of levels, be it a project, state, province, nation 
or world region. 
In the context of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS), CO2 
leakage refers to the escape of injected carbon dioxide (CO2) from the 
storage location and eventual release to the atmosphere. In the con-
text of other substances, the term is used more generically, such as for 
methane (CH4) leakage (e.g., from fossil fuel extraction activities) and 
hydrofluorocarbon (HFC) leakage (e.g., from refrigeration and air-con-
ditioning systems). {WGIII}
Likelihood
The chance of a specific outcome occurring, where this might be esti-
mated probabilistically. Likelihood is expressed in this report using a 
standard terminology (Mastrandrea et al., 2010), defined in WGI AR5 
Table 1.2 and WGII AR5 Box 1-1. See also Confidence and Uncertainty. 
{WGI, II, III}
Lock-in
Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with a standard even though 
participants would be better off with an alternative. In this report, 
lock-in is used more broadly as path dependence, which is the generic 
situation where decisions, events or outcomes at one point in time 
constrain adaptation, mitigation or other actions or options at a later 
point in time. {WGII, III}
Low regrets policy
A policy that would generate net social and/or economic benefits under 
current climate and a range of future climate change scenarios. {WGII}
Marine-based ice sheet 
An ice sheet containing a substantial region that rests on a bed lying 
below sea level and whose perimeter is in contact with the ocean. The 
best known example is the West Antarctic ice sheet. {WGI}
Meridional Overturning Circulation (MOC)
Meridional (north–south) overturning circulation in the ocean quanti-
fied by zonal (east–west) sums of mass transports in depth or density 
layers. In the North Atlantic, away from the subpolar regions, the MOC 
(which is in principle an observable quantity) is often identified with 
the thermohaline circulation (THC), which is a conceptual and incom-
plete interpretation. It must be borne in mind that the MOC is also 
driven by wind and can also include shallower overturning cells such as 
occur in the upper ocean in the tropics and subtropics, in which warm 
(light) waters moving poleward are transformed to slightly denser 
waters and subducted equatorward at deeper levels. {WGI, II}
Mitigation (of climate change)
A human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs). This report also assesses human interven-
tions to reduce the sources of other substances which may contribute 
directly or indirectly to limiting climate change, including, for example, 
the reduction of particulate matter emissions that can directly alter 
the radiation balance (e.g., black carbon) or measures that control 
emissions of carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, Volatile Organic Com-
pounds and other pollutants that can alter the concentration of tropo-
spheric ozone which has an indirect effect on the climate. {WGI, II, III}
Mitigation scenario
A plausible description of the future that describes how the (studied) 
system responds to the implementation of mitigation policies and 
measures. See also Baseline/reference, Emission scenario, Represent-
ative Concentration Pathways (RCPs), SRES scenarios and Transforma-
tion pathway. {WGIII}
Net negative emissions
A situation of net negative emissions is achieved when, as result of 
human activities, more greenhouse gases (GHGs) are sequestered or 
stored than are released into the atmosphere. {SYR Box 2.2, footnote 
29} 
Ocean acidification




extended period, typically decades or longer, which is caused primarily 
by uptake of carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, but can also 
be caused by other chemical additions or subtractions from the ocean. 
Anthropogenic ocean acidification refers to the component of pH 
reduction that is caused by human activity (IPCC, 2011, p. 37). {WGI, II}
Overshoot pathways
Emissions, concentration or temperature pathways in which the metric 
of interest temporarily exceeds, or overshoots the long-term goal. 
{WGIII}
Oxygen Minimum Zone (OMZ) 
The midwater layer (200–1000 m) in the open ocean in which oxygen 
saturation is the lowest in the ocean. The degree of oxygen depletion 
depends on the largely bacterial consumption of organic matter and 
the distribution of the OMZs is influenced by large-scale ocean circula-
tion. In coastal oceans, OMZs extend to the shelves and may also affect 
benthic ecosystems. {WGII}
Permafrost
Ground (soil or rock and included ice and organic material) that 
remains at or below 0°C for at least two consecutive years. {WGI, II}
pH 
pH is a dimensionless measure of the acidity of water (or any solution) 
given by its concentration of hydrogen ions (H+). pH is measured on 
a logarithmic scale where pH = –log10(H+). Thus, a pH decrease of 1 
unit corresponds to a 10-fold increase in the concentration of H+, or 
acidity. {WGI}
Poverty
Poverty is a complex concept with several definitions stemming from 
different schools of thought. It can refer to material circumstances 
(such as need, pattern of deprivation or limited resources), economic 
conditions (such as standard of living, inequality or economic position) 
and/or social relationships (such as social class, dependency, exclusion, 
lack of basic security or lack of entitlement). {WGII}
Pre-industrial
See Industrial Revolution. {WGI, II, III}
Private costs
Private costs are carried by individuals, companies or other private enti-
ties that undertake an action, whereas social costs include additional-
ly the external costs on the environment and on society as a whole. 
Quantitative estimates of both private and social costs may be incom-
plete, because of difficulties in measuring all relevant effects. {WGIII}
Projection 
A projection is a potential future evolution of a quantity or set of 
quantities, often computed with the aid of a model. Unlike predictions, 
projections are conditional on assumptions concerning, for example, 
future socio-economic and technological developments that may or 
may not be realized. See also Climate projection. {WGI, II}
Radiative forcing
The strength of drivers is quantified as Radiative Forcing (RF) in units 
watts per square meter (W/m2) as in previous IPCC assessments. RF is 
the change in energy flux caused by a driver and is calculated at the 
tropopause or at the top of the atmosphere. {WGI}
Reasons For Concern (RFCs)
Elements of a classification framework, first developed in the IPCC 
Third Assessment Report (IPCC, 2001b), which aims to facilitate judg-
ments about what level of climate change may be dangerous (in the 
language of Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC)) by aggregating impacts, risks and vulner-
abilities. {WGII}
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD)
An effort to create financial value for the carbon stored in forests, 
offering incentives for developing countries to reduce emissions from 
forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to sustainable devel-
opment (SD). It is therefore a mechanism for mitigation that results 
from avoiding deforestation. REDD+ goes beyond reforestation and 
forest degradation and includes the role of conservation, sustainable 
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. The 
concept was first introduced in 2005 in the 11th Session of the Con-
ference of the Parties (COP) in Montreal and later given greater recog-
nition in the 13th Session of the COP in 2007 at Bali and inclusion in 
the Bali Action Plan which called for ‘policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD) and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stock in developing countries’. Since then, support for 
REDD has increased and has slowly become a framework for action 
supported by a number of countries. {WGIII}
Reforestation 
Planting of forests on lands that have previously contained forests 
but that have been converted to some other use. For a discussion of 
the term forest and related terms such as afforestation, reforestation 
and deforestation, see the IPCC Special Report on Land Use, Land-Use 
Change, and Forestry (IPCC, 2000b). See also information provided 
by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC, 2013). See also the Report on Definitions and Methodolog-
ical Options to Inventory Emissions from Direct Human-induced Deg-
radation of Forests and Devegetation of Other Vegetation Types (IPCC, 
2003). {WGI, II, III}
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)
Scenarios that include time series of emissions and concentrations of 
the full suite of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and aerosols and chemically 
active gases, as well as land use/land cover (Moss et al., 2008). The 
word representative signifies that each RCP provides only one of many 
possible scenarios that would lead to the specific radiative forcing 
characteristics. The term pathway emphasizes that not only the long-
term concentration levels are of interest, but also the trajectory taken 
over time to reach that outcome (Moss et al., 2010). 
RCPs usually refer to the portion of the concentration pathway extend-
ing up to 2100, for which Integrated Assessment Models produced 
corresponding emission scenarios. Extended Concentration Pathways 
(ECPs) describe extensions of the RCPs from 2100 to 2500 that were 




and do not represent fully consistent scenarios.
Four RCPs produced from Integrated Assessment Models were selected 
from the published literature and are used in the present IPCC Assess-
ment as a basis for the climate predictions and projections presented 
in WGI AR5 Chapters 11 to 14 (IPCC, 2013b):
RCP2.6  
One pathway where radiative forcing peaks at approximately 3 W/
m2 before 2100 and then declines (the corresponding ECP assuming 
constant emissions after 2100). 
RCP4.5 and RCP6.0 
Two intermediate stabilization pathways in which radiative forcing 
is stabilized at approximately 4.5 W/m2 and 6.0 W/m2 after 2100 
(the corresponding ECPs assuming constant concentrations after 
2150).
RCP8.5 
One high pathway for which radiative forcing reaches >8.5 W/m2 
by 2100 and continues to rise for some amount of time (the corre-
sponding ECP assuming constant emissions after 2100 and con-
stant concentrations after 2250).
For further description of future scenarios, see WGI AR5 Box 1.1. See 
also van Vuuren et al., 2011. {WGI, II, III}
Resilience
The capacity of social, economic and environmental systems to cope 
with a hazardous event or trend or disturbance, responding or reor-
ganizing in ways that maintain their essential function, identity and 
structure, while also maintaining the capacity for adaptation, learning 
and transformation5. {WGII, III}
Risk
The potential for consequences where something of value is at stake 
and where the outcome is uncertain, recognizing the diversity of values. 
Risk is often represented as probability or likelihood of occurrence of 
hazardous events or trends multiplied by the impacts if these events 
or trends occur. In this report, the term risk is often used to refer to the 
potential, when the outcome is uncertain, for adverse consequences on 
lives, livelihoods, health, ecosystems and species, economic, social and 
cultural assets, services (including environmental services) and infra-
structure. {WGII, III}
Risk management
The plans, actions or policies to reduce the likelihood and/or conse-
quences of risks or to respond to consequences. {WGII}
Sequestration
The uptake (i.e., the addition of a substance of concern to a reservoir) 
of carbon containing substances, in particular carbon dioxide (CO2), in 
terrestrial or marine reservoirs. Biological sequestration includes direct 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere through land-use change (LUC), 
afforestation, reforestation, revegetation, carbon storage in landfills 
and practices that enhance soil carbon in agriculture (cropland man-
agement, grazing land management). In parts of the literature, but not 
in this report, (carbon) sequestration is used to refer to Carbon Dioxide 
Capture and Storage (CCS). {WGIII}
 
Sink
Any process, activity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas 
(GHG), an aerosol or a precursor of a GHG or aerosol from the atmos-
phere. {WGI, II, III}
Social cost of carbon
The net present value of climate damages (with harmful damages 
expressed as a positive number) from one more tonne of carbon in 
the form of carbon dioxide (CO2), conditional on a global emissions 
trajectory over time. {WGII, III}
Social costs 
See Private costs. {WGIII}
Solar Radiation Management (SRM)
Solar Radiation Management refers to the intentional modification of 
the Earth’s shortwave radiative budget with the aim to reduce climate 
change according to a given metric (e.g., surface temperature, pre-
cipitation, regional impacts, etc.). Artificial injection of stratospheric 
aerosols and cloud brightening are two examples of SRM techniques. 
Methods to modify some fast-responding elements of the long wave 
radiative budget (such as cirrus clouds), although not strictly speaking 
SRM, can be related to SRM. SRM techniques do not fall within the 
usual definitions of mitigation and adaptation (IPCC, 2012b, p. 2). See 
also Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) and Geoengineering. {WGI, III}
SRES scenarios
SRES scenarios are emission scenarios developed by IPCC (2000a) and 
used, among others, as a basis for some of the climate projections 
shown in Chapters 9 to 11 of IPCC WGI TAR (IPCC, 2001a), Chapters 10 
and 11 of IPCC WGI AR4 (IPCC, 2007), as well as in the IPCC WGI AR5 
(IPCC, 2013b). {WGI, II, III}
Storm surge 
The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the height of the sea 
due to extreme meteorological conditions (low atmospheric pressure 
and/or strong winds). The storm surge is defined as being the excess 
above the level expected from the tidal variation alone at that time 
and place. {WGI, II}
Structural change
Changes, for example, in the relative share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) produced by the industrial, agricultural, or services sectors of an 
economy, or more generally, systems transformations whereby some 
components are either replaced or potentially substituted by other 
components. {WGIII}
Sustainability
A dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of natural and 
human systems in an equitable manner. {WGII, III}





Development that meets the needs of the present without compromis-
ing the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED, 
1987). {WGII, III}
Thermal expansion 
In connection with sea level, this refers to the increase in volume (and 
decrease in density) that results from warming water. A warming of 
the ocean leads to an expansion of the ocean volume and hence an 
increase in sea level. {WGI, II}
Tipping point
A level of change in system properties beyond which a system reorgan-
izes, often abruptly, and does not return to the initial state even if the 
drivers of the change are abated. For the climate system, it refers to a 
critical threshold when global or regional climate changes from one 
stable state to another stable state. The tipping point event may be 
irreversible. See also Irreversibility. {WGI, II, III}
Transformation
A change in the fundamental attributes of natural and human systems. 
{WGII}
Transformation pathway
The trajectory taken over time to meet different goals for greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, atmospheric concentrations, or global mean sur-
face temperature change that implies a set of economic, technologi-
cal and behavioural changes. This can encompass changes in the way 
energy and infrastructure are used and produced, natural resources 
are managed and institutions are set up and in the pace and direction 
of technological change (TC). See also Baseline/reference, Emission 
scenario, Mitigation scenario, Representative Concentration Pathways 
(RCPs) and SRES scenarios. {WGIII}
Transient Climate Response to Cumulative CO2 Emissions (TCRE)
The transient global average surface temperature change per unit 
cumulated CO2 emissions, usually 1000 PgC. TCRE combines both 
information on the airborne fraction of cumulated CO2 emissions (the 
fraction of the total CO2 emitted that remains in the atmosphere) and 
on the transient climate response (TCR). {WGI}
 
Uncertainty
A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of infor-
mation or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. 
It may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the data to 
ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projec-
tions of human behaviour. Uncertainty can therefore be represented by 
quantitative measures (e.g., a probability density function) or by qual-
itative statements (e.g., reflecting the judgment of a team of experts) 
(see Moss and Schneider, 2000; Manning et al., 2004; Mastrandrea et 
al., 2010). See also Confidence and Likelihood. {WGI, II, III}
Vulnerability
The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability 
encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity 
or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt. {WGII}
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Annex III Acronyms, Chemical Symbols and Scientific Units
μatm  Microatmosphere
AFOLU  Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use
AMOC  Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation
AR4 Fourth Assessment Report
AR5  Fifth Assessment Report
BAT  Best Available Technique
BAU  Business As Usual
BECCS  Bioenergy with Carbon Dioxide  
 Capture and Storage
CCS  Carbon Capture and Storage
CDM  Clean Development Mechanism 
 
CDR  Carbon Dioxide Removal
CF4  Perfluoromethane
CH4  Methane
CHP  Combined Heat and Power
CMIP5  Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5
CO2  Carbon Dioxide
CO2-eq  Carbon Dioxide Equivalent 
 
CSP  Concentrating Solar Power 
 
DC  Developing Country
ECS  Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity
EDGAR  Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research
EJ  Exajoule
EMIC  Earth System Model of Intermediate Complexity 
 
ENSO  El Niño-Southern Oscillation
ES Executive Summary  
 
ESM  Earth System Model
ETS  Emissions Trading System
F-gases  Fluorinated gases
FAQ  Frequently Asked Question
FAR  First Assessment Report 
FIT  Feed-in Tariff 
 
FOLU  Forestry and Other Land Use
GCM  Global Climate Model 
 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
GHG  Greenhouse Gas
GMI  Global Methane Initiative
Gt  Gigatonnes
GTP  Global Temperature change Potential 
 
GWP  Global Warming Potential
H2  Hydrogen
HadCRUT4  Hadley Centre Climatic Research    
 Unit  Gridded Surface Temperature Data  Set 4
HDV  Heavy-Duty Vehicles
HFC  Hydrofluorocarbon  
 
HFC-152a  Hydrofluorocarbon-152a, 
 Difluoroethane
IAM  Integrated Assessment Model
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO  International Maritime Organization
IO  International Organization
LDV  Light-Duty Vehicles 
LULUCF  Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
MAGICC  Model for the Assessment of    
 Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change
MEF  Major Economies Forum
MRV  Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
N2O  Nitrous Oxide
NAMA  Nationally Appropriate Mitigation  Action
NAP  National Adaptation Plan 
 
NAPA  National Adaptation Programmes of Action 
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NGO  Non-Governmental Organization 
O2  Oxygen
OA  Ocean Acidification
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation  
 and Development 
 
PFC  Perfluorocarbon
ppb  parts per billion
ppm  parts per million
PV  Photovoltaic
R&D  Research and Development
RCP  Representative Concentration Pathway
RE  Renewable Energy
REDD Reducing  Emissions from Deforestation  
 and Forest Degradation
REEEP  Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership
RES  Renewable Energy System
RFC  Reason For Concern
RPS  Renewable Portfolio Standard 
SAR  Second Assessment Report
SM  Supplementary Material
SO2  Sulfur Dioxide
SPM  Summary for Policymakers
SRES  Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
SREX  Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme  
 Events and Disasters to Advance  
 Climate Change Adaptation
SRM  Solar Radiation Management
SRREN  Special Report on Renewable Energy  
 Sources and Climate Change Mitigation
SYR  Synthesis Report
TCR  Transient Climate Response
TCRE  Transient Climate Response to Cumulative  
 CO2 Emissions
TFE  Thematic Focus Element
TS  Technical Summary
UHI  Urban Heat Island 
 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework  
 Convention on Climate Change
W  Watt
WG  Working Group
WMGHG  Well-Mixed Greenhouse Gas
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 See also Emissions
Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR)*, 21, 23, 24, 81, 
82, 89
Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS)*, 22, 
24, 25, 28, 82, 85, 109, 110
Carbon price*, 24, 25, 30, 106, 107, 108, 109
Carbon sequestration, 31, 101, 112
Carbon sinks*, 20, 28, 45, 67, 81, 98
Cascading impacts, 51, 52
Causes. See Detection and attribution
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 See also Climate finance
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Decarbonization*, 5, 78, 81, 98, 99-100
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 management, 27, 29, 96, 97
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Emissions
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 economic assessment and, 30, 79, 85, 86
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 metrics for, 23, 87-88
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 observed changes, 2, 3, 4-5, 5, 44, 44, 45-47, 
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 projections( See Emissions scenarios)
 reductions, 8, 17-19, 18, 20-24, 28, 30, 56, 76, 86, 
98-100, 99-101
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24, 28, 56, 63, 77-78, 81, 110
 relationship with climate changes, 3, 4, 17, 18, 86
 by specific gases, 5, 46
 temperature (warming) and, 8-10, 9, 18-19, 18, 
20-24, 56, 58, 62-63, 81-86, 83
Emissions scenarios*, 8, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 21-24, 
28, 28, 60-61, 63-64, 74, 81-86, 82-86
 baseline*, 8, 20, 21, 22, 24, 24, 28, 28, 82, 85, 99, 
110
 climate change risks and, 8, 18-19, 18, 73-74
 mitigation pathways and, 18, 20-23, 21-23, 78, 
81-86, 98-100, 99-101
 overshoot scenarios*, 20-23, 22, 81, 83, 89
 overview of, 21-23, 83, 83
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63-64, 74, 74
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 sea-level rise and, 16
 specific sectors and gases, 28, 46, 47, 99, 99
 SRES scenarios, 57, 58
 standard set of, 56-58, 57
 temperature and, 8-10, 9, 16, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 
22, 62-63, 81
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Energy demand, 29, 99-100
Energy efficiency, 30, 81, 110
Energy intensity, 47, 47, 94, 98-99
Energy price. See Carbon price
Energy production, 28, 28, 30, 31, 81, 99-100, 
100-101, 103, 110
 decarbonizing of, 28, 98, 99-100
 low-carbon energy, 21, 23, 28, 30, 82, 84, 85, 94, 
100, 100, 110
 policy instruments, 108
Equity, 17, 76-77, 89, 90, 95, 109
Exposure*, 8, 13, 16, 20, 36, 53, 54, 58, 64, 76, 96
 reduction of, 19, 27, 80
Extinction risk, 13, 19, 51, 65, 67
Extreme weather events*, 7-8, 53
 economic losses from, 53
 human influences, 8, 53
 observed changes, 7-8, 53
 precipitation, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 53, 58, 60
 projections, 10, 11, 58
 as Reason for Concern, 18, 18, 72-73, 78
 risks due to, 19, 65
 sea level, 7, 8, 53
 temperature, 7-8, 10, 53, 60
F
Finance, 29, 30-31, 95, 95, 97, 102, 107, 109-110, 
110-111
 funding gap, 31, 111
Fisheries, 13, 15, 67, 68, 97
Floods*, 8, 15, 53, 67
Food production, 15, 16, 67, 68-69, 69, 97
Food security*, 13, 16, 19, 64, 65, 69, 109
Forests*, 29, 52, 67, 81, 102
 afforestation*, 28, 29, 81, 82-83, 102
 deforestation*, 28, 29, 67, 83, 102
Future changes, risks, and impacts, 8-16, 56-74
 See also Projected changes
Future pathways, 17-26, 76-91
 adaptation pathways, 19-20, 79-81
 decision making and, 17, 19, 76-77, 107
 mitigation pathways, 20-26, 81-86
G
Geoengineering*, 89
Glaciers, 5, 48, 56
 observed changes, 5, 42, 48
 projected changes, 12, 62
Global aggregate impacts, 18, 18, 72-73, 73, 78
Global Temperature change Potential (GTP)*, 
87-88
Global Warming Potential (GWP)*, 87-88
Governments/governance, 17, 26, 29-30, 31, 89, 
112
 adaptation and, 19, 26, 54, 80, 94, 95, 106, 107
 See also Policies
Greenhouse gas emissions. See Emissions
Greenland ice sheet, 5, 48
 observed changes, 4, 5, 42, 48
 projected changes, 16, 74
H
Heat waves*, 7-8, 10, 53, 58, 60, 69
Human health, 13, 15, 31, 51, 65, 69, 97, 109
Human security, 16, 54, 64, 77, 97
Humans
 anthropogenic forcings, 5, 6, 44-47, 45, 48, 48
 anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, 3, 4-5, 
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 projected losses, 16, 74
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 exposure and vulnerability and, 58, 58
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 future, 8-16, 56-74
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 models of, 58, 58
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 risk reduction for, 65, 65
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Migration
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Mitigation pathways, 17-26, 76-91, 98-100, 
99-101
 characteristics of, 20-26, 81-86
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Models. See Climate models
N
National governments, 19, 29, 30, 80, 106-109
O
Observed changes, 2-8, 40-54
 in climate system, 2-4, 3, 12, 40-44, 41-43, 47, 
49-51, 50-52
 in emissions, 2, 3, 4-5, 5, 44, 44, 44-48, 45-47, 
45-47, 54
 extreme events, 7-8, 53
 human influence and, 2, 5
 impacts of, 6, 7, 49-51, 50-52
 in temperature, 2-4, 3, 5, 7-8, 12, 40, 41, 43, 47, 
49, 61
Ocean, 40-41, 60-62, 97
 cascading impacts in, 52
 energy accumulation in, 4, 42
 heat content, 5, 45, 48, 49
 modeling, 56
 observed changes, 2, 3, 4, 5, 40-41, 41, 42
 oxygen content, 13, 41, 51, 62
 projected changes, 10, 11, 16, 60-62, 67
 salinity of, 4, 40, 48
 thermal expansion, 42, 48, 56
 warming of, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 40, 41, 45, 47-48, 
49, 58, 60, 67
Ocean acidification*
 impacts of, 51, 67, 74
 observed increase, 4, 40-41, 45, 48
 projections, 10, 12, 16, 58, 59, 62, 66, 74
 risks associated, 13, 65, 66, 67
 timescale of, 16, 74
Overshoot scenarios*, 20-23, 22, 81, 83, 89
P
Permafrost*, 4, 12, 16, 42, 62, 74
Policies, 17, 29-31, 91, 94, 102-111
 for adaptation, mitigation, technology, and 
finance, 26, 29-31, 81, 94, 95, 96, 102-111
 assessing, 76
 decision making and, 17, 19, 29, 76-77, 107
 emission metrics and, 87-88
 sectoral instruments, 30, 107, 108
 sustainable development and, 90, 91
Population growth, 4, 8, 20, 44, 46-47, 47, 56, 81
Poverty*, 16, 17, 27, 31, 54, 73, 76, 90, 96
Precipitation
 extreme events, 7, 8, 10, 11, 15, 53, 58, 60
 observed changes, 4, 8, 12, 40, 41, 48, 51, 53, 61
 projected changes, 11, 12, 60, 61
Private sector, 19, 29, 30, 80, 95, 97, 106, 107, 111
Projected changes, 10-13, 11, 56-74
 basis for (models), 56, 58
 in climate system, 10-13, 16, 56, 58-64, 59-61, 
63-64
 confidence and uncertainty in, 56
 ecosystems and services, 66, 67
 emissions scenarios and, 8, 9, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 
21-24, 28, 28, 56, 57, 60-61, 63-64, 74, 81-86, 
82-86
 relative to 1986—2005, 10, 58
 See also Temperature projections
R
Radiative forcing*, 5, 6, 43, 44, 45, 48, 48
Range shifts of species, 6, 13, 51, 67
Reasons for Concern*, 18, 18, 72-73, 77-78, 78
Regions
 adaptation experience, 106, 106
 impacts, 7, 50-51
 irreversible changes, 16
 key risks, 13, 14, 65, 65
 mitigation initiatives, 106
 temperature data, 49
Renewable energy, 22, 28, 30, 110
Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs)*, 
8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 22, 56-62, 59-61, 63-64, 74, 
74
 description of, 57
Resilience*, 31, 94






Risk*, 8-16, 36, 56-74
 of adaptation, 17, 76, 91
 causes of, 58, 64
 from climate change, 13-16, 17-19, 18, 31, 36, 
64-73, 66, 76-79, 78
 estimating, 58
 future, 8-16, 56-74
 of geoengineering, 89
 with high temperatures, 15, 16, 18, 66, 73-74, 77, 
78
 key risks, 14, 64-65, 65, 70-73
 of mitigation, 17, 19, 30, 76, 78-79, 91, 102, 
103-104, 107, 109
 models of, 58, 58
 new risks, due to climate change, 13, 64
 perception of, 17, 19, 77
 quantification of, 36, 58, 79
 Reason for Concern and, 18, 18, 72-73, 77-78, 78
 region-specific, 13, 14, 65
 unavoidable, 19
 uneven distribution of, 13, 64
Risk management/reduction*, 8, 13, 14, 17-19, 
36, 65
 adaptation and mitigation and, 14, 17-19, 17-25, 
18, 26, 65-67, 65, 70-71, 76, 77-79, 79, 94, 108
 substantial emissions reductions, 19, 20, 77-78, 
81
 See also Disaster risk management
Rural areas, 16, 65, 69, 97
S
Scenarios, 17-26, 56-58, 81-86, 82-86
 emissions, 8, 9, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 21-24, 28, 28, 
60-61, 63-64, 74, 81-86, 82-86
 overshoot*, 20-23, 22, 81, 83, 89
 RCPs, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21, 22, 56-62, 57, 59-61, 
63-64, 74, 74
 SRES, 57, 58
 See also Emissions scenarios
Sea ice
 anthropogenic influences on, 5, 48, 49
 Arctic, 4, 5, 12, 41, 42, 48, 49, 62, 74
 observed changes, 4, 5, 41, 42, 48, 49
 projected changes, 12, 59, 62
Sea level
 extremes, 7, 8, 53
 observed changes, 2, 3, 42-44, 61
 thermal expansion and, 42, 48, 56
Sea level rise
 anthropogenic influences on, 5, 48
 contributions to, 42, 44, 74
 observed, 2, 3, 4, 5, 41, 42-44, 48
 projected, 10, 11, 13, 16, 58, 59-61, 62, 74, 74
 risks associated with, 65, 65, 66, 67, 74
 timescale of, 16, 74
 variability in, 13, 62
Seasonal activities, 6, 51
Sectors, 97, 98
 adaptation options, 95-97, 98
 GHG emissions by, 28, 46, 47, 88, 99, 99, 101
 key risks, 65, 70-71
 mitigation options, 28, 98-99, 99, 101
 policy instruments, 30, 107, 108
Snow cover, 2, 4, 42, 47, 48, 51, 62
Solar irradiance, 10, 44, 58
Solar radiation management (SRM)*, 25-26, 89
Species extinctions. See Extinction risk
Species range shifts. See Range shifts
SRES scenarios*, 57, 58
Subsidies, 30, 107-109, 108
Sustainable development*, 17, 31, 76-77
 adaptation and mitigation and, 17, 19, 31, 76, 79
 climate change as threat to, 31, 90
 climate policy and, 31, 76, 90, 91
 equity and, 17, 76-77, 109
 future pathways, 17-26, 76-91
 trade-offs, synergies and interactions, 31, 80-81, 
90, 112
 transformations and, 20, 80
Synergies, 19, 20, 26, 31, 80-81, 90, 109, 112
T
Technology, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 81, 85, 94, 95, 95, 
100
 policies and, 29, 30, 102, 109
Temperature
 emissions and, 8-10, 9, 16, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 22, 
56, 58, 62-63, 63-64, 78, 83
 extremes, 7-8, 10, 53, 60
 global mean surface temperature, 9, 10, 20, 
58-60, 59-61
 Global Temperature change Potential (GTP), 87-88
 human influence on, 4, 5, 8, 9, 44, 47-48, 48, 63, 
63-64
 mortality associated with, 8, 51, 53
 observed changes, 2-4, 3, 5, 7-8, 12, 40, 41, 43, 
49, 61
 observed changes, contributions to, 48, 48
 observed regional changes, 49
 recent trends, 43, 48
 risks from high temperatures, 15, 16, 18, 66, 
73-74, 77, 78
 timescale of changes, 62-63, 73-74
 variability in, 2-4, 3, 40, 41, 43
 See also Warming
Temperature projections, 8-10, 9, 11-12, 16, 20-24, 
56, 58-60, 59-61, 63-64, 73-74, 74, 83
 in discontinuance of SRM, 26
 global mean peak surface temperature change, 62
 mitigation and, 20-25, 21-23, 81
 warming to 2°C above pre-industrial, 8-10, 11, 19, 
20, 22, 23-24, 60, 60, 62, 63, 74, 77, 81-82, 83, 85
 warming to above 2°C above pre-industrial, 10, 
11, 19, 20-21, 22, 24, 60, 60, 74, 77, 81-82, 83
 See also Emissions scenarios
Thermal expansion*, 42, 48, 56
Timescales of climate change and impacts, 13, 
62-63, 73-74, 77
Trade-offs, 20, 26, 31, 80-81, 90, 95, 98, 98, 112
Transformation*, 20, 27, 76, 80, 96
U
Uncertainty*, 17, 20, 36, 37, 56
 See also Confidence
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change), 2, 18, 29, 36, 102, 105
Unique and threatened systems, 18, 18, 19, 65, 
72-73, 78
Urban areas, 15, 31, 69, 97, 112
V
Values and valuation, 17, 19, 23, 36, 76-77, 96
Violent conflicts, 16, 54, 77
Volcanic aerosols, 10, 43, 44, 56
Vulnerability*, 8, 13, 26, 36, 53, 54, 94, 96
 estimating and models, 58
 reduction of, 19, 27, 80
 risks and, 58, 58, 64, 76
W
Warming
 of climate system, 2-4, 3, 8, 9, 40-44, 43, 47, 48, 
49, 62-63
 CO2 emissions and, 3, 8-10, 9, 18-19, 18, 20-24, 
21, 56, 62-63, 63, 64, 78
 feedbacks and, 62
 human contribution to, 4, 5, 8, 9, 44, 47-48, 48, 
63, 63-64
 irreversibility of, 62-63
 of ocean, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 40, 41, 45, 47-48, 49, 
58, 60, 65, 67
 projections of, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 20-21, 22, 56, 
58-60, 59-61, 63, 74
 risks in high warming scenarios, 66, 73-74, 77, 78
 timescales of, 16, 20, 62-63, 73-74
 without additional mitigation, 17, 18-19, 18, 77, 
81
 See also Temperature
Water
 management, 27, 31, 96, 97, 98
 resources and quality, 13, 16, 20, 51, 69, 97, 98
 security, 13, 67-69
Water cycle, 4, 5, 47, 48, 60 In
de
x

